More progress has been made on the Iran nuclear issue during the thirty hours of talks in Geneva than over the past 30 years, said Thomas Pickering, an expert on Iran and a member of the Iran Project, though Mr. Pickering said there are three issues that need to be overcome. “My sense is that the inter-relationship between these three issues…are things that can be worked out.”

“I think that they’re within reach of sealing the deal,” he said, and that “both sides are handling this in a serious way, in a way that indicates a genuine commitment to try to find an answer, even if they weren’t able to do it on the first talks.”

In this interview, Mr. Pickering goes into depth on the three issues currently at play in the deal, which revolve around what to do about the stockpile that Iran has built up of material enriched to 20 percent; the heavy water reactor at Arak; and how much sanctions relief to provide.

About the stockpile, he said that moving it entirely out of Iran is a “highly desirable objective, but a not possible one to achieve,” but that close IAEA monitoring and the strong interest on the part of Iran in keeping that stockpile below 200 kilograms, “are all very useful questions to be part of the mix of a deal, particularly if the deal is for six months or somewhat longer term.”

On Arak, he said it’s very unlikely that it would be finished in the next six months, so, he said, “it seems to me that’s a very important issue for the future, but not for the interim period.”

“Iran does not yet have a plant or a facility, nor is it apparently working on one, where it would, in an industrial way, separate plutonium from spent fuel. It might be able to use laboratories, but here again, the IAEA is fully engaged in monitoring those activities and would be, were that plant to start,” he said.

About sanctions, he said if the dispute is with Israel and others over the degree of sanctions relief, “maybe it is better at this stage to start with a small agreement with little sanctions relief and in no way which touches the structure of sanctions, which, of course, people are concerned about because they don’t see that structure as easily reversible.” 

“My own view is the present effort on sanctions is perfectly acceptable. It could be expanded without, in my view, injuring the capacity on the part of the P5+1 and others, should the Iranians fail to carry out their side of the deal, once again to increase sanctions pressure, because the basic structure remains in place.”

Mr. Pickering said that it looks as if the negotiations now are centered on a short-term agreement, which “sets the stage for a broader agreement or agreements leading to a satisfactory conclusion with respect to the totality of Iran’s civil nuclear program,” though it could feed into US and Israeli fears that Iran could “breakout” and develop a weapon.

“So, none of this is chiseled in stone, but it seems to me we’re as close to finding an answer for a first-step agreement with Iran as we have ever been in the history of the negotiations on this nuclear subject, and it would be very important for the parties to make the kind of sustained and continued and serious effort that they had begun with,” he said.

“I think there’s no historical precedent which is exactly like this,” he said.

The interview was conducted by Marie O’Reilly, associate editor at the International Peace Institute.

Interview

Marie O’Reilly: Today I’m speaking with Ambassador Thomas Pickering, who served as a US diplomat for five decades including as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; Ambassador to the United Nations; and Ambassador to Russia, India Israel, Nigeria, Jordan, and El Salvador. Today, he is a member of the Iran Project which is dedicated to improving the relationship between the US and Iranian governments. 

Ambassador, nuclear talks resumed this week in Geneva between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Last week, negotiators came very close to reaching an agreement. Why couldn’t they seal the deal?

Thomas Pickering: I think that they’re within reach of sealing the deal. There are apparently three issues that seem at the moment to stand in the way of actually making that happen. One of those has to do with what to do with the stockpile that Iran has built up of material enriched to 20 percent. Less than 200 kilograms of this stockpile, according to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the Iranians, is in a form that could be readily upgraded. The rest of it has been moved to a metallic form which is harder to reverse, and therefore provides some kind of safeguard. 

There are requests that that stockpile be moved entirely out of Iran. I think that that would be a highly desirable objective, but a not possible one to achieve, but I do think the close IAEA monitoring; the strong interest on the part of Iran in keeping that stockpile below 200 kilograms, which means, in fact, that it is not sufficiently large enough to be upgraded to a single nuclear weapon, are all very useful questions to be part of the mix of a deal, particularly if the deal is for six months or somewhat longer term. 

The second question that’s out there is the question of what to do about the heavy water reactor at Arak. There is a dispute here as to whether it should be shut down, or whether for the next six months, the kind of slow-work progress on it might continue. It’s fairly clear to experts that the reactor is not likely to be finished in the next six months, period. And it’s only when the reactor is finished that it will have a chance to start to burn fuel, which over a period of time would leave, as a residue in that fuel, plutonium. Iran does not yet have a plant or a facility, nor is it apparently working on one, where it would, in an industrial way, separate plutonium from spent fuel. It might be able to use laboratories, but here again, the IAEA is fully engaged in monitoring those activities and would be, were that plant to start. So, it seems to me that’s a very important issue for the future, but not for the interim period. 

Finally, there’s the question of the quality of sanctions relief. Some have asserted that the quality of sanctions relief will result in the relinquishment of sanctions control over up to fifty billion dollars of Iranian money. The US says it’s about ten billion dollars. Obviously, if we wish to go further on the agreement and cover the two issues I just discussed, the Iranians are going to—quite rightly, in my view—ask for a larger share of sanctions relief. 

And if the dispute is with Israel and others over the degree of sanctions relief, maybe it is better at this stage to start with a small agreement with little sanctions relief and in no way which touches the structure of sanctions, which, of course, people are concerned about because they don’t see that structure as easily reversible. 

My sense is that the inter-relationship between these three issues—how much sanctions relief can be put on the table, and how far the P5+1 want to extend restrictions on Arak and on the supply for the stockpile of 20 percent material—are the things that can be worked out. I think that if you want more on one, you have to be prepared to give more on the other. I don’t think there is a relationship here in which you can only get what you want and not provide additional relief on the sanctions. 

MOR: On Sunday, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the deal currently under discussion would allow Iran to produce fissile material necessary for a nuclear bomb in three weeks. Is that your understanding of the situation?

TP: I’m not sure that I would know what he’s talking about. This deal stops enrichment at 20 percent, which means that the enrichment level that Iran is permitted to exercise is below five percent. And therefore, Iran would not be permitted under this deal to do high-level enrichment. 

If the Prime Minister were talking about the time it would take Iran to upgrade the material it currently has to a quantity of fissile material sufficient for nuclear weapons, people have estimated that as short as two months. But, that means you just have the fissile material. There are others who believe it would take more months, and perhaps even a longer period of time, particularly to fashion that material into a deliverable weapon, particularly if it were going to be delivered by missiles which require much more sophistication, if I could put it that way, in the fabrication formulation of the weapon because of size constraints, among other things. 

And this is important, because if we’re talking only about having a sufficient amount of fissile material for one weapon—and no state that’s gone nuclear has ever, in fact, announced and tested it’s material at a one-weapon range—that, too, would be a different consideration. 

So, I think that’s this is a… put it this way, very worst-case estimate, when everything else is broken down, and when people are not prepared, as the president of the United States has said he is fully prepared to do something, if Iran were to try to break out and go for a nuclear weapon. 

Finally, Iranians keep saying that they are not interested in going for nuclear weapons. They have had talks with the IAEA, which have not been perfect, but they have been making progress over how and in what way to clean up the checkered record of the past, when it appeared as if the Iranians up until 2003 were doing things consistent with an interest in a nuclear weapon. And that, too, ought to be settled as part of this particular set of negotiations. 

It looks as if the negotiations now are centered on a short-term agreement, which increases the amount of time it would require Iran to do a break out, which is what Prime Minister Netanyahu and indeed the United States has been worried about on the one hand, but secondly, sets the stage for a broader agreement or agreements leading to a satisfactory conclusion with respect to the totality of Iran’s civil nuclear program. 

MOR: The US is under a lot of pressure at home as well as abroad not to lift sanctions on Iran, and even to impose additional sanctions. So, coming back to this question you mentioned earlier, how do you see the P5+1 negotiating team overcoming this opposition to lifting sanctions?

TP: They will have to decide what they believe is adequate among themselves. Either they are prepared to go, as apparently the news reports indicate the French insisted upon, further in shutting down the Arak reactor sooner, or doing something more substantial in exporting the 20 percent stockpile material, for which they will have to decide to pay more sanctions, in my view. I don’t think the Iranians are likely to agree to do more for less, although that seems to be the attitude. 

My own view is the present effort on sanctions is perfectly acceptable. It could be expanded without, in my view, injuring the capacity on the part of the P5+1 and others, should the Iranians fail to carry out their side of the deal, once again to increase sanctions pressure, because the basic structure remains in place. So that’s one way to go. The other way to go is to put off these requests for further steps or go ahead for the current deal on the basis of the sanctions offer that was on the table, which was apparently agreeable to all the P5. Or, finally, to seek some halfway houses between the two, which the negotiators would try to put together. 

I’m sure the parties are now thinking about all those three alternatives, and how they might want to deal with them, and hopefully they will come prepared at Geneva on the 20th with some thoughts and ideas about which way they want to go. And the “how” and “in what way” the proposals could be put on the table to get there. 

It seems to me that since the first meeting in Geneva, enormous progress was made in thirty hours of talks. I think more progress was made than in years of meetings in the past, and we ought to be buoyed by the notion that up until now, both sides are handling this in a serious way, in a way that indicates a genuine commitment to try to find an answer, even if they weren’t able to do it on the first talks. 

MOR: Is there any historical precedent for these talks and what can we learn from history about what the best approach might be now?

TP: I think there’s no historical precedent which is exactly like this. I think it’s interesting that with respect to North Korea, the major technical effort at that time on the part of the Koreans was to produce plutonium for a bomb, similar to what people are concerned about with the Arak heavy water reactor. They did, they made a deal. Seemingly over a period of time they changed their mind. Whether they changed their mind because they didn’t like the original deal, or whether they felt that the other side wasn’t keeping its side of the equation, or there was some other geostrategic imperative that pushed them in the direction of not completing or carrying out their deal and beginning to test, I think remains somewhat of a mystery. 

The South African issue is interesting because there we’re heavily focused on the uranium enrichment process, which they used. Those talks went very well but they were basically the response to a fundamental decision on the part of the new South African government, led by President Mandela, to get out of this business. And as result, those talks have held, and the process with South Africa was an exemplary one in terms of putting that particular weapons program back into the box where it still stays. 

So, none of this is chiseled in stone, but it seems to me we’re as close to finding an answer for a first-step agreement with Iran as we have ever been in the history of the negotiations on this nuclear subject, and it would be very important for the parties to make the kind of sustained and continued and serious effort that they had begun with.

MOR: Thank you so much for speaking with me today.

About the photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry, third from left, meets with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, center, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, second from right, for a trilateral discussion focused on Iran’s nuclear capabilities on November 9, 2013, in Geneva, Switzerland. (US State Department)