The meeting yesterday between presidents Barack Obama and Thein Sein may have been more symbolic than substantive, but it is an important step towards a normal relationship for the United States and Myanmar. It will deepen the engagement of the two countries and move them closer to the broader partnership they want as the transition in the country Washington still calls Burma faces some grave internal challenges.

When Thein Sein took office at the end of March 2011, his inaugural address outlining an ambitious reform agenda was received with scepticism in the United States. But as he brought Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi over to his side, this tone began to change. The April 2012 by-elections saw the National League of Democracy enter Parliament as the largest non-government party. This was the single most important event that led to the reset button being hit on this bilateral relationship. Within the space of about a year, this formerly pariah nation had a new US ambassador and a visit from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and President Obama stopped by to deliver a landmark speech in Yangon. Decades-long sanctions were suspended.

What comes next? For a partnership to eventuate, the US will have to stand by Myanmar as it takes steps forwards–and back–for years to come. It will not always be smiles with the band playing anthems. In the last twelve months, we have seen new political freedoms let loose old hatreds in waves of anti-Muslim violence. This showed there is still much to do to transform this country into the tolerant one of Thein Sein’s televised speeches.

Key Conclusions

• Three interconnected and difficult issues need attention for the country to move forward—citizenship for the Rohingya; building capacity in the police to prevent  violence against Muslims; and re-envisioning the country as one that is multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious.
• The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy could take decades. Key waypoints are the 2015 elections, implementing constitutional reforms, and the achievement of true civilian leadership.
• The US should  engage on a broad range of issues and stop using sanctions as a diplomatic tool. An enduring partnership would involve sustained support for the transition across the spectrum of political interests, and transitional development assistance would expand to include programs for education, health, and the media.

Analysis

The quick fix to stop violence is a home-grown one. Put simply, President Thein Sein’s strong word needs to be met with firm but not repressive action by local authorities. Violent extremism needs to be punished by the law, whoever commits it.

Beyond this, there are three areas that deserve special attention as Myanmar tries to resolve the underlying ethnic and religious tensions that could threaten its transition. It needs more encouragement and not threats from international policymakers, and where possible, offers of practical help to succeed.

When France’s President François Hollande flew to Timbuktu and Bamako on February 2 to supervise the ongoing Serval military operation, the crowds welcomed him as their savior, chanting his name and waving the French flags that had been widely distributed (some had even painted themselves blue, white, and red). The scene was reminiscent of Benghazi in September 2011 when Libyans cheered the arrival of then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister David Cameron with signs that read, “Vive la France.” (Of course, Benghazi and Libya have now plunged into a security-political turmoil, and no one knows where it will lead.)

At the start of the engagement, French authorities were quick to announce that their troops would withdraw gradually from Mali in early March. However, unsurprisingly, the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian has since revised France’s position, indicating that the military mission will take longer than expected. Now, it has been decided that French troops will remain in Mali alongside the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), due to start on July 1. And a number of issues and security problems related to Mali and the Sahel region still remain.

Key Conclusions

• Conventional military operations cannot defeat terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and, on the contrary, may exacerbate the threat by providing more impetus to the terrorists who can in turn rally more support from the local populations. Indeed, civilian casualties often trigger anger among the populations who see no good in a foreign military intervention, as is the case in Iraq or Afghanistan.
• Mali’s allies and partners such as France have for a long time turned a blind eye to the internal problems of the country, and the economic aid pledged last week should only be part of a larger assistance plan involving political advice and training.
• Mali is the weakest link in a highly vulnerable Sahel region, which means that any lasting and concrete solution must have a regional and holistic approach.
• Military interventions can only be seen as a small part of a global political solution in Mali and the Sahel region in general. Mali and the Tuareg population suffer from decades-long socio-political and economic inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of willingness from Bamako to adequately respond to the legitimate demands of the Tuareg living in the north.

Analysis

The French military intervention may have helped to win back the cities of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, and the north of Mali, but, despite killing a large number of terrorists, most members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have fled Mali and are now hiding in the grey zones of the vast Sahel region stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. There are even growing indications that many have found safe haven in southern Libya as well as elsewhere in the contiguous southern areas.

Furthermore, the deaths of AQIM’s leader Abou Zeid and other terrorists, along with the presumed killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar—the mastermind behind the dramatic attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria in January—will not change the regional landscape instability. Indeed, AQIM’s tentacle body remains well alive, and terrorists who are fighting a typical asymmetrical guerrilla war will continue to hit-and-run either in Mali or in neighboring countries, just as they did in In Amenas. In fact, the recent coup attempt in N’Djamena could well be a response to Chad’s military involvement in Mali.

It is now three months since Hollande’s visit and his call for a dialogue to resolve the Malian crisis, and there remains legitimate doubts about Bamako’s willingness to find a genuine and durable socio-political solution to this ongoing deep-rooted crisis and engage into an open and sincere dialogue, even with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Further complicating this equation is that many believe that even if a political dialogue began, it could be a biased political disequilibrium favoring Bamako due to the French military involvement and influence.

Furthermore, it has been reported numerous times by human rights NGOs that the Malian army is taking revenge against the population in the north, especially against the Maures, Tuareg and Songhai. Similarly, the angry Malian population in the south perceives the Tuareg as those responsible for the current crisis in Mali, as well as behind the presence of the terrorists in the country. This can only widen the already dangerous divide between the north and south populations, and it is a serious issue the authorities must deal with quickly to prevent civilian chaos which would greatly undermine any possibility for stability and the unity of Mali.

"I think the EU will not be able to achieve anything with our Central Asian partners if we do not engage long-term and with the necessary patience,” said Patricia Flor, European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. 

Ambassador Flor said the Central Asian governments have a long-term view of transformation. “They take their time, they have a slow pace of reform, and sometimes we would encourage them to actually move faster on some of these issues.”

She said the EUSR’s main task is to establish trust between EU and Central Asia. “The EU and its member states are coming from a different sphere in terms of how we organize governments and governance, our understanding of our basic principles and standards and values,” she said. “Therefore, one of the main tasks is to bridge the different mentalities and cultures in a partnership that looks at common interests and how we can establish trust between each other so that we can then engage in such difficult issues like rule of law or civil society.”

Ambassador Flor said the EU has established itself as a trusted interlocutor for mediation between the five Central Asian countries on issues such as water management, but that political will and the ownership of the Central Asian governments are key to solving these issues. Most of the regional issues are trans-boundary, she said, and require the involvement and coordination of neighboring states and regional and international organizations.

She said there is now EU representation in all Central Asian countries, and an EU-Central Asia high-level security dialogue is to take place for the first time this summer. The EU has committed itself to support three of the six confidence building measures of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan.

The interview was conducted by David Muckenhuber, a consultant based at the International Peace Institute's Vienna office.

David Muckenhuber (DM): Our guest today in the Global Observatory is Patricia Flor, the European Union’s Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. She coordinates EU action in Central Asia and oversees the implementation of the EU strategy for Central Asia. Her mandate, which runs from July 1, 2012 until June 30, 2013, is to promote good relations between the EU and Central Asian countries and to strengthen stability, cooperation, democracy, and respect for human rights in the region. She previously served in Kazakhstan, at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, and as German ambassador to Georgia. Ambassador Flor, thank you for joining us over the phone today in the Global Observatory.

One of the main tasks within your mandate is to oversee the implementation of the EU strategy for Central Asia, which was adopted for the period of 2007 to 2013. How would you evaluate the implementation and success of this strategy so far?

Patricia Flor (PF): First of all, let me clarify that the strategy will not expire. The strategy actually has been reviewed in 2012 and the Council of the EU Foreign Ministers then reaffirmed the validity of the strategy and its main objectives so that it will continue to be in force. The EU foreign ministers added an additional dimension by suggesting the start of a high-level security dialogue between the EU and Central Asia, which is scheduled to take place for the first time this summer. Therefore, no need to worry; the EU has a strategy, it will continue to function, and it does function well.

From May 19-27, 2013, the African Union (AU) will hold its 21st summit in Addis Ababa. It will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under the theme of “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.” It will also be almost ten years since the creation of the AU.

When the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses the assembled heads of states and governments and representatives of the AU Commission, he will likely praise the remarkable strides made by the African continent and the dynamic partnership between the UN and the AU to address peace and security challenges in Africa.

Yet, just as UN-AU collaboration seemed to have reached an all-time high, a recent AU Peace and Security Council communiqué revealed new tensions in the relationship. The communiqué expressed concerns about UN Security Council resolution 2100 which authorized the creation of the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), stressing that it “…is not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years.” This came just one month after another AU statement expressed support for the transformation of the African-led support mission in Mali, AFISMA, into a UN operation. What happened to change the AU’s position?

Key Conclusions

• The crisis in Mali has exposed important differences between the AU and the UN, stemming from divergent philosophies of peace operations and the Security Council’s decision not to follow the AU’s request for a UN-funded support package for AFISMA.
• Further sources of tension emerged as the UN operation was authorized by the Security Council. This meant that the AU’s requests concerning key personnel and a central political role may have been ignored, and the deployment of MINUSMA was made contingent on certain criteria.
• This situation once again revealed considerable mistrust between the two organizations, which must recognize that no amount of coordination mechanisms will completely prevent the political frictions that are bound to occur. 
• Nevertheless, as our recent report makes clear, the two organizations should continue to improve their bureaucratic interactions, and the AU should strengthen its capacity to articulate a timely, coherent, and effective voice in New York. 

Analysis

The crisis in Mali has exposed important differences between the African Union  and United Nations. In December 2012, UN Security Council resolution 2085 authorized an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). However, in light of the slow African response, and at the request of the Malian authorities, on January 11, 2013, France launched Opération Serval, a military intervention to stop the rebel advance and recapture major urban settlements in the north of Mali. Opération Serval created new facts on the ground, and AFISMA’s deployment timetable was accelerated from the originally planned date of September 2013. The subsequent deployment of African troops was supported by voluntary contributions made at an emergency donor conference on January 29, 2013, in Addis Ababa.

Shortly afterwards, in February, a joint UN-AU-ECOWAS planning conference in Bamako finalized the revised and harmonized AFISMA Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was adopted in March 2013 with the mission strength set at nearly 9,450 uniformed personnel. The door was also opened for the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, which would take over from AFISMA.

The international donor community is gathering in Brussels on May 15 to consider a request to pledge about 340 million euros ($439 million) in support of “a new Mali.” With significant progress made in constraining the presence and influence of armed groups in the north, it is crucial to focus on the provision of human security for all communities in Mali. It is essential for the political process to be sufficiently inclusive to address the multiple crises facing the country.

The donor conference should focus on six issues:

First, the “plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali,” as submitted by the Malian government to the donors, introduces many important programs to take care of the humanitarian crisis, rebuild the governance of Mali, and ensure the provision of social services. But why is the concept of human security absent in the presentation of these development efforts? The reduction of poverty and improvement of the well being of the Malian people in relation to greater freedom and participation are all elements in a comprehensive approach to strengthen human security, which is the key to undoing the conditions that helped violent extremism gain influence.

Second, the recovery plan of the government does not address how a process of dialogue and mediation can be organized in the coming months to reconcile different aspirations and build consensus between the south and the north, including in particular those communities whose sense of being neglected greatly contributed to the crisis. There can be no development or institution-building in Mali without conscious and designated relationship-building in society.

Third, elections in Mali should be rescheduled if no sufficient human security can be ensured across the country in the coming months. The aggressive occupation of northern Mali has disrupted the social infrastructure, made thousands flee their homes, and caused a significant humanitarian crisis. In the plans submitted to the donors, it is expected that elections will be held before July 31st. In reality, it is hard to imagine that it will be possible to have a voting system in place on the basis of biometric voter registration within the next 10 weeks. Elections are important, but bad elections in which a significant number of the Malian people cannot effectively participate—notably the communities most affected by the crisis—will be a disaster. It will move the country backward rather than forward on the road to recovery.

A list of books on peace and security, recommended by staff at the International Peace Institute:

Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions, by Robert Mandel (Stanford University Press)
This book challenges the assumption that central governments are always a source of stability, while nonstate armed groups are inherently forces of instability. Mandel argues that at times it can actually be counterproductive to rely on state governments for stability, depending upon the character of the government and the security situation. Following his past work on transnational organized crime, Mandel shows how armed nonstate groups can provide local stability better than weak state power, and he shows how cooperation between states and armed nonstate groups may at times be fruitful. The book provides a novel analysis of the nature of stability and the transformation of global security. It concludes with a series of policy guidelines on how to approach nonstate armed groups in the future. Suggested by Adam Lupel, IPI Editor and Senior Fellow.

Changing Norms Through Actions: The Evolution of Sovereignty, Jennifer Ramos (Oxford University Press)
The principle of the responsibility to protect has rekindled long-held debates about the status of sovereignty. One side holds state sovereignty to be inviolable, and one side holds it to be conditional, including both rights and obligations. In this book, Jennifer Ramos takes a more nuanced look at the sovereignty debate. She examines how the sovereignty norm has evolved over time, and she argues that you can trace its development in relation to the result of actions taken on its behalf. For example, whether an intervention is seen as a violation of sovereignty or not, depends greatly on the military outcome, and she argues this can have a profound effect on international normative commitments in subsequent crises. Through the analysis of conceptions of sovereignty before and after crises related to counterterrorism, human rights, and weapons of mass destruction, Ramos provides insight into how political action shapes international norms change over time. Suggested by Adam Lupel, IPI Editor and Senior Fellow.

Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East by Rashid Khalidi (Beacon Press, 2013)
Mr. Khalidi, Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, examines historical moments during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to reveal why he believes the American-brokered negotiations have not only failed but have undermined progress towards lasting peace. Suggested by Warren Hoge, Senior Adviser for External Relations.

Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions by Matthew Levinger (US Institute of Peace Press, 2013)
Finally, in one volume, the theoretical underpinning and the tools to understand today’s conflict dynamics and develop policy responses. This handbook aims to help practitioners of conflict management in analyzing both the causes of conflict and peace, and to include their analysis in decisionmaking and program implementation. A very timely toolbox in an age of shifting global conflict trends that can enable policy makers to design more nuanced and agile responses to the early 21st-century complex conflict crises. Suggested by Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research.

The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat by Vali Nasr (Doubleday, 2013)
Questioning what he calls America’s dangerous choice to engage less in the world, Mr. Nasr, dean of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins and a former member of the Obama State Department, delivers a sharp indictment of the president’s foreign policy and charts a path forward for how the US can regain lost influence and compete with its chief rival, China. Suggested by Warren Hoge, Senior Adviser for External Relations.

Essays in Humanitarian Action by Hugo Slim (Oxford Institute of Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and Kindle Books, 2012)
This collection of essays, written between 1996 and 2005 by a leading humanitarian scholar, provides food for thought on some fundamental tensions underlying humanitarian ethics and practice. As humanitarian action needs to adapt to a fast-changing world and faces recurrent challenges from Syria to Mali and Somalia, the book offers timely and badly needed reflection on humanitarian values and dilemmas. Suggested by Jeremie Labbé, IPI Senior Policy Analyst, Humanitarian Affairs.

Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case of Putting America’s House in Order by Richard N. Haas (Basic Books, 2013)
Arguing that America is underperforming at home and overreaching abroad, Mr. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, explains that America’s continued influence and leadership in the world is contingent upon its ability to confront pressing challenges at home and progress in a 21st-century “nonpolar” world of American primacy but not domination. Suggested by Warren Hoge, Senior Adviser for External Relations.

Along with the authorization of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, the UN Security Council authorized French troops to continue their military campaign in northern Mali, Opération Serval, in order to counter the threat of international terrorism emanating from the region. This is the latest indication that governments and multinational organizations such as NATO and the UN continue to believe a military presence can counter international terrorist threats. The so-called “war model” response to terrorism is familiar to global audiences, most starkly used by US President George W. Bush in his war against al-Qaeda, and is reinforced by terrorists who frequently characterize themselves as warriors and soldiers for their cause, engaged in a war against their targets.

Large-scale military responses to terrorism include campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, but is a military deployment the best response to a terrorist threat? Or can engaging in a war with terrorist actors be counterproductive?

Key Conclusions

• Protracted military campaigns do not reduce the threat of terrorism and can often exacerbate the threat by providing terrorist groups with media images of oppression, overwhelming lethal force, and cultural insensitivity. Civilian casualties inflicted by military campaigns can contribute to radicalization of the indigenous population, sympathy for terrorist causes, and grist for terrorist propaganda mills.
• Short-term and standalone military missions can, however, be effective in countering terrorism. A response of targeted, forceful operations can inflict lasting damage on terrorist networks, capabilities, and morale.
• Military intervention is a small part of counterterrorism strategy and should be used as a narrow and defined tool. Diplomatic, economic, social, and criminal justice models are essential for comprehensive counter terrorism policies and military units can be no substitute for these.
• The first phase of Opération Serval in Mali is assessed as having achieved its aims in the first ten days of deployment, but the mission must avoid the danger of being caught in what one expert calls “the quagmire,” where the aims become vague and there is no exit strategy.

Analysis

There has been a recent trend among Western governments and multinational organizations away from full-scale ground deployments as a means of countering international terrorism, and governments have sometimes chosen more limited, short-term action, such as the airstrikes in Libya. But capitals are also still entrenched in extended counterterrorism campaigns that have proved costly in lives, money, and reputations.

By deploying troops in the face of a terrorist threat, governments are responding to a public desire for action against terrorist actors. Political leaders appear decisive and able to regain the upper hand, often in the aftermath of, or threat of, an attack. However, the disadvantages of responding with force are many and well documented, and the action can often hinder broader counterterrorism initiatives. Indigenous populations can feel alienated, invaded, and colonized, and civilian casualties which accompany military engagements can have a radicalizing effect on populations, causing them to sympathize and collude with terrorist groups.

On April 18, the UN Security Council “underlined the need to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance through the most effective ways, including, where appropriate, across borders,” in a nonbinding oral statement. The statement followed a passionate plea to the Council by Valerie Amos, the Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to “consider alternative forms of aid delivery, including cross-border operations,” to access the most needy population in rebel-controlled areas of Syria.

These developments gave new impetus to an ongoing debate on whether aid can be channelled across borders directly in opposition-controlled areas despite Damascus’ lack of consent, or whether it should be channelled across frontlines with consent of the Assad regime. In practice, humanitarian organizations normally request state permission for access to territory. As previously explained in the Global Observatory, the centrality of state sovereignty and state consent in this debate is due to “the deeply state-centric nature of the legal and institutional framework regulating humanitarian assistance.”

From a purely legal perspective, however, arguments can be raised against an absolute condition of state consent for the delivery of humanitarian relief to areas not effectively controlled by state forces. International humanitarian law is not clear cut around this issue, but does provide legal arguments against a strict state consent requirement for humanitarian relief in internal armed conflict that can assist policy makers to heed the recent call of the Security Council.

Key Conclusions

• International humanitarian law stresses the obligation of parties to a conflict—state or nonstate actors—to allow and facilitate humanitarian assistance. As such, it does not require a strict consent by the state to the delivery of aid—with the exception of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions to which Syria is not a party—but focuses on the need of the civilian population.
• Parties to a conflict retain a right to control humanitarian assistance that allows them to prohibit access if it is used for other purposes than strictly humanitarian ones—such as to deliver military equipment. But it also implies that, in order to exercise this right, the concerned party has an effective control over the territory where the aid is transiting.
• In the case of Syria, a progressive interpretation of international law shows that Damascus’ consent is not a strict requirement to cross-border humanitarian assistance where the Assad regime has no control over the relevant border areas, on the condition that the aid is strictly humanitarian and impartial in nature.