REGIONAL ANALYSIS SYRIA

03 July 2014
Part I – Syria

This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is now produced quarterly, replacing the monthly RAS of 2013. It seeks to bring together information from all sources in the region and provide holistic analysis of the overall Syria crisis.

While Part I focuses on the situation within Syria, Part II covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries.

More information on how to use this document can be found on page 69. Please note that words that are underlined are hyperlinked to their location either on internet or to navigate within the report. The Syria Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email SNAP@ACAPS.org.

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Overview

Conflict and political developments: Elections were held in early June, when Bashar Al-Assad won a third 7-year term. In the last few months, the Government of Syria (GoS) made significant progress taking almost full control of the Qalamoun region, including opposition supply lines with Lebanon.

While the Islamic State (IS) formerly known as the Islamic of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has recently gained sizable portions of Iraqi territory, it has also been pushed back from Idleb and Aleppo city, withdrawing to its Raqqa stronghold. As a result, other opposition groups have been able to make small advances to Northern Hama, Southern Idleb, western Aleppo and Quneitra.

Displacements: In Q2, at least an additional 688,000 people were displaced, which adds to the 793,000 displaced in Q1. These displacements mostly occurred in Deir-ez-Zor and Idleb. Smaller-scale displacements were also recorded in Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Al- Hasakeh, Lattakia and Da’ra.

Access: Overall, the UN Security Council’s 2139 resolution has not fulfilled its promises, while new regulations regarding the sealing of convoys further limited access. The lack of information on needs in besieged areas is a source of concern; estimates indicate that up to 3.5 million vulnerable people are still living in besieged areas and areas inaccessible to official assistance from Damascus.

Humanitarian concerns: An estimated 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The 2014 Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) requested USD 2.28 billion for aid provided from Damascus. As of June, only 27% of this funding had been secured. Without further donor commitment, lifesaving assistance to vulnerable communities is expected to be cut drastically. Furthermore, with the summer arriving, Water is becoming a serious problem in terms of availability and quality. This contributes to health concerns, with a reported increase in waterborne diseases, such as acute diarrhoea in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor and Al- Hasakeh.

Protection continues to be a major issue in areas affected by violence, with a rise in indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including children. The number of children killed has increased disproportionately since mid-February, notably in Aleppo and Dar’a. Food remains an area of concern due to the lack of livelihoods, rising prices, population movements and constriction of aid.

Possible Developments

- Instances of negotiations in Rural Damascus: Reported attempts of negotiations between Gos and opposition have taken place in Harasta, Mleiha and Hajar-Aswad. Terms of negotiations will depend on future military developments, but could be related to topics such as ceasefire agreements, lifting of sieges, withdrawal of armed groups and regularisation of opposition fighters.

- Instability in the northeast and on the border with Turkey and Iraq: IS’s push in Iraq has allowed the group to establish a link with Deir-ez-Zor, Al- Hasakeh and Aleppo. Fighting between IS and other armed groups may occur, but it is more likely that the various non-state actors in the northeast will avoid or minimise confrontation as long as negotiations around oil-wealth distribution are ongoing. However, there are reports of cases of abuse against civilians by IS, and the multiplicity of armed groups in the northeast could increase the general level of insecurity, causing small-scale displacement and further protection issues.

- No improvement of access despite new draft resolution: UN Security members are considering a new resolution to authorise cross-border deliveries at 4 crossing points with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. The GoS has indicated it would consider the proposal with a number of restrictions to control the delivery of aid (approval of implementing partners, locations of distribution and type of assistance). Even if the resolution is adopted, access is unlikely to significantly improve.

- Reduced water level: Drought-like conditions are of major concern. The main focus has been on their impact on agricultural production and subsequent food security. Wheat yields for 2014 are expected to be 50% below the 10-year average. Additionally, the Euphrates Lake is at an unprecedentedly low level. This, combined with water infrastructure damage caused by conflict, is likely to significantly impact water availability and electricity production.
### 2014 Q2 Timeline – Main events Syria

**Border closures and new waves of displacement:** The Peshkapour border crossing with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) was closed to refugees and the Government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-G) constructed a trench, thereby further constraining the movement of goods and people in and out of Iraq. On the Turkish side, increased restrictions have prevented the smuggling of goods and people, particularly from the Kurdish region. In April, the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) took control of the Qalamoun region and increased control of illegal entries between Syria and Lebanon. Military operations moved to Eastern Ghouta coupled with opposition in-fighting in Deir-ez-Zor. This caused new waves of displacement and the establishment of new IDP camps in Aleppo, Dar’a, Al-Hasakeh and Idlib.

### April

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### Food security concerns rise: The GoS raised the price of gasoline by 20% while wheat production was estimated to be just 50% of the pre-crisis 10-year average. Ongoing besiegement policies and access constraints, which widely disregard UN Security Council resolution 2139, continue to deprive people of their basic nutritional requirements. By April, at least 299 Syrians had died of starvation according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.

### May

**Local Peace agreements:** Early May saw a ceasefire in the besieged Old City of Homs, with around 2,000 opposition fighters evacuated to the north. The truce also gave aid access to besieged Nabul and Zaraa in northern Aleppo. Many returnees streamed back to their homes in Old City neighbourhoods, despite the lack of water and electricity. A truce has also been reached in Al Waer neighbourhood in Homs, where tens of thousands live, and in other areas in southern Damascus.

**New Government of Syria (GoS) restrictions on aid convoys:** On 5 May, the GoS started implementing new guidelines requiring all aid convoys to be sealed in the presence of security authorities and Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). The new procedure has caused major delays in aid deliveries to targeted locations, as reported by WFP.

**Formal economy deterioration:** according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research, by the end of 2013 GDP had contracted by 60% since the start of the crisis, unemployment increased to 54% of the labour force and the overall poverty rate reached 75%. The GoS started to reduce its expenditure, for example it was reported that the contracts of 4,500 public workers in Ar-Raqqa would not be renewed.

**Conflict developments and President Assad re-elected:** Bachir-Al-Assad was re-elected as the President of Syria on 5 June. Opposition fighters had stepped up mortar attacks on GoS-held areas prior to the elections. Kasab, a town in northern Lattakia, bordering Turkey, was retaken by the SAF in mid-June. By the end of May, opposition fighters had taken over a strategic town in southern Idlib. SAF offensives against opposition groups have been highly related to IS progress in eastern Syria. While IS has been advancing in Deir-ez-Zor against Jabat al-Nusra, an expected agreement between the two groups is likely to end the fighting in the governorate.

**Amnesty:** After President Assad’s re-election, a general amnesty was declared on 9 June. A few hundred prisoners were released, while tens of thousands remain in jail.

### June

**Euphates low water levels:** Water levels at the Euphrates Lake fell to unprecedentedly low levels, for reasons including the amount of water pumped from Turkey to Syria. Syrian officials reported that Turkey had completely cut off the supply of water to Syria for 13 consecutive days in May, and partially for sporadic days in March and June. This ongoing reduction in water levels is expected to have a significant implication for many civilians in the northern governorates.

**Increase in local truces:** Following the increase in local peace agreements in the Old city of Homs and around Damascus, new areas come under ceasefire in Rural Damascus.

### Jul– Aug– Sept

**Possible developments:**

**Operational constraints remain high, particularly in Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, and eastern Aleppo, due to intense fighting. Coordination between Kurdish parties controlling the Simalka border crossing results in improved access for humanitarian assistance to Al-Hasakeh.

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**Operational constraints**

- **Unimproved aid access after the UN resolution:** In March, WFP reported that access had improved following February’s UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139. However this did not last and WFP’s access subsequently decreased. Humanitarian access has continuously shrunk for NGOs, with access to governorates in the north, such as Ar-Raqqá, Al- Hasakeh, and Rural Damascus having been entirely cut-off since the start of 2014. Access to besieged areas is still restricted, except in areas where truces have been reached, such as Yarmouk. The only real improvement in access was to the Islamic State (IS)-besieged city of Deir-ez-Zor in mid-June, when opposition fighters and IS allowed vital humanitarian assistance via the Al Siyesieh Bridge.

- **New UN resolution draft:** UN Security Council members have been considering a new resolution to authorise cross-border aid deliveries into Syria at 4 crossing points with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. The Government of Syria (GoS) has indicated that it would consider the proposal, albeit with a number of restrictions. However this initiative might have the unintended effect of rendering any other humanitarian aid, which does not meet these conditions, as unauthorised or illegal.

- **GoS impediments to humanitarian access:** The head of the UN reported in May that “bureaucratic resistance” by the GoS was preventing the delivery of aid to millions of Syrians in need of assistance. These bureaucratic procedures mainly relate to visas for humanitarian organisations’ international staff and to the movement of goods. Aid group Mercy Corps was forced to close its Damascus operation at the end of April, following a request from the GoS to stop delivering humanitarian assistance from neighbouring countries, across the border into opposition-controlled areas.

- **New GoS restrictions on aid convoys:** On 5 May, Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs started implementing new guidelines requiring all aid convoys to be loaded and sealed in the presence of both the Syrian security authorities and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), in order to limit any losses on the road. The GoS also wants to create a single process for all truck movements within the country. WFP reported that the new procedure has caused major delays in deliveries to target locations.

- **Cross-border aid:** The border crossings between Syria and its neighbouring countries have been subject to intermittent openings and closures. The Jordan/Syria official border crossing point ‘Al-Naseeb, has been sealed off since 2013. By mid-May, aid convoys for WFP had entered Al- Hasakeh from Turkey via the Nusaybin- Qamishli border crossing point, following approval by the Turkish and Syrian Governments. This aid delivery reached 80% of the targeted beneficiaries, yet they only represented 20% of people in need. From Iraq, the border crossing with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), Simalka-Peshkhabour, was re-opened in late May for medical cases and some humanitarian assistance. In early June, the Ya’rubiya border crossing between Al- Hasakeh and Iraq came under control of Kurdish Peshmerga on the Iraqi side. It is expected that humanitarian access and commercial trade will increase as a result. Al-Qaim-Abu Kamal and Al-Waleed-Al Tanf border crossings came under control of IS in June. This will most likely affect cross-border trade and significantly increase smuggling activities.

- **Truces enable limited access:** In early January, a partial lifting of blockades allowed humanitarian assistance to reach Yarmouk camp, though the truce collapsed again the following month. Several other ceasefires in Yarmouk have already been broken. Truces were also reached in Barzeh in Damascus city and in some other towns on the southern outskirts, allowing intermittent access. A truce in the old City of Homs allowed a UN inter-agency mission to deliver food rations and critical humanitarian supplies.

- **Hard to reach and besieged areas:** Despite the increase in truces around Damascus and Homs, many areas remain inaccessible. Estimates indicate up to 3.5 million vulnerable people still live in inaccessible locations such as besieged areas or those affected by cross-fire.

- **Active hostilities against humanitarian personnel and aid:** Over the course of the conflict, 12 UNRWA staff members have been killed, 24 injured and 25 detained or missing. At least 34 SARC staff or volunteers have been killed while a number of others have been seriously injured. Other humanitarian personnel and activists continue to face the risk of shelling and detention during their relief missions. The hostilities also affect aid warehouses and convoys, resulting in deliveries being particularly low in the southern governorates of Dar’a, Damascus and Rural Damascus.

- **Restriction by multiple armed groups:** Multiple interagency missions and convoys have been postponed several times due to security-related challenges and difficulties liaising with different parties. Aid delivery is especially challenging in some IS-controlled areas. Access restrictions and continuous population movements also impede the assessment of needs.

- **Airlifted assistance:** From 26 - 29 May, 4 emergency airlifts were organised from Damascus to Qamishli, transporting over 311 m³ of urgent relief cargo. The assistance is expected to be delivered to the hard-to-reach areas of southern Al-Hasakeh.

- **Lack of funding:** NGOs and INGOs inside Syria continue to suffer from a lack of funding, which affects their relief distributions. By the end of March, WFP reported a 20% reduction in that month’s food aid to the most vulnerable. This reduction affects the average calorie intake of every family. UNHCR also reported a forecasted funding reduction from August onwards. The 2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) was launched in December 2013. UN agencies, IOM and INGOs requested USD 2.28 billion for the year. As of June, only 27% of the funding had been secured.
Humanitarian profile (see Annex D for definitions)

- **Displaced outside Syria**: ~4.7 million
  - Protracted IDPs (pre-March 2011) ~205,000 – 858,000
    - 1982 Hama ~10,000 – 20,000
    - Kurds 1965-1976 ~60,000 – 140,000
    - Golan 1967 ~70,000 – 433,000
  - Drought induced 2007/8 & 2008/9 ~65,000
  - Iraqis and others ~46,000

- **Displaced inside Syria**: ~8.1 million
  - Registered refugees & asylum seekers in Syria ~512,000
    - Palestinians ~467,000
      - 6,600 in Aleppo
      - 4,500 in Lattakia
    - 6,450 in other governorates

- **IDPs**: ~7.6 million
  - 1,735,000 in Aleppo
  - 908,000 in Lattakia
  - 762,000 in Rural Damascus
  - 724,000 in Idleb
  - 588,000 in Homs
  - 517,000 in Deir-ez-Zor
  - 500,000 in Tartous
  - 423,000 in Hama
  - 372,000 in Dar’a
  - 327,000 in Al-Hasakeh
  - 318,000 in Damascus
  - 308,000 in Ar-Raqqa
  - 78,000 in Quneitra
  - 52,000 in As-Sweida

- **Others of concern**: Third Country Nationals 120,000 - 150,000

- **Non-displaced**: ~3.6 million

- **Others Unknown**
- **Host families Unknown**

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1. Figures are not mutually exclusive; e.g. some refugees registered prior to 2011 may also be displaced by current unrest.
2. Of the 46,000, almost 87% are Iraqis (UNHCR 2013/12/02).
3. The overall figure for Palestinians is the PRS pre-orsis count of 540,000 less those registered in host countries. 270,000 PRS are displaced within Syria (UNRWA 2014/05/25).
4. The largest IDP figure between (SINA 2013/12) and (OCHA 2013/12) is used.
5. The largest people-in-need figure between (SINA 2013/12) and (OCHA 2013/12) is used.
6. OCHA 2013
7. SINA 2013
8. Calculated by deducting IDPs from People in Need.
Armed conflict and possible developments

**Lattakia:** GoS forces retook control of the territories they lost in March and April, and Kasab town, on the Turkish border, is under their control again.

**Idleb and Hama:** Opposition forces made significant gains, taking control of Khan Sheikhoun town and tightening the siege on GoS forces bases in Wadi ad Deif and Hamediyeh. Progress was made close to Morek in Northern Hama, on the main road linking Aleppo city and Hama city and a few villages there are now controlled by opposition fighters.

**Homs:** Following a truce between opposition fighters and GoS, the old city of Homs came under GoS control. Opposition fighters were allowed to move to opposition-held areas in the north of the governorate.

**Quneitra and Dar’a:** Opposition forces made progress in both governorates, taking control of Tal al Jomou’a, a strategic army base in Dar’a, and a few villages near Quneitra city.

**Damascus and Rural Damascus:** GoS forces took full control of Qalamoun in early May. They are expected to move their focus to certain neighbourhoods in the capital and Eastern Ghouta, and possibly make some gains there.

**Deir-ez-Zor:** ISIL forces progressed significantly in Deir-ez-Zor during the second quarter of the year. The areas they control in Syria and Iraq are now connected.
Displacement profile

Syria is now the world’s biggest internal displacement, with an estimated 6.52 million IDPs according to OCHA and more than 2.8 million registered refugees with UNHCR. According to SNAP calculations (Please review Humanitarian Profile, page 8), the number of IDPs inside Syria is 8.1 million. More than three years into the conflict, roughly 9,500 Syrians are being displaced each day, approximately one family per minute becoming displaced. (Syria Deeply 2014/05/26, SHARP 2013/12/16)

- **IDPs**: The recent estimates on the number of people displaced within Syria are:
  - According to the Syrian prime minister, there are 6.7 million IDPs in Syria. (Al-Iqtisadi 2014/05/20)
  - Nationwide 6.52 million people were estimated to be displaced as of December 2013, most residing in Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Homs & Idleb. This number has not been updated since December 2013. (SHARP 2013/12/16)
  - In the first quarter of 2014, an additional 793,000 people were reported to be displaced according to SNAP calculations from additional IDPs reported during this period. In the second quarter at least 688,000 were estimated to flee after summing up the number of reported IDPs according to governorates.

- **Palestinian refugees in Syria**: Out of approximately 540,000 Palestinians registered with UNRWA in Syria, over 50% have been displaced inside Syria. 13% of the Palestinian refugees in Syria fled to neighbouring countries. (UNRWA 2014/05/25)

- **Refugees**: According to UNHCR, about 2.88 million refugees have registered as refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, less than 100,000 have declared asylum in Europe with a small number offered resettlement by countries such as Germany and Sweden. (UNHCR 2014/06/19, EU 2014/02)

**Main displacements 2014 Q2:**

- **Deir-ez-Zor**: The escalation of violence in Deir-ez-Zor due to the fighting between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra and its affiliates caused mass displacements during this period. In April, civilians in Abu Kamal fled toward the towns of al-Mayadeen, Muhasan and surrounding villages in the east. However, in May, the infighting extended further to most of the eastern countryside. By mid-May, more than 100,000 civilians had fled the fighting following weeks of intense clashes among the opposition groups according to the SOHR. Among these, 60,000 people fled several towns such as Busayra, Abriha and Al-Zir in the east in the beginning of May alone and these towns have been virtually emptied of their inhabitants. In June, the number grew up to 250,000 of IDPs fleeing the areas of intense fighting. In the city of Deir-ez-Zor, the GoS aerial bombardment on opposition-controlled areas also prompted around 100,000 individuals to flee toward GoS-controlled areas which have been overcrowded with IDPs. (Assafir 2014/04/14, ARA News 2014/04/13, Daily Star 2014/05/04, Aljazeera 2014/05/04, Daily Star 2014/05/12, Assafir 2014/06/10, PI 2014/06/13)

- **Aleppo**: Ongoing displacements were witnessed from the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo towards the countryside with the intense use of barrel bombings. It was reported that 500,000 people were displaced from eastern Aleppo since the beginning of 2014. As the number of IDPs was around 250,000 in the first quarter, it is estimated that another 250,000 were displaced during the second quarter. Some people also fled the GoS-held areas amid fears of escalating violence ahead of the presidential elections. At least 3,000 civilians, who fled from Aleppo and Ar-Raqqah due to worsening humanitarian conditions, intended to enter the KR. However, the closure of the Simalka border crossing compelled them to take shelter in villages bordering Iraq. In IS-controlled areas, around 50,000 Kurdish citizens fled Al-Bab city in Aleppo towards unknown destinations. (ARA News 2014/05/09, Jesuit Refugee Services 2014/05/21, ARA News 2014/05/27)

- **Idleb**: Amid threats of opposition attacks on GoS-held areas ahead of the Syrian elections, thousands of people fled government-held Syrian cities by late May. Around 20,000 civilians escaped the GoS-held northwestern city of Idlib, which has been blockaded by opposition fighters on three sides, after the Islamic Council, a military and civil body in opposition-held areas, ordered them to leave because of the presumed attacks. Most of the displaced moved to other towns in the governorate while others moved to areas close to the Turkish border. (Daily Star 2014/05/30, Al-akhbar 2014/05/31)

- **Rural Damascus**: An escalation of fighting in several villages of Rural Damascus have forced around 10,000 people in villages of Western Ghouta to flee to the nearby village of Kisweh and surrounding areas. Little information is available on whether people have been able to escape the intensified fighting in the region of
Eastern Ghouta, knowing that the whole region has suffered from a longstanding siege since June 2013. (WFP 2014/06/10)

Al-Hasakeh: No updated information is available on the reported displacement toward or from Al-Hasakeh for eastern Markada, where in-fighting erupted in March and early April, causing an estimated 5,000 people to flee to nearby villages. These displacements were reported as temporary; however no updated information is available on their status, particularly after IS took control of the area in April. (Zaman Al-Wasi 2014/04/13)

Lattakia: In light of the intensification of violence in northern Lattakia in early April, around 450 families were displaced from Kasab, mostly towards Lattakia city. The GoS retook control of Kasab on 15 June, but no accurate figures on the return of IDPs were reported. According to the Syria Integrated Needs Assessment (SINA) conducted in November, there were around 900,000 IDPs in the governorate. By the end of May, estimates pointed to around 1 million were displaced in the coastal governorate, mostly originating from Aleppo, Homs and Idlib. (Al-akhbar 2014/04/16, Daily Star 2014/05/24)

Dar’a: An air strike on 18 June hitting an IDP camp near Ash Shajara town caused the displacement of around 3,500 people from the camp.

2014 Q1: In the first quarter of 2014 and as a result of the heavy aerial bombardment on the eastern opposition-held part of Aleppo city, more than 250,000 people fled towards the western half of the city and to the countryside. The heavy fighting in Dar’a also prompted around 160,000 people to seek refuge in other areas within the governorate. Significant waves of displacement have also affected Al-Hasakeh governorate in February and March, mainly towards Quamishli and the rural areas surrounding Al-Hasakeh city, mostly from rural Damascus. Over 50,000 fled the Qalamoun region in February mostly towards Lebanon. The escalation of fighting in Quneitra resulted in a displacement of around 35,000 to other areas within the governorate, to Dar’a and Damascus by mid-February.

Returnees

Homs ceasefire: Following the implementation of the ceasefire in the Old City of Homs in early May, thousands of people streamed back into the old neighbourhoods. Some of them wanted to check on their assets or to seek missing relatives, some of whom were believed kidnapped by the opposition. Some others have camped out in their damaged houses despite the lack of water, electricity and other basic services. According to the Governor of Homs, more than 700 families have returned to the Old City of Homs in which the rehabilitation of services has been limited to water distributions and open roads. (Daily Star 2014/05/11, Al-Watan 2014/05/19, Los Angeles Times 2014/05/19)

Al-Hasakeh: On 12 June, as the Simalka border crossing between KR-I and Al-Hasakeh opened, 450 refugees who had fled the northeastern region to KR-I came back to Al-Hasakeh. Hundreds of others were expected to return to Al-Hasakeh following the fighting between Iraqi forces and IS in western Iraq and an agreement was reportedly made between the PYD and the KR-I allowing for the passage of returnees. (Hawarnews 2014/06/13)
Countrywide sectoral analysis

Priority sectors

- Although priority needs differ significantly by location, some generalisations can be made: Protection concerns are widespread and are the primary cause of Syria’s humanitarian crisis. In opposition-controlled areas of the north and east, as well as Dar’a, Hama and Rural Damascus, civilians are subject to indiscriminate airstrikes while Homs is experiencing a spate of car bombings targeting civilian areas. In the north and northeast, civilian populations, particularly minority Kurds, are subject to human rights violations by armed groups. Protection issues were highlighted as major humanitarian concerns throughout 2014, particularly with ongoing barrel bomb campaigns in Aleppo and Dar’a. The lack of freedom of movement significantly hampers people’s ability to flee and their access to markets and basic services, which is a main driver of the humanitarian crisis.

- With low seasonal rainfall, summer temperatures and access to water resources increasingly being used by opposition groups as a weapon of war, WASH needs are a high priority. WASH needs appear to be particularly severe in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor governorates which record the highest number of suspected measles cases in the country. Idleb, Homs, Hama and Dar’a governorates will be particularly vulnerable due to the heavy destruction of water infrastructure and their dependence on agricultural production.

- Access to Food continues to be a priority sector across all governorates, particularly in areas under siege. With expected shortfalls in agricultural production due to insecurity, lack of inputs, high transportation costs as well as drought-like conditions are likely to result in further food price increases as well as food shortages, making basic food commodities less accessible to Syria’s increasingly impoverished population.

- While information on the health situation is limited, the reports on disease outbreaks, including measles, typhoid and polio, highlight the consequences of the ongoing collapse of the health system coupled with the weakened immune system of the population due to a lack of food and access to WASH services.

- Syria’s high intensity conflict has devastated significant swathes of the country’s residential and commercial buildings or rendered remaining structures unsafe for living, causing a noticeable increase in shelter needs in 2014. Ongoing large-scale displacement has forced IDPs into extremely overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions and camps, which often lack basic protection. The GoS campaign in Aleppo has led to the proliferation of camps in the north, particularly in Idleb governorate, in recent months. Reconstruction efforts in areas retaken by the GoS, particularly Homs and the Damascus suburbs, remain extremely limited due to the scope of devastation and high costs of construction.
Protection – Key developments Q2

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as of 31 March, the death toll since the start of the Syrian conflict stood at 162,000. This figure includes 54,000 civilians, of whom over 8,600 are children and over 5,600 are women. It is estimated that a further 18,000 people are detained or missing and between 50,000 to 100,000 are held in GoS prisons. The overall number of people killed increased by 16% compared to the figures reported in mid-February. Child deaths increased disproportionately, by 23%. The increase in child casualties is likely linked to the increase in indiscriminate attacks, including the GoS’ heavy reliance on barrel bombs, as witnessed in Aleppo and Dar’a. In January, the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed that it has stopped updating the death toll since its last formal count of 100,000 in July. [AFP 2014/05/19, SOHR 2014/05]

Attacks on education facilities continued unabated and, according to the UN Commission of Inquiry (Col), increased during the second quarter. Between April and 17 June, the UN reported that there were 10 attacks on schools and education facilities across Syria, killing 66 people and injuring at least 180. In eastern Aleppo, an airstrike on a gathering of mostly women and children for a children’s art exhibit resulted in 36 dead, 33 of whom were children. 2 universities in Aleppo and Damascus were also struck with mortar. [UNSG 2014/04/23, UNSG 2014/05/22, UNSG 2014/06/20, Col 2014/06/16]

Several hundred Kurdish students traveling from Ain Al Arab to take their exams in Aleppo city were kidnapped by IS on 30 May. The female students were released on the same day but between 150-190 boys were held hostage in Manbij. There were reports that IS was attempting to radicalise the boys and that some were subject to beatings. There has been little attention to the event and it is believed that IS is holding the children to negotiate an exchange with Kurdish groups. [Guardian 2014/06/26, McClatchy 2014/06/04, Daily Star 2014/06/03]

Amidst official assertions that Syria’s declared chemical weapon stocks have been removed or destroyed, allegations of chlorine and other chemical attacks continued throughout 2014. Human Rights Watch found credible evidence that the GoS dropped chlorine laden barrel bombs in 5 separate attacks in rural Hama and Idlib in mid-April, killing 11 people and affecting over 500. Although the combination of these indiscriminate weapons has only been reported locally, their use in densely populated areas would cause major casualties. A senior Israeli military official stated that chemical attacks took place in Harasta (Damascus) and near Aleppo city on 29 March, although evidence was not provided. Chlorine and other chemicals with practical uses are not categorised as chemical weapons under the agreement with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, a number of chemicals could be used in high concentrations as weapons, with indiscriminate effects. Despite these latest allegations, there has been limited support in the international community for a full investigation into the attacks. In the absence of any accountability, these small-scale, localised attacks are likely to continue. [HRW 2014/05/13, Reuters 2014/04/07, NYT 2014/04/07]

On 23 June, the OPCW stated that all chemical weapon materials and equipment declared by the GoS had been removed from the country or destroyed. This was in adherence to a September 2013 deal struck by the US and Russian governments, aimed at avoiding international military strikes. However, the OPCW and GoS have not yet agreed on the destruction of 12 production facilities, although the equipment for producing chemical weapons is no longer available at the sites. In addition, some western diplomats believe that the GoS failed to declare all its chemical weapons stock and capacity - they allege that a significant amount has been hidden. It remains unclear whether the OPCW will be able to conduct future inspections to certify that Syria is free of chemical weapons. [OPCW 2014/06/23, Economist 2014/04/24, Reuters 2014/04/25, Reuters 2014/04/07, NYT 2014/04/07]

Following the elections, the GoS announced a general amnesty and reduced sentences for all crimes except those involving what they have broadly defined as ‘acts of terrorism’. There were varying reports on the number of detainees released after the amnesty was put in place, with Syrian sources ranging from 1,200 to 10,000. While the announcement raised hope for the families of those detained or disappeared, it is likely that only a small percentage of the estimated 50,000-100,000 detained since 2011 were released. Furthermore, the amnesty is unlikely to lead to a significant change in conflict dynamics or the number of fighters laying down their arms. State media sources reported that dozens of prisoners were released in Al-Hasakeh, Dar’a, Hama and Homs. Other sources reported that 40 opposition fighters had turned themselves into GoS authorities in Rural Damascus. [NYT 2014/06/09, Al Nashra 2014/06/13, SANA 2014/06/15, SANA 2014/06/15, SANA 2014/06/15, Al Akhbar 2014/06/16, Daily Star 2014/06/15, OHCHR 2014/04/14, AFP 2014/05/14, worldbulletin2014/06/09, Assafir 2014/06/17]

WASH – Key Developments Q2

Water shortages: Water shortages have been widely reported in Syria. Within rural areas reliant on wells, the demand has already increased for electricity and fuel for generators needed for water pumping in the first months of
summer. While some problems are common across Syria, others vary depending on the conflict dynamics affecting an area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of areas</th>
<th>Commonly reported problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High conflict intensity</td>
<td>Damage or destruction to water infrastructure, a lack of access hampering repairs, deliberate water cuts by armed groups and/or the Syrian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low conflict intensity</td>
<td>Increased demand due to an influx of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All areas</td>
<td>Increased costs and shortages of chemicals and fuel, power outages, reduced revenues for water establishments, theft for pumps, pipes and generators, structural pre-crisis weaknesses, such as sewage leakages into the water network.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Reduced rainfall levels**: Drought-like conditions are of major concern and the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform issued a warning for agricultural areas within various governorates as cumulative rainfall has been 50% below the average this year. The main focus of the GoS has been on the impact on agricultural production and subsequent food security, with wheat yields for 2014 expected to be 50% below the 10-year average. In Damascus, a large decrease in the water levels of Al Fijeh spring, the major drinking water source for Damascenes, has already been witnessed. However, the impact of the water shortages on water supply remains an information gap. (UNICEF 2014/05/19, GIEWS 2014/05/15)

- **Euphrates’ Lake reduced water levels**: In May, an unprecedented decrease in water levels in the Euphrates’ lake was reported by multiple local sources. This is linked to various factors including the amount of water pumped from Turkey to Syria. Syrian officials reported that Turkey had completely cut off the water flow toward Syria for 13 consecutive days in May, and partially for sporadic days in March and June. This ongoing reduction in water levels is expected to have significant implications for many civilians in the northern governorates.

**Livelihoods and food security – Key Developments Q2**

**Needs for food assistance**

- A report covering 94 sub-districts across Syria by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) in March and April found that about 39% of the assessed population or 5.6 million people were in need of food assistance. Of those in need, 35% were identified as being in acute need of food assistance. (ACU 2014/05)

- Findings from a FAO/WFP December 2013 food security assessment found that 9.9 million people were in need of food assistance. The heightened level of conflict in Aleppo and increasingly dire humanitarian conditions in Deir-Ez-Zor, coupled with expected decreases in agricultural productions and increasingly restricted humanitarian access this year, are likely to lead to a major increase in the number of people in need. Due to the lack of quality control typically provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR) the per hectare production is expected to be significantly lower. (SHARP 2013/12/16, OCHA 2014/02/26)

- A June REACH assessment of eastern Aleppo city found that food was the priority need reported. (REACH 2014/06)

- Due to extremely limited access, mass displacement and significant intensification of conflict in Deir-ez-Zor, the humanitarian situation has significantly deteriorated, particularly but not limited to, food security. In March, a limited window to access Deir-Ez-Zor led to a temporary increase in aid distributions and a reported 17% drop in bread prices. By June, however, local media sources reported that prices had increased fourfold and that some shops were closed due to the lack of food supplies. In April, WFP was only able to distribute 10% of planned assistance for the eastern governorate, which has faced some of the most severe access issues in the country. (Zaman Al Wasl 2014/06/12, Daily Star 2014/05/21, WFP 2014/06/10, WFP 2014/06/03)

**Food availability**

- **Bakeries**: In the 94 sub-districts monitored by the ACU, over 1,000 bakeries were identified, but 33% were not functioning. Among functioning bakeries, only 20% were public bakeries. The primary reasons for bakeries not functioning were the lack of flour and fuel, however shortages of electricity and yeast were also a reported obstacle. (ACU 2014/05)

- **Food shortages**: In pockets of the country, shortages of flour and food items have been reported:
  - Deir-ez-Zor governorate faces major access restrictions to both assistance and commercial traffic due to the intensity of conflict. As a result, food shortages have been reported throughout much of the governorate. (Zaman Al Wasl 2014/06/12, Daily Star 2014/05/21, WFP 2014/06/10, WFP 2014/06/03)

Ongoing attacks on infrastructure: After more than 3 years of conflict, a major part of Syria's water infrastructure is in ruins, gravely impacting water availability and quality. Shelling, theft and controlling access to water have deprived many citizens of domestic and drinking water. These attacks have increasingly been used as tactics in the conflict and are taking place mostly in Aleppo, Damascus and Dar’a.
Northern rural areas of Ar-Raqqa governorate witnessed major food shortages due to intensified conflict and the ongoing closure of international borders. (WFP 2014/05/20)

Besieged areas suffer from regular food shortages. Darayya in the Damascus suburbs received no outside food assistance, leaving residents to rely on local food production, while in Yarmouk UNRWA reported that it had met less than 25% of civilians’ food needs since January. (UNRWA 2014/05/25, Amnesty 2014/06)

Agricultural production
- FAO warned that Syria’s major agricultural producing areas are threatened with drought-like conditions this year, particularly Aleppo, Dar’a, Hama, Homs and Idleb, which will significantly impact wheat and barley production – Syria’s 2 main food crops. Winter rainfall was below average and there was an increase in late seasonal rainfall, which was not necessarily beneficial to crops. If similar rainfall conditions occur next year, then the situation would be considered a drought. Despite the ongoing conflict and poor access to inputs, last year’s wheat harvest, which reached 2.5 million metric tons (MT) (about 50% of the 10 year pre-crisis average) at least experienced favourable rainfall. According to FAO projections, the wheat harvest is expected to be less than 2 million MT, about half of Syria’s pre-crisis production levels. However, other agricultural experts said wheat production could fall below 1 million MT. (FAO 2014/05/15, Reuters 2014/04/28)
- As a result of the low levels of rainfall, coupled with the high costs of inputs and access constraints, there were significant decreases in reported areas planted:
  - In Hama, local media reported that significantly less rainfed wheat crops were planted and a frost in late March affected the potato and fruit harvest. (Tishreen 2014/05/18)
  - In Dar’a, it was estimated that just 60% of planned wheat crops were planted due to unfavourable rainfall. (Tishreen 2014/05/18)
  - Around Ain Al Arab in northern Aleppo, a significant decline in agricultural production was reported. (ARA News 2014/05/14)

Health – Key Developments Q2
The last few months have not seen drastic changes in the health status of the Syrian population. Nevertheless, the summer months and concerns over lower availability of water, coupled with the weakened health system and breakdown of routine immunisation services, are serious risk factors for the spread of communicable diseases. Meanwhile, the increasingly limited availability of medications is heavily affecting those with chronic diseases.

- As measles presents a particular concern, health authorities have embarked on measles immunisation activities. The highest number of suspected measles cases is reported in the governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and Idleb. Between March and May alone, 965 suspected cases of measles were reported through EWARS. In late April, UNICEF announced its support for an immunisation campaign targeting 1 million children under 5 years old across the country.

- There is an anticipated rise in the number of cases of water-borne diseases such as typhoid, diarrhoea and cholera given the increased scarcity of water and other water issues. Areas reporting issues with water and sanitation services, primarily in Idleb, Deir-ez-Zor and Rural Damascus, are reporting higher numbers of cases of typhoid and acute diarrhoea. Similarly, the number of reported cases of bloody diarrhoea has been highest in Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor and Lattakia, whereas the greatest number of cases of acute diarrhoea have been recorded in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor and Al- Hasakeh.

- Polio vaccination campaigns are currently in their final rounds, achieving targeted coverage in most areas and surpassing it in others. However, the security situation continues to hamper good coverage in some areas such as Deir-ez-Zor. As of mid-June, vulnerable areas, namely in Aleppo (6) and Deir-ez-Zor (12) have seen the majority of Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases (most are awaiting confirmation). To date, a total of 39 confirmed polio cases have been reported across the entire country. In March, the fourth round of the polio outbreak response campaign reached 2.9 million children – the highest number of children immunised since the campaigns began and exceeding the target of 2.6 million children. Some areas were difficult to access in Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, rural Lattakia, Quneitra and Rural Damascus. The number of children estimated to have been missed as a result ranges between 500,000 and 700,000 in these areas.

- While the health system as a whole has not experienced dramatic changes, it remains weak as staff, medical equipment and medicines are increasingly in short supply and therefore overstretched. As before, this will continue to affect the quality of care that can be offered, adding a further layer to the existing vulnerability of the population, which struggles to adequately address its health concerns. Reduced capacity has been reported in Aleppo, eastern Ghouta and Ar-Raqqa, mostly due to besiegement, lack of staff and funding. Field hospitals are overwhelmed by the increased referrals resulting from the decreased services in public hospitals.
• The number of normal deliveries in hospitals has dropped. Records show a significant increase in the number of caesarean sections, indicating that there are more complicated cases being admitted to hospitals.

• It is worthy of mention that information gaps remain regarding the nutrition status of the population. UNICEF is finalising a rapid nutrition assessment of conflict-affected children across the country, including those residing in hard to reach areas. However, in early June, UNICEF reported that data was not available from Al-Hasakeh or Ar-Raqqa. The results of a recently conducted nutrition survey in Idlib, focusing on severe acute malnutrition, are pending. In the coming months, the various assessments should begin to provide some clarity on the nutrition situation in these areas.

Shelter/NFI – Key Developments Q2

• In the north, the IDP population residing in camps rose to about 155,000 in May, an increase of over 40% since January. The number of camps more than doubled from 40 in November 2013, to 85 camps in Idlib governorate alone, many of which were established in May. With continuing displacement and limited remaining safe spaces, the number and size of IDP camps are expected to increase. However, their ability to absorb and provide safe shelter and protection remains a major concern. [ACU 2014/05, CCCM 2014/05]

• In April, the Government of Syria (GoS) announced that fuel prices would be increased by 20% from SYP 100 to 120. This follows 4 fuel price increases since the beginning of 2013, which has nearly doubled the costs of gasoline in the past year. In May, the Central Bureau of Statistics reportedly released information showing that the price of domestic fuels had risen by 118% over the last 3 years of conflict, while fuel for transportation in Syria went up 105%. The increased costs of fuel will affect people’s movements, ability to cook food and their access to clean water. [Al-Akhbar 2014/04/16, Zamanalwasl 2014/04/17, DailyStar 2014/05/14]

• The GoS reported that reconstruction efforts would begin immediately in the formerly besieged areas of Homs City, including the Old City, Jurat El Shieh and Khalidiyyah. The restoration of water and electricity services and rubble clearance were stated as the top priorities for GoS institutions and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). [Al_Akhbar 2014/05/12, SANA 2014/05/12, SANA 2014/05/24, SANA 2014/06/09]

• A new IDP camp was established in Malikiyyah in Al-Hasakeh governorate. 300 tents have reportedly been set up under the auspices of the GoS, with overall management falling to the Kurdish political group, the PYD. Local media reported that some IDPs residing in Qamishli were asked to move to the new IDP camp. [Hawar News 2014/05/13, ARA News 2014/05/28, UNHCR 2014/06/09]

• A recently opened IDP camp in Ash Shajara in Dar’a governorate was attacked by GoS airpower, killing an estimated 20 people and injuring dozens. Remaining IDPs, estimated at up to 4,500, are reportedly leaving the camp, as well as another nearby site, and will likely place major pressure on limited stocks of available shelter in Dar’a. [AFP 2014/06/18, SNAP 2014/05/06, SOHR 2014/6/18, USAID 2014/06/19]

Shelter

• A REACH assessment of eastern Aleppo city found that neighbourhoods near the frontline with western Aleppo experienced the heaviest damage due to the intensity of airstrikes and fighting on the ground. Other parts of eastern Aleppo experienced moderate levels of damage. Despite the extensive damage to buildings, it was reported that damage did not appear to be the main factor in the functionality of basic services, such as bakeries, schools and health facilities, which did not function due to lack of supplies and staff. In Aleppo, UN Habitat reported that housing was extremely overcrowded with an average of 15-20 people sharing an apartment. [REACH 2014/06, UN Habitat 2014/05/18]

• According to UN Habitat, 50% of Homs city has experienced heavy damage due to the conflict, with disproportionate damage occurring in informal, unplanned housing areas. Commercial areas of Homs were also heavily damaged, which is affecting the city’s ability to recover economically. With an estimated 58% of the city’s population made up of IDPs, Homs has reached its maximum hosting capacity. [UN Habitat 2014/05/18]

• The GoS stated that there are currently 976 collective shelters across the country. In March, IOM reported that it had identified 823 collective shelters. The Sports City collective shelter in Lattakia is reportedly accommodating over 37,000 IDPs. [Al Iqtisadi 2014/05/20, IOM 2014/03/06, UNICEF 2014/05/19]

• IDPs continue to face major discrimination in finding refuge, in addition to major shortages and high costs of housing. As a result, many IDPs live in overcrowded housing or camps, with little to no privacy or adequate protection. According to local media, those neighbourhoods of Damascus which have a significant presence of intelligence and military offices are off-limits for IDPs, including Al Maliki, Ar Rawad, Muhajirin and Jisr El Abyad. Police stations are reportedly asking all IDPs in the area to obtain security...
clearance in order to complete rental agreements. Renting a furnished flat in Damascus was reported to cost between SYP 75,000-100,000 per month (USD 500-670). ([Zaman Al Wasl 2014/04/27])

- Despite the collapse of Syria's tourist industry, hotels remain full due to the influx of IDPs. A Lattakia beach resort reported that it had remained full with IDPs for the past 2 years, despite increasing accommodation costs. ([AFP 2014/05/22])

**NFI**

- Fuel : In late April, opposition attacks on a gas pipeline led to major electricity shortages in Damascus, as well as across the southern governorates, which persisted throughout June. In Damascus, this led to power outages lasting nearly 12 hours each day, while Dar'a experienced cuts for 20 hours. State media reported a similar attack occurring on gas pipelines in Deir-Ez-Zor and Homs in June, causing power outages. ([Al Iqtisadi 2014/04/28, Syria Deeply 2014/05/21, SANA 2014/06/08, SANA 2014/06/02, SANA 2014/06/11])

- Electricity : Access to electricity varies across the governorates due to fuel shortages, infrastructure damage and conflict over control of power plants. Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) reported that electricity production continued to deteriorate throughout 2013, with substantial damage inflicted on power stations and cables since late 2013. ([SCPR 2014/05])

- Control over electricity access was an ongoing source of conflict in Aleppo city, with opposition groups shutting down electricity to western Aleppo. This significantly reduced the area’s access to water supplies, which were already under major stress due to the high number of IDPs in the area. In April, water to GoS controlled areas of the city was cut off for 1 week. ([AFP 2014/04/25, Daily Star 2014/05/26, Daily Star 2014/05/28, Syria Deeply 2014/04/28])

**Education – Key Developments Q2**

**Key Developments Q2**

- Attacks on education continued unabated during the 2nd quarter. Between April and 17 June, the UN reported that there were 10 attacks on schools and education facilities across Syria, killing 66 people and injuring at least 180. In eastern Aleppo, an airstrike on a gathering of mostly women and children for a children’s art exhibit resulted in 36 dead, 33 of whom were children. ([UNSG 2014/04/23, UNSG 2014/05/22, UNSG 2014/06/20])

- Schools closed for the summer holidays in June, meaning that many education facilities are likely to be temporarily converted to collective shelters for IDPs as has been the case during previous school breaks.

- The GoS stated that 364,000 students sat their final secondary school exams. However, many of those residing in opposition areas had to undertake dangerous travel routes to GoS controlled areas to take their exams. As a result, on 29 May, IS kidnapped 225 Kurdish students as they were returning from Aleppo to Ain Al Arab. The female students, estimated at 125, were all released on the same day, while all the boys continued to be held. UNRWA negotiated the exit for 120 secondary school students to take their exams outside the besieged neighbourhood and hundreds more were reportedly escorted by GoS forces from Rural Damascus into the capital. ([UNSG 2014/06/20, UN News Center 2014/05/19, SANA 2014/05/30])

- In the besieged villages of Nubul and Al Zahraa in Aleppo governorate, an UN inter-agency mission found that 25 schools were functioning. However, in the 4 neighbouring opposition-held villages, which are not besieged but have been largely cut off from significant official assistance from Damascus, none of the schools were functioning and child labour was witnessed. ([WFP 2014/05/13])

- At the end of May, an estimated 39,600 Palestinian children were attending 42 UNRWA schools and other 43 public schools which UNRWA was approved to use for afternoon shifts. This represents a decrease of about 4,400 students, although there was no reported reason for the decrease. The 10% decrease in attendance might be attributed to the intensification of conflict in Palestinian settlements in and around Damascus and the lack of security to go to school. Before the crisis, there were 118 UNRWA schools pre-crisis receiving more than 65,000 Palestinian students. The remaining schools are either closed because of damages and insecurities or used as collective shelters. ([UNRWA 2014/05/25])
Annex A: Governorate profiles – Key Developments

The following pages provide a profile of each of the 14 governorates (in alphabetical order). Within these governorates, the following topics are covered: the key issues and possible developments, the context (including conflict dynamics), access issues, displacement occurring in the governorate and specific humanitarian needs reported.

Aleppo

Key issues and possible developments: From the beginning of January through to 29 May, air raids killed 1,963 civilians in Aleppo. Attacks continued, with the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs targeting predominantly residential buildings and neighbourhoods. Schools and hospitals have been repeatedly hit. Both water and power supplies have been used as weapons of war; being cut off as a means to garner leverage. Affected populations have been left with no water for days and were exceedingly vulnerable to disease.

Context: During the reporting period, reports showed scores of indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the SAF and non-state armed forces. Since late May, government forces in Aleppo city carried out several airstrikes and barrel bomb attacks on opposition-held areas in the centre and the south of the city, hitting public places such as busy markets, and civilian infrastructure such as schools. On 30 April, a twin airstrike hit a school in Ansari neighbourhood, killing at least 20 people including 17 children. On 1 May, warplanes hit a popular market, killing at least 33 civilians. Beginning of June, at least 10 civilians were reportedly injured by airstrikes in Masakin Hanano and Sheik Kider. In mid-June, Syrian helicopters dropped barrel bombs in Sukkari and Ashrafiyeh, killing 60 people and injuring dozens. Attacks by opposition forces on civilian infrastructure also took a toll on civilians. In early May, the SANA state news agency reported that opposition mortar attacks struck a hospital, killing 12 people, and Aleppo University, wounding 22 civilians, most of them students. The strikes came after GoS and opposition parties were about to conclude a second agreement to halt attacks on civilian areas. The first agreement, a week before, collapsed after dozens of people were killed in airstrikes and artillery shelling of opposition-held areas. The attacks were reportedly spurred by the opposition factions blocking electricity supplies to government-held neighbourhoods of Aleppo city. In the countryside, similar incidents caused additional civilian deaths. On 20 May, government warplanes targeted the city of Azaz, killing at least 10 civilians and injuring 22. At the border with Turkey, suspected IS fighters carried out a car bomb attack on the Bab Al-Sala border crossing, killing 43 civilians and wounding over 80. (Daily Star 2014/05/15, Now Lebanon 2014/05/16, AFP 2014/06/16, Al Jazeera 2014/06/17, AFP 2014/04/30, Al Jazeera 2014/06/17, ARA News 2014/06/02, ARA News 2014/05/21, AFP 2014/05/01, AFP 2014/05/03, Daily Star 2014/05/04) Adding to the violence, heavy clashes broke out between various opposition groups and IS, in several parts of Aleppo governorate. In the north, fighting between IS and opposition groups was reported between April and mid-June in the Tallat Bahouta area, but also in Hallisa, Abla, Tal Sha’eer and Tal Jijan villages. The Kurdish forces of the Popular Protection Units (YPG) and Shams al-Shamal Brigade also reportedly clashes with IS fighters in early May in the Tayara hill and both Nassiro and Khururs villages. (Zaman al Wsl 2014/06/11, SOHR 2014/05/18, Daily Star 2014/05/10, ARA News 2014/05/06, Assafir 2014/04/25) Between early April and mid-June, heavy fighting between SAF and opposition forces continued, and territory gains and losses were reported on both sides. In the first week of June, government forces took control of 5 villages in the area of Azzan Mountain overlooking the road between Damascus-Idlib and the road between Aleppo-Khanasir-Hama, progressing on the southern front and securing the area around Ramouseh, Wadihi, and An Nairib. And on 22 May, government forces broke a 13-month opposition siege on Aleppo prison, ending a stand-off that began in April 2013, thus cutting off a major opposition supply route and putting Government forces within reach of Castelo Road, which opposition forces in Aleppo have relied on as a supply route to move from the northern countryside towards Aleppo city. The prison had been closed.
a stronghold for government forces that was surrounded and isolated by opposition fighters. The prison is the Government's only major holdout between Aleppo and the Turkish border. At the end of April, GoS forces gained control of Al Matahen area, eastern Al-Zayat neighborhood granted them control over the nearby industrial city and central prison of Aleppo. GoS forces started progressing towards Al Sheikh Sae’id neighborhood on the southern front after taking control of Ar-Ramouseh. In mid-April, Government forces advanced around some of the eastern outskirts of Aleppo city, reopening the international airport to the east. On the opposition side, attacks on government-held areas of Aleppo intensified in the run-up to the 3 June presidential elections, killing 54 in two days. On 31 May, opposition forces planted explosives in a tunnel under a government position near the Zahrawi market in the Old City of Aleppo, killing at least 20 government soldiers. The Islamic Front, claimed responsibility. Fighting broke out after the explosion. Opposition mortar rounds killed 4 people in government-held areas of the city on the same day. In late April, opposition mortar rounds killed at least 21 people and wounded 50, including some areas in the Old City. In April, opposition forces also carried out several attacks on military bases, including in the strategic area of Hanano, which overlooks a key supply route for opposition forces going north into the rest of the governorate. At the beginning of April, an attack was also conducted around the Air Force intelligence headquarters, the most fortified area in northwest Aleppo, where thousands of detainees are believed to be held. (Reuters 2014/04/17, DW 2014/05/22, Al-Akhbar 2014/04/06, Al Jazeera 2014/05/31, AFP 2014/05/31, Assafir 2014/04/28, AFP 2014/04/17, Al-Akhbar 2014/04/17, Zamana’l-wsl 2014/04/11, AFP 2014/04/12, AFP 2014/04/13, Daily Star 2014/04/14)

**Access:** The siege imposed on Efrin by IS led to humanitarian assistance to the region being suspended for 11 months. WFP assistance first reached the area in early June. Also in early June, ICRC and SARC made rare aid deliveries to opposition-held territory in northern Aleppo, with government consent. The convoy, carrying aid for 30,000 people was relatively small in relation to need, according to ICRC officials. The Government rarely grants permission for aid deliveries to opposition-controlled areas, and the ICRC operates only with consent from both opposition and Government. (Daily Star 2014/04/10, ARA News 2014/06/16) Negotiations and agreements aimed at securing access for humanitarian convoys can be tense and unpredictable. On 20 April, for example, negotiations with opposition groups aimed at securing access for UN humanitarian assistance to a number of locations in rural Aleppo besieged since mid-2013, were suspended 12 days after they had begun. Heavy fighting, among other factors, made progress towards a successful conclusion impossible. (WFP 2014/05/04) In April, UNHCR and SARC, with agreement from the Government and opposition forces, delivered the first humanitarian aid into a besieged area of Aleppo since last June. The ceasefire, agreed for the duration of the operation, was fully respected as two truck-loads of supplies were moved by hand into the Boustan al Qaser neighbourhood of eastern Aleppo. (UNHCR 2014/05/04). Assistance is delivered under insecure conditions. Civil Defense personnel in opposition-held Aleppo held a sit-in on 9 May to demand compensation for the families of colleagues killed in the line of duty. 3 personnel were killed in March by a government airstrike as they tried to rescue people trapped under the rubble following a barrel bomb strike in the neighbourhood of Haidarieh. They said that they have been forced to rely on primitive tools to clear rubble and find survivors. (Daily Star 2014/06/10) In the Azaz area, aerial bombardments and clashes between the FSA and IS impeded humanitarian access in May, limiting staff movements and delaying emergency relief commodity distributions, according to NGOs. Airstrikes also constrained access in rural areas west of the city of Aleppo. (USIAID 2014/05/22) In another incident, 3 members of an emergency medical team were killed during air raids in Atarib in mid-May. (Daily Star 2014/05/15) Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) said that trucks carrying flour and blankets were caught in the middle of a government air campaign on 8 May targeting opposition strongholds in Aleppo city. (AFP 2014/05/09) Since the end of February, the UN has delivered aid to the opposition-held area in Aleppo city, but was forced to use a perilous path from Damascus rather than a nearby rebel-held border crossing with Turkey. (Daily Star 2014/04/28) The road Aleppo- Khasasir-Hama- Homs- Lattakia and Damascus is closed and opened sporadically. This has caused a spike in prices in the western half of the city. The fuel stations have also stopped working. (Al-Akhbar 2014/04/15)

**Political Developments:** In May the umbrella group Ahl al-Sham – incorporating Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Islamic Front and the Mujahedeen Army - announced a truce with the Kurdish forces of the Popular Protection Units (YPG) in Aleppo city and its rural areas in order to bolster their fight against government forces in the area. The truce allows groups to travel across territory held by rivals and entails prisoner exchanges. (Daily Star 2014/04/26). On 8 May, several dozen government soldiers were released by opposition forces fighters in Aleppo, as part of a deal struck to allow fighters to withdraw from Homs city. (Al-Jazeera 2014/05/08). In early May, media reports suggested that a lack of weapons supply had halted the opposition’s advance in Aleppo. An opposition spokesperson stated that their weapons were outdated, forcing them to rely on mortar attacks to try to cut off west Aleppo from its supply lines to Damascus. Mortars are fired indiscriminately into neighbourhoods held by the Government. (Al-Monitor 2014/05/07).

**Displacement:** Official displacement figures for Aleppo are likely to be considerably off, as they do not reflect the effects of the heightened increase in bombardments and fighting in recent months. According to UNICEF, for example, Aleppo’s population has doubled in the last 18 months to 2.5 million people. (UNICEF 2014/06/06). According to REACH, the heavy bombardments, conflict and lack of basic services, have displaced an estimated 550,000 people from eastern Aleppo since January 2014. Within eastern Aleppo, an estimated up to 220,000
people have gradually relocated to the southern area, closer to conflict hotspots, between January and early May 2014. The remaining population in eastern Aleppo was clustering in a southern area, near conflict hotspots. The area registered an estimated between 500,000 and up to 735,000 people as of late April. Following large-scale displacement in 2013, a second assessed area in the north, registered only an estimated 15,000 people. As of June 2014, these figures have, according to local reports and debriefings, drastically changed as several hundred thousands more people have left eastern Aleppo. (REACH 2014/06)

Humanitarian needs: In May, OCHA reported that given the intensified fighting, at least one million people were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in Aleppo. 1.25 million People are in need of food in Aleppo city and rural parts of the governorate. The road from Damascus to Aleppo - a vital lifeline – has often been cut. Other key roads are blocked by different armed groups. (OCHA 2014/04/23)

Protection: Despite the United Nations Security Council Resolution unanimously passed on 22 February demanding that all parties in Syria cease the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs and other weapons in populated areas, attacks have continued relentlessly. Between 22 February and 2 April, Human Rights Watch documented at least 85 strike sites in opposition-held neighbourhoods of Aleppo city, including 2 barrel bomb attacks on clearly marked official hospitals with no military targets nearby. (HRW 2014/04/29) The Violations and Documentations Centre issued a report on a variety of human rights violations to which professional journalists and civilian “media activists” have been subjected. It said that 307 journalists had been allegedly killed by government forces or allies, mostly by gunfire or bombing, with 24 of them allegedly tortured to death. The report also discussed violations by non-state actors, including extremist and Kurdish groups. It said 50 journalists still remain missing after a total of 114 were arbitrarily detained, mainly in Aleppo city, and blamed IS. (Daily Star 2014/05/05) On 31 May, IS kidnapped about 200 Kurds from the town of Qabbasin town and took them to an unknown destination. Also at the end of May, IS kidnapped students travelling between Aleppo city and Ain Al-Arab. On 8 May, IS kidnapped 30 passengers from Ain Al-Arab. According to one media report, by the end of May the group had kidnapped more than 400 Syrians in rural Aleppo. (Al-Akbar 2014/05/31, Syrian Observer 2014/06/02, ARA News 2014/05/10) Kurdish media reported that IS practices against have Kurds resulted in the displacement of approximately 50,000 Kurdish citizens, while their private property has been looted by fighters. (ARA News 2014/05/27) In May, IS ordered non-Muslim subjects living within its areas of control in Aleppo to pay protection fees, according to its interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. Residents of Menbij city, where an Armenian Christian minority live, were particularly affected. On 19 May, Menbij residents staged a strike in protest at IS’s campaign of arrests, harassment and summary executions. There were conflicting reports as to whether IS fighters opened fire on town residents. (ARA News 2014/05/13, Daily Star 2014/05/19)

Physical safety and security (incl. indiscriminate weapons): Nearly 2,000 civilians, more than a quarter of them children, have been killed in the massive air offensive on opposition-held areas of Aleppo governorate this year, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. From the beginning of January through to 29 May, air raids killed 1,963 civilians, including 567 children and 283 women. Human Rights Watch, which conducted an analysis of satellite imagery from late April to early May, found that over 140 major damage sites were strongly consistent with the impact of air strikes. They refer specifically to the continued indiscriminate use of barrel bombs targeting predominantly residential buildings and neighbourhoods in opposition-controlled areas. Data on 50 impact sites collected between 26 April and 7 May indicate that the Government had significantly increased its bombardment over the preceding weeks. Indiscriminate strikes often hit areas with no apparent military establishments, with both schools and hospitals being attacked. For example, a government airstrike hit a school in an eastern neighborhood of Aleppo on 30 April, killing at least 9 people, including 3 children, activists reported. (Daily Star 2014/04/30). According to Human Rights Watch, opposition forces have detonated at least 3 large tunnel bombs underneath government military positions in the centre of Aleppo city. These tunnel bombs have destroyed dozens of buildings, leaving blast craters upwards of 50 metres in diameter. Tunnel bombs can be indiscriminate in their impact across large areas. (UN Security Council 2014/05/22).

Access to assistance and services (incl. Besiegement): At the start of May, some 40-45,000 people were reported to remain under at least partial siege in Zahraa and Nobel, north-west of Aleppo, by fighters belonging to Ahrar al-Sham, Al-Nusra Front and other non-state armed groups. On 9 May, as part of negotiations linked to government forces lifting the siege of the Old City of Homs, a joint UN and SARC convoy was able to deliver humanitarian assistance to the residents of the two towns. (Worldbulletin 2014/05/07, Amnesty International 2014/06/10) According to Kurdish media, Al-Tawheed Brigade, one of the factions affiliated with the Islamic Front in Aleppo, in May laid a new siege on Efrin after disputes with the YPG. This comes after IS’s one-year siege on the city. An FSA official stated that civilians’ movement will not be restricted but that food movement will not be provided to the city. (ARA News 2014/05/15) As of early April, the city of Ain Al-Arab had been besieged by IS for 6 months. Ain Al-Arab and its surroundings shelter around 750,000 internally displaced Syrians who have been deprived of water and electricity as the resources are under the control of the extremist group. (ARA News 2014/04/11)

Human right violations: On 22 May, government forces broke a 13-month opposition siege on Aleppo prison. The prison had been besieged by Ahrar al-
Sham and Al-Nusra Front since mid-2013. Prisoners and detainees, reportedly numbering about 2,500, faced dire humanitarian conditions, disease, lack of medical treatment and adequate food, water and other essential supplies. State media reported that 150 prisoners died because of bombing and lack of medical supplies and food. Reportedly, hundreds of individuals remained in the prison even though they have already served their sentences. According to Amnesty International, more than 800 prisoners were reported to have died in the prison in the period between July 2012 and the end of the siege, including dozens after the siege was imposed in April 2013. Some deaths were due to indiscriminate bombardment by the besieging armed groups but most are reported to have been caused by the government forces controlling the prison. They are alleged to have executed some prisoners and to have caused the deaths of others under torture or other ill-treatment. Other prisoners reportedly died after they contracted illnesses, such as tuberculosis, but were denied medical treatment. Still others are said to have starved to death. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights said a number of prisoners and detainees, in particular 53 political detainees are at imminent risk in light of the Government regaining control. (Assafir 2014/05/23, UNOHCHR 2014/05/21, Amnesty International 2014/06/10, Daily Star 2014/05/24). The Attorney General in Aleppo stated that as of 16 June, 240 prisoners had been released according to the Amnesty Law. (SANA 2014/06/15).

SGBV: According to UNFPA, healthcare providers in Aleppo have observed an increase in cases of gender-based violence, including sexual violence. An average of one to two SGBV cases per month were reported by different clinics in Aleppo, though formal protocols for case management are not in place. There are reports that families are relying on females for money and of sex being exchanged for commodities. Living conditions, such as overcrowding and lack of regular electricity supply, in addition to a scarcity of female staff in IDP shelters, have contributed to the observed increase in SGBV cases. An increase in cases of sexually transmitted infections has also been associated with an increase in the exchange of sex for money among internally displaced women, although UNFPA was unable to verify these findings due to limited access and lack of agreed protocols. UNFPA partners in the field have reported early pregnancy and domestic violence as being relatively common. (UNFPA 2014/04/20)

Livelihoods and Food Security:

Macro-economics and livelihoods: The agricultural sector in Ain Al-Arab has seen a huge decline due to the low levels of rainfall and the effects of the siege imposed by IS. With the high prices and scarcity of fertilizers and the high costs of fuel, many farmers have been unable to produce crops. (ARA News 2014/05/14). 6 cotton gins in Aleppo governorate are out of service. (Al-Iqtisadi 2014/04/12). A UN mission visiting western Aleppo city from 18 to 22 March found that the areas main pre-crisis vocations of industry and agriculture, had been significantly affected by the conflict, leading to widespread poverty. Small-scale farming and livestock herding continued. (WFP 2014/04/05).

Food availability: Disruption of mains water supplies in Aleppo city in the last 2 weeks of May contributed to a drop in bread production, highlighting the vulnerability of supply, which is affected by multiple factors including a significant lack of flour reported in Aleppo. According to DYNAMO, 26% of bakeries in Aleppo governorate lack flour, 18% lack electricity and 6 % lack water to function. (WFP 2014/06/04). According to WFP's price monitoring over May, widespread volatility in commodity prices continues in rural Aleppo, where markets have been severely disrupted by spiralling insecurity and outbreaks of heavy fighting along key supply routes. Bread prices, in particular, registered steep rises over in these areas, where the provision of government subsidies is weak. (WFP 2014/05/20). The March UN mission to western Aleppo found markets generally well supplied and functioning, with prices relatively stable. Bread was found to be generally available in areas where WFP partners are providing public bakeries with wheat flour, allowing them to produce over 65,000 bread bundles per day. However, concerns were raised regarding the eastern districts of the city and rural areas, with reports of food shortages and soaring inflation. (WFP 2014/04/05).

Health:

Health infrastructure (incl staff and medicines): An independent study identified 150 attacks perpetrated between March 2011 and March 2014 against Syrian health facilities or practitioners. Aleppo recorded 35 attacks, the highest in the country, along with Rural Damascus. (REACH 2014/06) A local media source reported that Atereb Hospital, one of the few remaining hospitals in the opposition-held areas of Aleppo will be forced to close at the end of the June, after a major international NGO withdrew funding. This development will leave half a million people with access only to rudimentary field clinics, which can only offer basic emergency services. (Gamanawal 2014/06/15) Physicians for Human Rights reported that as of March in Aleppo city the only hospitals still functioning were 4 primary healthcare centres and 5 trauma clinics. Of the city’s 17 pre-war ambulances, only 7 remained functioning. In the opposition-controlled areas of the city, there were an estimated 10–12 general surgeons, 3–5 orthopaedic surgeons, and fewer than 10 internal medicine specialists. OCHA reported that as of May there were only 40 doctors for a population of 2.5 million people,
compared to 2,000 prior to the conflict. Only 10-15 surgeons are currently performing 1,500 surgeries in the city per week. (Physicians for Human Rights 2014/04/14, OCHA 2014/04/23)

Maternal Health: Ministry of Health (MoH) records show that only 3 to 4 deliveries a day are conducted by the MoH Maternal Hospital. The low number of deliveries indicates that women are either delivering at home or are paying high prices for private hospital care. Anecdotal evidence suggested that women prefer to go to private hospitals as they find the public ones to be of poor quality with limited access to reproductive health facilities. (UNFPA 2014/04/30) Aleppo University hospital reported a reduction in the number of births not requiring vacuum, forceps, or caesarean delivery from 5,251 in 2011 to only 937 in 2013. Caesarean-section deliveries increased from 42.5% in 2011 to 55.7% in 2013, due to the growing number of complicated cases admitted to the hospital. The findings also revealed an increasing number of sexually transmitted infection cases and a shortage of family planning and maternal health medicines and supplies.

Disease outbreaks: Of the 36 confirmed cases of polio reported in Syria, Aleppo, with 5 confirmed cases had the second highest number of cases, after Deir-ez-Zor. The latest round of monthly polio vaccinations was held 4-8 May. According to the Ministry of Health, areas in 29 districts in 11 governorates were not accessible during the May round due to active fighting and access restrictions, one of which was in Aleppo. (UNICEF 2014/05/19) Disease surveillance systems had reported suspected measles cases in 13 of 14 governorates in Syria as of 30 April. The Early Warning and Response System reports the greatest number of suspected cases in Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor governorates. Underreporting is likely due to the frequent population movement, access constraints, and the interruption of routine immunisation services. (UNICEF 2014/04/23, UNICEF 2014/05/19)

WASH: Damage to infrastructure: The attack on the main water network on Aleppo at the beginning of June was followed by agreements between relief actors and armed groups to allow access to the water pumping station lying in an opposition-controlled neighbourhood. Repairing the network required electricity, but the network had been attacked the same day. Aleppo's water establishment declared that the damaged network would not be repaired soon. The repair of Suleiman Al Halabi pumping station has stopped because of the shelling and water shortages were reported in 10 neighbourhoods of western Aleppo. (Al-Akhbar 2014/06/06, Al-Akhbar 2014/06/14) Complete water network shutdowns were registered in Aleppo between 23 – 27 April and 5 – 14 May, as parties to the conflict attempted to use control over the water supply as leverage. Estimates as to the figures of those affected range between 200,000 to 300,000 severely affected in eastern Aleppo (REACH) and 2.5 million (UNICEF). The severely affected in eastern Aleppo had to rely on unsafe, unregulated and unprotected groundwater sources putting them at a high risk to contracting diarrhoea, typhoid, polio and other water borne and contagious diseases, while long lines formed around the city as residents scrambled to secure a minimum of their water needs. According to REACH, the rest of the people in eastern Aleppo were affected to a lesser extent, having more options to procure safe water through safe wells and/or markets. (REACH 2014/06, Daily Star 2014/05/13, UNICEF 2014/05/19) According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the opposition were seeking to end the cuts in order to fully separate the network so that government-held areas could be isolated, and presumably targeted later on by another round of water cuts. The Observatory cited engineers in the city who said “non-experts” were behind the moves, which could have “catastrophic” effects if their plan to separate the two halves of Aleppo succeeded. (Daily Star 2014/05/13, SOHR 2014/05/10) Before and after the shutdowns, water supply through the network was already intermittent. Water was available through the network for only 12h (continuous) in each 48h in assessed areas in eastern Aleppo. Across the southern assessed area, the current situation with water was identified as being very problematic, but still not life-threatening. While most of the population in eastern Aleppo is heavily reliant on the water network for safe water supply, prolonged cuts would likely have a terrible humanitarian impact on the population. (REACH 2014/06) In May, UNOHR reported that some neighbourhoods in the Old City of Aleppo had not had access to potable water for 5 months. The water grid in Aleppo had to be repaired dozens of times in the month of April alone, mostly to fix damage caused by aerial bombardment and shelling. Some damaged points on the water grid have not been repaired because of shortage of equipment or spare parts, ongoing attacks, and the inability to remove large chunks of rubble to access the damaged areas. Media reports suggested in April that water being pumped into the drinking water network had declined as a result of an opposition group controlling one of the pumping stations and not supplying it with fuel. (UNOHR 2014/05/21, Al-Akhbar 2014/04/28) An early May agreement between SARC and the opposition groups that control Al Babiri station lead to water being pumped through Al Assad Lake on the Euphrates River to Aleppo city. (Al-Akhbar 2014/05/07)

Water shortages: In addition to the conflict, the low rainfall recorded this year is causing a severe water crisis throughout the country, with the availability of safe water at one third of pre-crisis levels. Aleppo hosts 1.25 million internally displaced, many of whom are forced to share already limited resources in overcrowded shelters and hosting homes. (UNICEF 2014/05/19)

Water quality: Residents of besieged Ain Al-Arab resorted to digging artisan wells in order to access water. However, the surface water started to dry up with the approach of summer, and got mixed with sewage, according to local media. Eventually, all potable water became polluted and led to a number of diseases, such as especially children and infants. (ARA News 2014/05/14) State media reported
in May that water has been diverted by the opposition forces from the pipelines towards Qwaik River, which passes through the middle of the Aleppo, and is contaminated with sewage. Trucked water was sold at SYP 3,000 for 1 litre (around USD 20) so some residents resorted to the using the Qwaik River water and 100 cases of poisoning have been reported. (Assafir 2014/05/12) Some of the trucks used to transport water had been used for the suction of sewage, according to media reports. Every truck with 20 m3 costs around 20,000 SYP (USD 130). (Al-Akhbar 2014/05/10)

Shelter:
Damage to infrastructure: Aleppo city’s most heavily damaged buildings are in the east and southeast areas of eastern Aleppo, where bombardments have been heaviest, and also in the areas where conflict has concentrated. In some districts near the eastern fringes of Aleppo city, up to 30% of all buildings have been demolished by the sustained heavy bombardments. the population has mostly departed from the areas that are heavily damaged into the southern and northern areas of eastern Aleppo, where private houses registering mostly medium levels of damage, according to a recent REACH report. (Guardian 2014/05/24, REACH 2014/06)

NFI:
Fuel and electricity: Disrupting electricity supply, which in turn affects water pumping stations, has been used by the parties to the conflict as a weapon of war. Eastern Aleppo underwent 2 complete electricity network shutdowns; between 18 April – 28 April and 1 May – 5 May, affecting an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people. On average, electricity supply in eastern Aleppo is intermittent; going on and off approximately every 3 hours. (REACH 2014/06) The April disruptions on electricity supply in government-held parts of Aleppo were due to Al-Nusra Front systematically attacking the high-voltage lines feeding the governorate. A local agreement was reached between the GoS and Al -Nusra on 28 April which lead to the restoration of power. Terms included isolating civilian areas from the fighting and bombardments and all parties agreeing to isolate the services institutions in the city from the fighting (water, electricity, telecommunications, waste disposal). The opposition had also threatened that if the Government did not relent on the airstrikes, the outages would be extended to Damascus and Lattakia. (Daily Star 2014/04/26, SANA 2014/04/28, Assafir 2014/04/29, Washington Post 2014/04/29)

Education:
Infrastructure: According to media reports, half of Aleppo city and the surrounding countryside’s schools have badly damaged or destroyed. Though some schools in the governorate are still functioning, the indiscriminate bombardments from the warring sides pose a severe barrier to education, with schools having been hit on several occasions. As WFP noted, in Nobol and

Zahra, 25 functioning schools enabled children to continue learning, though they were at risk of constant shelling. (Al-Monitor 2014/04/21, WFP 2014/05/20)

Attendance rates: More than half of all school-age children in Syria (51.8%) no longer attend school. This figure reaches above 90% in Aleppo. (UN Security Council 2014/06/23)
Al-Hasakeh

**Border crossings**

- Open
- Restricted access
- Unofficial crossing

Key issues and possible developments: Access to the governorate of Al-Hasakeh remains a major concern for the humanitarian actors. With the Islamic State (IS) control of Ar-Raqqa and the in-fighting in Deir-ez-Zor, the access from within Syria is sealed off. The Nusaybin-Quamishli border crossing has been opened again around mid-May and airlifted assistance has recently reached the governorate from Damascus. However, the access of humanitarian convoys towards hard-to-reach southern areas of the governorate remains extremely difficult. The Simalka border crossing has been opened in June for the return of refugees and for the passage of humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, the Ya’rubiyyah border crossing between Al-Hasakeh and Iraq has fallen under the control of Kurdish political parties on both sides and future coordination between them is expected to allow for humanitarian access. The deteriorating economic conditions in the governorate heightened by the rise in prices and reduction in agriculture production have caused a huge displacement of Kurds towards the neighbouring countries. Remaining residents survive on the edge of poverty relying mostly on revenues from the public sector and diminished agriculture returns. According to a study published by the Syrian Center of Policy Research (SCPR), the poverty rate in Al-Hasakeh is the highest among Syrian governorates at 65%. The flourishing informal economy relying has also caused a reallocation of wealth and benefited a limited number of individuals. Protection concerns in the governorate remain high as well especially in IS-held areas. IS has renewed its attacks on a Kurdish village in Ras Al Ain on 10 June and several car explosions resulted in 10s of casualties. The Arabic-Kurdish tensions have been heightened this period both in the countryside and in the city’s neighborhoods. The risk that IS re-launches its offensives against the Kurdish-majority northern part of the governorate nurtures fears among the Kurdish citizens. However, the strict border measures from the Turkish side make displacement a difficult option. Hakima camp, the first IDP camp of its kind in Deirk (Al-Malkeyyeh) has opened by mid-May. The camp falls under the administration of the PYD.

**Context:** During this period, clashes between the Popular Protection Units (YPG), the military wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the IS continued in rural Al-Hasakeh. Both sides have continued to shell each other's positions near the town of Ras al-Ain on the Turkish border. IS attacks on Kurdish villages have been also repeated as in the village Al Tileliya village (Ras El Ain) when IS fighters attacked Kurdish civilians and killed 15 by the end of May according to Human Rights Watch. Despite the semi-stability in the mostly-Kurdish region, car explosions were frequent in Al-Hasakeh since the beginning of 2014. During this period, similar explosions were reported since April in Al-Hasakeh city, Ras Al Ain, Darbasiyah and Tal Halaf. (ARA News 2014/04/18, Al-akhbar 2014/04/25, Annahar 2014/06/14, Daily Star 2014/05/29, Al-akhbar 2014/05/31, HRW 2014/06/14) On 10 June, the Iraqi Kurdish forces, known as Peshmerga, managed to take control of the Ya’rrobeiah-Rabi’a border crossing between Ninewa and Al-Hasakeh from the Iraqi side, while the YPG controls it from the Syrian side. (alhadathnews 2014/06/10, Zamanalwasi 2014/06/15) Most notably in the city of Al-Hasakeh, clashes erupted since the end of April between the Kurdish security forces (Asayish) supported by YPG on one side and national defense forces, constituted by members of Arab tribes, on the other side. The clashes took place in various neighbourhoods such as Aziziyyeh and Al Mufti. Such tensions,
attributed mostly to struggle over power between the GoS supporters, mostly in the center and the PYD, mostly in the northern neighborhoods, have erupted before in the city, though on a smaller scale. (ARA News 2014/05/14, Zamanalwasi 2014/05/21, SOHR 2014/05/21) After expelling hard-line fighters out of Ras Al Ain bordering Turkey and Ya’roubyah bordering Iraq in October 2013 and declaring an administrative autonomy in late September 2013, the PYD managed to consolidate the grip on the mostly Kurdish north-eastern region. IS has also maintained control in the south of the governorate since the start of 2014 despite some fighting with the YPG in southern Quamishli and Ras Al Ain. By mid February, clashes erupted between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front in Markada village, on the supply line between Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasekeh. These clashes have subsided around mid April.

Access

Cross-border assistance: WFP continues to face major access challenges in Al-Hasekeh, the governorate neighboring Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor and through which the main access points have been closed due to IS presence or fighting with other opposition groups. WFP has relied on access to the governorate through the Nusaybeen border crossing as happened in late March when a U.N. convoy crossed the border towards Quamishli for one day. Concerns arose whether the aid reached IS-controlled southern Al-Hasekeh and where the needs are paramount. However, WFP confirmed that the food rations were distributed to people in southern Al-Hasekeh as well including Al-Hole, Shadakah and Tal Tamer. The aid distribution was completed by mid May. It was reported that the aid reached 80% of the beneficiaries who had not been accessible since August. However, these beneficiaries represent only 20% of the people-in-need in the governorate. The WFP food convoys re-entered Al-Hasekeh through the border crossing with Turkey by mid-May. (WFP 2014/04/03, WFP 2014/04/17, AlertNet 2014/05/13, UNICEF 2014/05/19, USAID 2014/05/22, WFP 2014/05/16) The Simalka-Peshkhabour border crossing between Iraq and Al-Hasekeh re-opened again in June for the return of refugees and for the passage of humanitarian convoys towards Syria. The crossing was completely closed in front of refugees since the end of April. It was reported that 450 returnees came the Simalka border gate by mid June as a new agreement was reached between the Kurdish self-administrative region in northeastern Syria and the KR in Iraq. (hawarnews 2014/06/13, Welati 2014/06/10, pdk 2014/06/11). The control of Iraqi Peshmerga and Syrian YPG of the Ya’roubyah-Rabia border crossing highlights the possibility of coordination between the 2 Kurdish parties for the access of humanitarian assistance through this gate, especially with the approaching risk of IS fighting.

Airlifted assistance: Al-Hasekeh has also relied on airlifted assistance. Since December 2013, a series of airlifts to Quamisli airport allowed a limited number of food parcels and NFIs from KR and Damascus to reach populations in need in the northern part of the governorate. On 28 April, an airlifted assistance reached Quamishli again from Iraq, 70% of which being in opposition controlled areas according to WFP. Between 26-29 May, 4 emergency airlifts from Damascus to Quamishli were organized moving over 311 m³ of urgent relief cargo to the people-in-need in Al-Hasekeh. (WFP 2014/05/04, logcluster 2014/06/10)

GoS and YPG checkpoints: The number of checkpoints installed by the GoS security forces has recently increased in the city of Al-Haskeh to reach areas which fall under the control of the PYD. This has led to clashes between the two sides since April 30. The 2 main cities of Al-Haskeh and Quamishli in addition to the road linking them have already seen a plethora of YPG and GoS-held checkpoints. Residents and students passing from one city to another suffer from these checkpoints as their IDs are constantly checked. (ARA News 2014/05/01, ARA News 2014/05/07)

Displacement: More than 470 refugees returned from KR to Al-Hasekeh through the Simalka border crossing starting 10 June and following the escalation of violence in Iraq. (hawarnews 2014/06/13). Significant waves of displacement have occurred since late March and until the beginning of April, mainly towards Quamishli and rural Al-Haskeh. While precise estimates are not yet available, 250 newly displaced people have been registered for WFP assistance from the town of Markada, southern Al-Haskeh, where the fighting has been intense in March. Other estimates point out to thousands of IDPs who were forced to flee from east Markada to nearby villages. (WFP 2014/04/03, Zamanalwasi 2014/04/13). Since April, OCHA has not updated the IDP figures in Syria. In October, there were 230,000 IDPs in Al-Haskeh according to OCHA and 327,000 IDPs according to SINA. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Arabs have left the hard-to-reach governorates towards Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Europe. The pre-crisis population of Al-Haskeh was 1.5 million in 2010. (KOMELA ABORÎNASÊN KURD 2014/06/04)

Humanitarian needs: On 21 January a UN mission described Al-Haskeh as a besieged governorate and urged action to meet the needs of an estimated 500,000 people, of whom 50% are internally displaced. The mission found basic food items on local markets in short supply or sold at exorbitant prices as a result of road access restrictions. The people-in-need in the governorate were 319,000 in October 2013 according to OCHA and 654,000 according to SINA results in November 2013. (WHO 2014/04/15)

Livelihood and Food Security:

Reduction in agriculture production: The production of wheat declined by 30% from 1.45 million ton a year in 2010 to around 1 million ton in 2014. Large swaths of arable lands have not been planted mainly due to the high costs of inputs, access constraints and the high reliance on rain. 85% of the livestock has been exposed to viruses due to the lack of animal vaccines. The poultry production has been also reduced by 80% since 2010. Derik (Malkiye) district has been known for its contribution to the production of wheat, cotton, lentils and barely.
However, due to these high costs of inputs, previously provided cheaply by the GoS and which became rare and expensive, the production has significantly decreased. The middlemen now control the prices, and the warehouses of the Agricultural Banks went bankrupt. Farmers in Derik have to resort to Quamishli to receive fertilizers bags. (ARA News 2014/04/14, KOMELA ABORÎNASÎN KURD 2014/06/04) The high unemployment rate in the governorate reaching 70%, aggravated by high inflation rates increasing by 300% compared to pre-crisis levels and low purchasing power capacities with 70% estimated to be living in poverty, have resulted in the pervasion of an informal economy based mainly on smuggling and remittances from relatives abroad. The remittances vary from USD 200 to 300 per month, knowing that the average salary of a public employee is USD 200 and a family is estimated to require USD 500 per month to live in sufficiency. Recently, the access constraints imposed by the Turkish border guards and the trench being dug by Iraqi authorities have limited the smuggling activities to Turkey and Iraq. (KOMELA ABORÎNASÎN KURD 2014/06/04)

**Flour shortages:** The flour shortages in the main cities of Al-Hasakeh and Quamishli have increased the reliance on public bakeries in place of private bakeries. The public bakeries have increased their capacities by 141% to satisfy the demand. There are 9 automatic public bakeries in Al-Hasakeh knowing that the 2 public bakeries of Shadadah and Tal Brak are out of service. (Tishreen 2014/05/09)

**Shelter:**

**IDP camp:** The first IDP camp has been established in Al-Hasakeh in a village named Hakima, 6 Km from Derik (Malikiyeh). The camp was opened by mid-April in the presence of the Minister of Social Affairs and local relief committees. It contains 300 tents and is administered by the local autonomous administrative committees who will be providing services to the IDPs. Families displaced to Quamishli city were asked to move to the Hakima camp, outlying the city of Deirik. (hawarnews 2014/05/13, ARA News 2014/05/28)

**Temporary informal camp:** As a result of the fighting between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra and its affiliates in Markada in March and April, around 5,000 people have fled to nearby villages where they erected an informal camp. The camp which lacked basic humanitarian necessities was constructed temporarily until the fighting between the warring parties subsides. (Zamanalwasi 2014/04/13)

**Ongoing electricity cuts:** electricity is only available for 3-4 hours/ day in some areas of the governorate. (KOMELA ABORÎNASÎN KURD 2014/06/04)

**Protection:**

**IS abuses:** IS kidnapped in the beginning of May 3 prominent Arab tribal figures in Shadadah town in Al-Hasakeh. The Sheikhs were attending a conciliatory meeting in the eastern countryside of Deir-ez-Zor city. The Islamaic Shairi’s laws imposed by IS in their areas of control, such as Tal Hmis, continue to impose unbearable pressure on the citizens. (ARA News 2014/05/05)

**Extremists’ bombings and attacks on minorities:** On 14 June, a car bomb attack targeted a fuel station in Darbasiyah city, east of Quamishli, and claimed lives of more than 13 people. On 24 April, 2 car bomb attacks hit the city of Ras al-Ain, killing at least 10 civilians. (ARA News 2014/04/25, SOHR 2014/06/16). IS killed 15 Kurdish people, 7 of them children, in an attack on a Yezidi-majority village (Al Taliliah) near Ras Al Ain by the end of May. (Daily Star 2014/05/30)

**Arabic-Kurdish heightened tensions:** On 25 April, 3 armed Arab men from the village of Zahir al-Arab in the countryside of Ras Al Ain city killed a leader of YPG. The village of Zahir al-Arab is mostly inhabited by Arabs. The reason behind the assassination was attributed to the YPG attempt at controlling the wheat storage silos in the village. More heightened tensions between Arabs and Kurds were witnessed in the city of Al-Hasakeh since the end of April. (ARA News 2014/04/25)

**YPG abuses:** The Kurdish security forces of the Assayish and the YPG imposed a curfew in the city of Derbasiyeh (Al-Qahtaniyah) on 1 April, preventing people from getting in or out of the city. This came after a security barricade was constructed all around the city, followed by raids on a number of houses. The PYD arbitrarily arrested civilians and confiscated their houses. In the beginning of May, the Assyish reportedly arrested several members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS), a rival party to the PYD. HRW reported that the PYD security forces appear to have arbitrarily detained individuals affiliated to Kurdish opposition political parties such as the Yekiti Party and the Azadi Party as well. The PYD forces allegedly exiled those members to the autonomous KR in Iraq. A number of Kurdish activists were also exiled by the PYD in April. The PYD, on the other hand, denies holding any political prisoners and said the men whose cases we documented were arrested for criminal acts, such as drug trafficking and bomb attacks. (ARA News 2014/04/11, ARA News 2014/05/19, worldbulletin 2014/05/19, HRW 2014/06). The past two and half years have also seen at least 9 unsolved killings and disappearances of the PYD’s political opponents in areas controlled or partially controlled by the PYD. The PYD has denied responsibility for them all. (HRW 2014/06).

**Children military enrolment:** HRW provided evidence of children under 18 years old who have joined the YPG and the Asayish forces though the internal regulations forbid that. (HRW 2014/06).

**Protests against the Iraqi’s trench:** Following the beginning of the trench digging by Iraqi authorities along the borders with Al-Hasakeh since early April, PYD supporters started protesting against the KR-G decision. Around 1,000 PYD-affiliated people demonstrated alongside the ditch, heightening the tensions between the PYD demonstrators and Iraqi Peshmergas. The relationship between Barzani’s party, the KDPS, and the PYD is expected to improve, however, with the IS threat to the Kurdish region. (worldbulletin 2014/04/11).
Turkish guards preventing irregular entry: A Kurdish woman was shot dead by the Turkish border guards on 18 May while trying to cross the border into Turkey illegally from Derik. (ARA News 2014/05/20)

The dangerous trip to Europe: The deteriorating economic conditions in Al-Hasakeh have prompted many residents to seek refuge in Europe. The illegal trip through the sea is full of danger and requires payments reaching USD 10,000 to Turkish brokers in order to reach European coasts. Around 22 March, a boat heading from Turkey to Greece capsized off the Turkish coast. 4 Kurds who were on board passed away. (Al-Jazeera 2014/04/26)

Amnesty released prisoners: 65 prisoners have been released so far in implementation of the amnesty decree. (SANA 2014/06/15)

Health:
Scarcity of medicines has been continuously reported in the governorate. Those who are in need for medicines on daily basis, like diabetes and hypertension patients, suffer the most under the conditions of the ongoing crisis. Currently, medicine is 60% available compared to previous months in Amuda, for example. Some pharmacies monopolize missing drugs, which raises their prices. Moreover, some medicines are transferred to warehouses by plane, which raises 56% of the price. (ARA News 2014/04/13). Despite the access constraints, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) has been able launch a polio vaccine campaign in the governorate, reaching thousands of vulnerable children in hard-to-reach southern Al-Hasakeh. In March, 2 polio cases were reported in Al-Hasakeh. The frequent power cuts in the governorate are considered a main obstacle facing the vaccines storage in Al-Hasakeh and which eventually affect the campaign’s operations. (IFRC 2014/04/16).

WASH
Drinking water shortages have been reported during this period as in the city of Quamishli. The unavailability of water is exacerbated usually in areas far from urban centers and pumping stations’ sites. The problem of water in Al-Hasakeh is mainly related to the lack of electricity which affects the functioning of the artesian wells and the pumping operations. Despite the high costs of digging and buying plungers necessary to draw water, the reliance on digging wells has significantly increased. (Tishreen 2014/05/18, ARA News 2014/06/12)
Ar-Raqqa

Key issues and possible developments: Ar-Raqqa, strong-hold of the Islamic State (IS) has seen continued clashes between various opposition groups and IS, while also undergoing aerial bombardment by Syrian government forces. Protection issues and human rights violations are reportedly rife in the areas under control of extremist groups. Minority communities are particularly at risk.

Context: In April, Ain Issa witnessed clashes between Liwa' Thowwar Ar-Raqqa, a group that defected from Al-Nusra Front, and IS. The fighting continued in the beginning of May, particularly in the villages surrounding Ain Issa. Fighting broke out on 12 May between IS Muslims and the Popular Protection Units (YPG), the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in al-Mahmudiyyah village, near Ar-Raqqa. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the PYD and Islamist groups — which rarely cooperate — were fighting together against IS. (ARA News 2014/04/14, Daily Star 2014/05/12)

On 13 May, IS took control of the villages of El Aarida, Umm Hweish, Zannooba and others in rural Ain Issa after clashes with PYD. Areas controlled by IS in Ain Issa town were regained by other opposition groups. (Assafir 2014/05/13, Al Akhbar 2014/04/28, SOHR 2014/05/05, ARA News 2014/04/14)

On 15 May, IS bombed the shrine of Uwais al-Qarni, a Shia religious shrine in Ar-Raqqa governorate. (ARA News 2014/05/16)

On 27 May, a car bombing targeted a hotel being used by IS in Ar-Raqqa city. The attack wounded an unconfirmed number of civilians and prompted IS to impose a curfew and arrest 10 fighters from other opposition groups. (Daily Star 2014/05/29)

Clashes in Ar-Raqqa are expected to continue between IS and other opposition groups such as Liwa’ Thowwar Ar-Raqqa, supported by PYD in Ain Issa and in the west of Tal Abiad areas. Conflict is also expected between IS and PYD around the Kurdish majority villages in the same areas, but neither side is expected to progress or expand its territory in the near future. GoS forces are expected to continue aerial bombing sporadically against Ar-Raqqa and Tabqa cities, but areas of control are not expected to witness significant changes.

Access: In March, access to Ar-Raqqa slightly improved. However, WFP food distributions delivered was sufficient to support only 15% of intended recipients. (WFP 2014/04/12) That partial access that had allowed rare but significant deliveries of food assistance proved short-lived. Deteriorating security forced a complete suspension of dispatches to both governorates in April, with the result that none of the planned distributions for the month took place. (WFP 2014/05/04) Increased vehicle checkpoints established by non-state actors on transit routes throughout Ar-Raqqa governorate impeded access in May, according to an NGO. (US AID)
Access is highly dependent on the willingness of IS to allow humanitarian actors to function in their areas of control; even if it takes place it can be expected that IS will intervene directly in the activities of these actors.

Displacement: IS reportedly implemented new laws in several areas, such as in Tabqa city, prohibiting civilians from leaving without permission. This is thought to have limited the movement of IDPs out of the governorate. The closure of borders with Turkey in Tal Abiad also limited the numbers of people from Ar-Raqqa seeking refuge in Turkey. In small Kurdish villages in Ain Issa and Tal Abiad small displacement movement recorded in the past three months and IDPs main destination was Ain al Arab Kurdish majority area in north eastern Aleppo governorate. IS stated that Kurdish civilians who left their villages in Tal Abiad can return in case of giving up their Kurdish nationality and fully submit to the Islamic rules implemented by IS, it is not highly expected that many civilians will return under these conditions. (ARA News 2014/04/13) No major displacement movements are expected in the near future unless the border with Turkey in Tal Abiad is opened again, in which case the area might witness an influx of refugees toward Turkey. This development is unlikely, given Turkey's tight control of its frontier in the areas bordering IS held areas in Syria. Should IS attack another Kurdish village, civilians are expected to flee toward Ain al Arab sub-district.

Humanitarian needs:
Protection: IS has been reported that wherever IS or other extremist groups take control of a village or a city suburb, they not only impose their military rule, as but they also attempt to control civilian, economic, cultural and religious structures, legitimizing their claim to leadership through their military power. Dismissal of the laws they impose may be severely punished. For example, on 16 April, IS reportedly killed 3 civilians in Ar-Raqqa city because they refused to submit to the group's decision to ban smoking in the city. IS also reportedly imposed an Islamic tax on all villages surrounding Ar-Raqqa, forcing farmers to pay the money. (ARA News 2014/04/21, Conciliation Resources 2014/04/12, Syrian Observer 2014/06/04) According to local human rights activists, IS is believed to be holding more than 1,000 prisoners in Ar-Raqqa in an unknown number of detention facilities, including secret prisons where torture is especially severe. In April, IS announced it had executed 7 prisoners in its bastion in northeastern Syria, two of them by crucifixion. The group said it held them responsible for a grenade attack on one of its fighters. (AFP 2014/04/29, AFP 2014/04/22) Minority groups in Ar-Raqqa have come under oppression by extremist groups. IS has confiscated all land north of the city of Ain Issa from Armenian inhabitants. In late February, IS imposed regulations on Christians living in Ar-Raqqa to pay Islamic tax and obey commands related to practising their religious rituals. IS displaced many of them, confiscated their homes and schools and burning churches. In April, IS announced that the displaced Kurdish inhabitants of Tel Abiad could return home on condition of giving up their Kurdish national identity and fully submitting to the Islamic rules. In June, IS confiscated private property of Christian families in Ain Issa area (where Armenians constitute a majority). This protection concern can be expected whenever IS take control of areas where minorities are residing, although it will be less reported since relatively small numbers of Christians and Kurds are still residing in IS held areas. (ARA News 2014/04/13, ARA News 2014/06/02, Syrian Observer 2014/06/04)

Livelihood and Food Security: The contracts of 4,700 public employees in the governorate of Ar-Raqqa, who earn $100 per month, are not going to be renewed. The Government stated that they will now be dismissed from their positions because reduced consumption in the governorate. (Al-Akhbar 2014/06/14) According to WFP's price monitoring, volatility in commodity prices continues in northern rural Ar-Raqqa, where markets have been severely disrupted by spiralling insecurity and outbreaks of heavy fighting along key supply routes. Bread prices registered steep rises in these areas, where the provision of government subsidies is weak. (WFP 2015/05/20)

Health: Measles outbreaks are of increasing concern as summer season approaches. From the end of March to 3 May, 965 cases of suspected measles were reported through the Early Warning and Response System, including 378 in Ar-Raqqa. (UNICEF 2014/05/27)

WASH: Parts of Ar-Raqqa continue to face irregular supply or shortage of water due to shortages in power supply and fuel. According to local media, services in Ar-Raqqa city and countryside are poor. With the decline in the water level of the Euphrates River, Ar-Raqqa suffers from a shortage of water also affected by the continuous power outages. The low Euphrates water levels affect the drinking water plants. 5 pumping stations have gone out of service. (Al-Iqtisadi 2014/05/12, Assafir 2014/05/12) According to media reports, IS issued a fatwa that they will cut off electricity in Ar-Raqqa during Ramadan. (As-Safir 2014/06/17)

Education: More than half of all school-age children in Syria (51.8%) no longer attend school. This figure reaches above 90% in Ar-Raqqa. (UN Security Council 2014/06/23)
Key issues and possible developments: Although it has been one of the least affected governorates to date, As-Sweida is witnessing an increase in conflict-related incidents since the beginning of the year. Opposition groups operating in Dar’a have launched opportunistic attacks, including on water infrastructure, in the second quarter of 2014. The increase in attacks may be linked to a threat by Jabhat Al Nusra to attack GoS controlled areas. (Al Akhbar 2014/06/12) Meanwhile, tensions between Druze communities and GoS authorities have heightened in recent months with the arrest of a local leader reportedly because he refused to allow an election rally to be held. Local media sources also reported that over 30 civil servants working in the health, education and water departments were fired by national authorities, a potential sign of simmering tensions. (Daily Star 2014/04/30, Zaman Al Wasl 2014/04/11) The EWARS detected 2 cases of AFP and 7 suspected measles cases in As-Sweida in April and May. This is likely due to limited water supplies and poor water quality; limited incomes could also be hampering access to hygiene supplies. (WHO 2014/05/15)

Context: Mountainous As-Sweida governorate continues to be one of the least directly affected areas in Syria, however, its population is indirectly affected by weakened livelihoods, lack of fuel, increase in prices and limited access to goods and water supplies. The area is inhabited by Druze communities, which mainly support the GoS, although anti-government protests have sporadically occurred since 2011. Because of its relative stability, the governorate became host to a growing number of IDPs in 2013, estimated at between 30,000 to 52,000 people, many of which fled from neighbouring Dar’a. IDP entry and residence in As-Sweida is restricted and closely monitored by GoS forces. (SHARP 2013/12/16)

Displacement: There are no new updates on the number of IDPs in As-Sweida. However, due to restricted border crossings between Dar’a governorate and Jordan, reliable sources say that more people are transiting through As-Sweida to enter Jordan through the eastern desert, a route which entails significantly more risks and hardship. (PI 2014/06)
Humanitarian needs

**WASH:** Water shortages are a chronic issue in this arid region of Syria. The lack of electricity and fuel supplies to pump water has exacerbated water shortages, meeting only about half of As-Sweida city’s needs. ([Tishreen 2014/05/19](#))

**Health:** 2 new cases of AFP were reported from As-Sweida, bringing the total number of AFP cases detected to 4, although there have been no confirmed cases of polio to date. There was no information available on where the cases were found. ([OCHA 2014/03/13, WHO 2014/05/15](#))

**Livelihood and Food Security:** Late seasonal rainfall helped As-Sweida farmers avoid a drought conditions this year, although the rainfall in neighbouring Dar’a appears to be much more critical. However, livestock production has been significantly affected by the lack of inputs for veterinary services, fodder and transport, according to local officials. ([GIEWS 2014/05/15, ARA 2014/04/27](#))
Key Issues and possible developments: The security situation is deteriorating in Damascus and access is still very limited. New government restrictions on convoy clearance are further hampering aid activities. On 22 June, the Syrian Government and opposition groups have reportedly agreed a truce in Yarmouk camp. The agreement stated that the main entrances to the camp will be opened and basic services restored. Similar initiatives have collapsed in the past, and it is not clear when this truce will begin.

Context: Security conditions continued to deteriorate in Damascus since March, with intense clashes between government and opposition forces in the northeast, east and southeast of the city. In both government- and opposition-held areas, records showed indiscriminate mortar attacks and airstrikes on busy public places and civilian infrastructures, including schools and education facilities. Additionally, siege tactics were maintained in many opposition bastions in the east and south east, with GoS forces restricting or cutting access to besieged populations, and blocking people from exiting these areas. (UN 2014/05/22, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2014/04/10, Al Jazeera 2014/04/13, AFP 2014/04/13, Daily Star 2014/04/14, AFP 2014/04/15, Al-Akhbar 2014/04/23, Aranews)

Access:
In Damascus and its countryside: Hundreds of thousands of people reportedly continue to be inaccessible due to ongoing siege tactics imposed by GoS, and...
due to restrictions preventing aid actors based in Damascus from crossing checkpoints, working with local aid actors, and travelling to field locations. Supplies destined to Damascus are being delayed, sometimes for months, due to bureaucratic impediments in Lebanon and Syria. (PI 2014/04) In late March, the Government communicated a new procedure for clearance of unaccompanied trucks, imposing that trucks are checked and sealed at warehouses, and not searched at checkpoints. The implementation of this new procedure has reportedly slowed down the delivery of assistance. As of mid-May, at least 150 trucks were held up in different locations throughout the country, notably at the entrance to Damascus, where additional facilitation letters to the ones already required were being demanded at checkpoints. (UN 2014/05/22)

Closure of aid operations: In late April, the relief organization Mercy Corps announced it had to shut down its operations in Damascus, after it was forced to choose between operating in either regime-held or opposition-held areas, an ultimatum which stands in defiance of a Security Council resolution stipulating that assistance should reach people throughout the country. (Mercy Corps 2014/05/23)

Yarmouk: Conditions worsened significantly. The multilateral agreement signed in January to allow unrestricted humanitarian access to the camp broke down in March, when the Government demanded that opposition groups inside the camp surrender, drastically restricting all supply deliveries. (Guardian 2014/04/19) Forces loyal to GoS continued to maintain their siege established since December 2012. Some 18,000 civilians living in the camp are still denied access to food and medical care, and are not allowed to leave the area. Additionally over the last few months, members of Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS harassed medical workers and blocked access to areas where distributions were carried out on several occasions, threatening residents with violence. (Amnesty International 2014/06) Since January, UNRWA has carried out intermittent food distributions to civilians caught inside Yarmouk, although clashes and shelling often cuts the deliveries for days at time. Between 1 April and 2 June, the agency was able to provide shipments on 25 days, but there were no UNRWA distributions on an estimated 40 days. According to latest reports as of 18 June, access has not been authorised for UNRWA distribution since 3 June in Yarmouk. UNRWA also indicated that it was only able to get on average 100 food parcels per day since the beginning of the year, when at least 400 food parcels per day would be necessary to keep people from starving. (UNRWA 2014/06, 2014/05, 2014/04) Since distribution was first allowed on 18 January 2014, there was no distribution on 68% of the days when distribution was planned. Distribution was possible on 51 days, but distribution was described as low on 23 days, and moderate/high on 28 days. (UNRWA 2014/05/22)

Displacement: According to the UN, intensified clashes were reported between 22 April and 19 May in Damascus, particularly in the Jobar neighbourhood. Violence resulted in the displacement of the remaining residents, and the neighbourhood is reportedly almost deserted. (UN 2014/05/22)

Humanitarian Needs:

Food Security and Livelihoods: As of April, food and various kinds of fruits and vegetables were available in all areas of Damascus but prices were very high, which represents an issue in terms of financial access considering Damascus and its countryside have unemployment rates of over 50%. (Socioeconomic Monitoring Report on Syria, 2013/12) Some dairy products were also available but milk prices had significantly increased due to shortages caused by difficulties in transporting dairy products from the suburbs to the centre of Damascus. (NGO 2014/04). Over the last few weeks, prices of most goods were said to be relatively stable. (Department of Domestic Trade and Consumer Protection in Damascus 2014/05/19) Due to power outages in Damascus and its countryside, refrigerated food became spoiled, and people are increasingly relying on canned food and other food items which do not require refrigeration. (Syrian Observer 2014/06/18) In Yarmouk camp, only 25% of the food requirements were met by UNRWA food distributions between January and May. (UNRWA 2014/05) In addition to the aid distributed by UNRWA, small quantities of food aid from other humanitarian organizations were permitted by the government forces. (Amnesty International 2014/06)

Health: The latest round of polio vaccinations was held on 4-8 May, and 2.8 million children were reached. In Damascus, 3 districts could not be accessed due to fighting and restrictions. (UNICEF 2014/04)

Protection: Protection is increasingly of concern in Damascus, with frequent reports of attacks and violent events targeting public places and civilian infrastructures, including schools. Between July 2013 and early June 2014, 271 individuals believed to be civilians died as a direct result of the siege by government forces on the Yarmouk camp, 26 of which died between 10 April and 3 June. Records showed that one death was attributed to starvation, while 25 others were due to the lack of adequate medical care. Among these, 16 people had sustained injuries due to shelling and 4 had reportedly been shot by snipers. (Amnesty International 2014/06) In Jobar and other areas eastwards in Rural Damascus, reports show that children are used to gather raw materials in areas close to opposition factories manufacturing mortar shells, and are given very low income for this activity. (Al-Akhbar 2014/04/20). In south Damascus, a rising number of children are orphans or found abandoned after their families, no longer able to provide for them, leave them on the streets. These children are considered highly vulnerable to abuse and child labor. (Syria Deeply, 2014/05/16)
1,047 in February, and 2,026 in March. The increased demand for pre-marital counselling and the treatment for genital bleeding and sexually-transmitted infections are seen as anecdotal evidence of increased GBV incidents among the women in the area. (UNFPA 2014/04/30)

**Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI):** People in Damascus are facing long power outages, up to 12 hours/day so far in the city, and up to 16 hours/day in the nearby countryside. (Syrian Observer 2014/06/16) These cuts are mainly the result of the recent attacks on gas lines and power networks. (Al-Ahbar 2014/05/06)

**WASH:** Major water shortages are expected in the summer in Damascus. Although significant decrease was reported in the water levels of Al Fijeh due to low rain fall— a major source of drinking water for the city – water cuts are believed to be mainly caused by long hours of power cuts, lack of fuel in pumping centres and technical problems with the equipments. (General Organization for drinking water 2014/04/16, Aljitsadi 2014/05/08) Additionally, attacks on gas lines are causing more frequent power outages. (MWRI 2014/05) In early May, attacks were also conducted on water networks and caused the continuous interruption of water supply in the capital for 3 consecutive days (Al-Ahbar 2014/05/06) As of April, drinking water was available in the centre of Damascus 10 hours/day, and 10 hours/48hours in surrounding areas (NGO 2014/04). Due to low water levels, power outages and attacks disrupting the system, water is expected to be available only 1 hour per day during the summer. (General Organization for drinking water 2014/04/16) To compensate the cuts and satisfy the water needs, people are increasingly relying on water tanks from the private sector despite dwindling incomes, which results in increasing water prices. (Orient News 2014/04/17) In Yarmouk, access to adequate and safe water is extremely limited, with water reportedly available in most taps for less than an hour a day, due to damage sustained to water pipes from frequent shelling over the last 6 months. In areas with water wells, the quality is said to be poor and the pumping process very costly. (Amnesty International 2014/06)

**Education:** As of early May, the Department of Education in Damascus reported that 88 schools are not functional, while 17 are being used as evacuation centres. Another 108 schools only function part-time. Reports also show students and teachers are being targeted in violent events and kidnapping. An estimated 44,000 student are reportedly attending school. (Tishreen 2014/05/09)
Key issues and possible developments: Besiegement on the areas of Eastern Ghouta (especially the densely populated Duma city), Hajar Aswad neighbourhood and Sbeineh resulted in severe malnutrition, medical shortages and poor living conditions and also led to several casualties in those areas due to malnutrition and a lack of medicine. Heavy bombardments on Eastern Ghouta and the southern outskirts have likely taken a major humanitarian toll, although information was not available. Tens of thousands of people remain inaccessible.
due to the ongoing siege by GoS forces and by the violence witnessed in those areas.

Context: In April, GoS forces with the support of Hezbollah fighters regained near complete control over the Qalamoun region of northern Rural Damascus such as Yabroud, Rankus, Esal El-Ward, Hosh Arab, Ma’loula, Sarkha and Jobbeh following clashes with opposition forces. After the takeover of GoS forces over the Qalamoun region, fighting mainly shifted east towards the besieged areas of Harasta and Eastern Ghouta as well as towards areas in southern Rural Damascus such as Western Ghouta, Darayya, Hajar Aswad. Areas in the southern and eastern fronts are daily subject to heavy bombardment by SAF warplanes with clashes taking place in their outskirts. In 19 June, the Syrian Observatory reported 25 air raids on the town of Mleiha and its outskirts which is the most intense fighting front between both conflicting parties. Internal conflicts frequently break out between different opposition factions in Eastern Ghouta and sometimes develop into armed clashes. (Al Akhbar 2014/04/18, Al Akhbar 2014/04/19, SOHR 2014/06/20) Rankus town was taken over by GoS forces after an agreement was reached between GoS forces and the town’s residents, in which the residents agreed to demand opposition forces to withdraw from the area. A cease fire has been reached in Harasta of Eastern Ghouta with some medical cases evacuated, while the ceasefire has been breached several times it did lower the intensity of the conflict in the area. Fighters in Az-Zabadani reportedly submitted their heavy weapons following negotiations between both sides. Other negotiations are still underway in Mleiha and other areas. (BBC 2014/04/09, Al Akhbar 2014/06/10, Al Akhbar 2014/04/24)

Access: Access to Eastern Ghouta, Darayya and Madamiyet Elsham continues to be heavily restricted by the GoS due to the ongoing siege as well as heavy shelling and airstrikes by GoS forces and clashes between GoS forces and opposition forces. The siege imposed on the areas for the past 18 months affects an estimated 177,000 persons (50,000 in Eastern Ghouta, 20,000 in Madamiyet Elsham and 7,000 in Darayya), according to Amnesty. The GoS restricted relief convoys from reaching the besieged areas with limited exceptions in particular cases. (Amnesty 2014/06/12) Access to Duma city, inhabited by approximately 50,000 persons, has been extremely limited, with local sources stating that the only entrance to the city is through the Wafiden camp on the Damascus-Homs road near Harasta city. (Daily Star 2014/05/28) A convoy, organized by UN agencies and SARC, delivered food parcels, medicines and medical supplies to the city of Duma on April 24 for the first time since the start of the siege in November 2012. The Syrian Observatory reported that the city’s outskirts were subject to 2 airstrikes as UN and SARC workers distributed aid in the area. Nonetheless, the convoy reportedly distributed 400 aid parcels in Eastern Ghouta. The attack on the aid convoy was condemned Valerie Amos, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, describing it as a “deliberate attack on a humanitarian warehouse in Duma –Eastern Ghouta-which occurred as aid workers were preparing to distribute urgently needed supplies”. (Daily Star 2014/05/24, Assafir 2014/06/17, Amnesty 2014/06/12)

Displacement: Rural Damascus has witnessed displacements to safer areas under GoS control due to heavy shelling and aerial bombardment on areas that are outside GoS control. Other population movements have been noticed from border areas in western Rural Damascus to Lebanese border areas, for example several civilians from Yabroud and Rankus fled to Arsal in Lebanon during the intense fighting in Yabroud in April. However, others from Yabroud as well as Ma’loula fled southeast towards Damascus city. Local sources from the besieged Duma city reported that civilians must pay money to transit through GoS checkpoints in southern Douma near the Wafiden camp in order to be allowed out. (WFP 2014/04/20, Agence France-Presse 2014/04/17)

Humanitarian needs
Health: Some 177,000 civilians residing in the besieged areas of Rural Damascus continue to suffer from malnutrition and medical shortages. Health needs in besieged areas far exceed those in other areas under GoS control, for instance half of Duma’s 50,000 population reportedly require medical assistance. The severity of health needs in besieged areas has led to several casualties since the start of the siege. A doctor from Eastern Ghouta said in an interview with Amnesty international that several diseases emerged in the area such as measles, smallpox, typhoid, Hepatitis A and dermatological problems such as scabies, lice and general allergies. She also reported intestinal inflammations and infections due to the lack of antibiotics, anti-diarrhea medicine and serums. A lot of young patients have suffered from dehydration and acute renal failure leading to several deaths, mostly among children. (Amnesty 2014/06/12, Daily Star 2014/05/28) The number of hospitals, medical centers and doctors has highly decreased. Eastern Ghouta, which had 1,000 doctors before the conflict, only

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has 30 doctors currently, 24 out of 44 hospitals in Rural Damascus have gone out of service, while only 26 diabetes specialized centers are still operant (out of 38 pre-crisis). WHO reported that the entire Eastern Ghouta region with a population of one million only has seven operating hospitals and as for the entire Rural Damascus governorate, there is only one functioning public hospital for every 567,200 people. (Daily Star 2014/04/25, Tishreen 2014/05/09, Daily Star 2014/05/28)

The effects of the chemical weapons attack on Eastern Ghouta in August 2013 are reportedly still present, particularly among newborns. A newborn baby reportedly died in May to a mother exposed to the chemical attack. The Chemical Weapons Documentation Center said another baby was also recently born with severe head and face deformities. Opposition activists claim that other mothers have given birth to babies with birth defects after having been exposed to the August chemical attack. (Daily Star 2014/05/14)

**Education:** In May, UNRWA reported that 68% of students in Rural Damascus are no longer attending school. Several schools in the governorate are damaged, either partially or completely, while others were either used as military bases by one of the fighting parties or as shelters for IDPs. Parents also reportedly hesitate in sending their children to school out of fear for their security and well-being due to shelling and violent activities. (UNRWA 2014/05/28).

**WASH**

- In November 2013, a report in collaboration with UN agencies indicated that the current efficiency rate of water supplies in Rural Damascus is 40% while the efficiency rate of sewerage systems in the governorate is 20%.

- Rural Damascus and Damascus share the same main water supply which is the Fija spring, however the spring has witnessed water shortages due to low levels of rainfall. In addition, the transportation of water from the spring to other areas in Damascus and Rural Damascus is becoming increasingly difficult due to the damage of water networks and the frequent electricity cuts which affect water pumping capacity from the spring to Rural Damascus. Water is reportedly cut-off for several hours per day in all areas of Rural Damascus, more so in the besieged areas. Civilians in Rural Damascus are reportedly heavily dependent on water being sold per tank with prices ranging from 300 S.P to 2400 S.P - according to the level of water shortages in the area. There are fears over the quality of tank water since it comes from an unknown source amid water shortages in the entire area.

- People in Rural Damascus complained of regular water cut-offs and that even when water returns, it often coincides with an electricity cut-off which is required to pump the water in some areas, specifically Sahnaya, without benefiting from the water return. (Kassioun 2014/05/17)
Key issues and possible developments: During the second quarter, conflict persisted in Dar’a in population centres, including areas hosting displaced population, and spilled over into Quneitra governorate. In Dar’a, a high number of aerial bombardments, including the use of barrel bombs, were reported in Dar’a city, Jasim and Inkhel (northern Dar’a); Tassil, Tafs and Mzeireb (southwest); and Tiba and Sayda (east of the al-Naseeb border crossing with Jordan). (UNSG 2014/4/23) In the early morning of 18 June, an aerial attack struck a recently established IDP camp near Ash-Shajara town in southeastern Dar’a governorate, killing an estimated 20 people, 9 of whom were children, and injuring 80. There were initial reports that barrel bombs were used. Although this was not confirmed, barrel bombs have been frequently used in Dar’a governorate in recent months. The remaining IDPs, estimated at up to 3,500 people, have reportedly left the site. Some of the critically injured have been evacuated to Jordan for medical care. The area had previously been a target for attacks and the involvement of the Assistance Coordination Unit, linked to the Syrian opposition, were cause for concern among the humanitarian agencies. (AFP 2014/06/18, SNAP 2014/05/06, SOHR 2014/6/18, USAID 2014/06/19) The numerous hills around Nawa, which form the border with Quneitra, have become the main focus of military operations in the governorate. Offensives and counter-offensives from opposition and SAF forces are common in order to control the routes and strategic positions between Dar’a and Quneitra. From April until mid-June, operations have been particularly intense for taking over the control Tal al-Jumou’ area in western Dar’a. The hill is considered one of the most important military bases in the area since it overlooks the western countryside of Dar’a as well as of Quneitra governorate. According to local media sources, in mid-June, opposition forces gained control over the strategic Tal al-Jumou’. (Zaman Alwasl 2014/6/16, the Syrian Observer 2014/06/19) Tensions between Jabhat Al Nusra and the FSA have been reported and likely to increase, despite joint operations to take over key strategic positions between Dar’a and Quneitra. According to media sources, in April a Jabhat Al Nusra battalion started fighting with a FSA brigade in western rural Dar’a. (Al Akhbar 2014/4/12) In early-May, Jabhat Al Nusra fighters captured the FSA head of the Dar’a Military Council, Ahmad Naameh, along with 5 other commanders, days after he
announced the formation of the last FSA group dedicated to battling extremists. (Daily Star 2014/05/05, The National 2014/06/01)

**Context:** Home to the first uprising in March 2011, Dar’a is an ancient transit route between Syria and Jordan, as well as the Gulf states. Since mid-2013, GoS forces asserted control over the Damascus-Dar’a highway but the proliferation of checkpoints on the road limited civilians’ access to basic services, as arbitrary arrest detention and physical and sexual abuse were frequently reported to take place at such checkpoints. Since mid-2013, unofficial border restrictions have stemmed the flow of the displaced into Jordan, likely leading to a significant increase of IDPs within the governorate. Between June and December 2013, the number of IDPs in Dar’a more than doubled from 180,000 to 372,000.

**Displacement:** There was little information available on displacement but according to the UN, infighting between opposition groups caused displacement of people in Kerba village, but no numbers of IDPs were reported. In addition, the estimated 3,500 IDPs who had been residing in 2 camps in Ash-Shajara were displaced again due to the attack. (UNSG 2014/05/22)

**Access:** Cross-line assistance from Damascus continues to be extremely challenging due to bureaucratic restrictions imposed by local and national authorities. Problems for obtaining permission to travel are common. (UNSG 2014/4/23). According to the UN, the Jaber/Naseeb border crossing between Jordan and Syria remained open for the transportation of relief items, however all convoys must first transit to Damascus with a military escort through As-Sweida governorate, and is not necessarily targeted to hard to reach areas in the south. This is not a key crossing point for assistance into Syria and is only used by a handful of UN agencies. The UN has requested the use of one additional border crossing with Jordan to facilitate access to Dar’a governorate and the UN Security Council is considering a resolution which would allow assistance through the unofficial Tal Shihab crossing point. (UNSG 2014/5/22) Due to the intensified fighting in Kisweh in southern Rural Damascus in May, WFP faced problems on accessing its warehouse for some days, resulting in particularly low aid deliveries to Dar’a governorate. (WFP 2014/6/10) According to the UN, the MoH and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued facilitation letters for all areas across the country for the monthly polio vaccination campaign. However, security situation hindered it in numerous locations across the country, including 4 district in the governorate. (UNSG 2014/04/23, UNSG 2014/05/22)

**Humanitarian needs**

**Protection:** In late May, a mortar exploded in a tent with supporters of President Bashar Al Assad, killing 39 people and wounding 205 others, according to Syrian state media sources. (Daily Star 2014/05/24, AP 2014/05/23)

**Health:** Dar’a had very poor coverage rates during the World Immunization Week (26-30 April) organized to provide catch-up routine vaccinations to children and women. (UNSG 2014/5/22)

**Food security:** According to local media, despite GoS expectations of reaching 45,808 tons of wheat through the planting of 60% of plans for Dar’a and good rainfall during March, farmers in the region do not expect a production of more than 50%. This is attributed to low planting levels in irrigated lands and low levels of rainfall in dry farming lands. FAO issued an alert for drought conditions to low overall seasonal rainfall averages. (Tishreen 2014/05/18, FAO 2014/05/15)
Deir-ez-Zor

**Key issues and possible developments:** Fighting over the last few months has caused displacement of an estimated 250,000 people. The Governorate experiences high insecurity and severely limited access. The humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating in an area where conditions were aggravated by the conflict already.

**Context:** The oil-rich Governorate in eastern Syria has witnessed battles between the regime, IS and opposition forces led by Jabhat al-Nusra in the last three months. Deir-ez-Zor is an important supply route and transit zone and the Governorate connects IS stronghold in Iraq to the one in Ar-Raqqa. IS had both pushed out and strategically withdrawn from Deir-ez-Zor in January and February when opposition and tribal forces rose against them. IS started their counter-offensive at the end of March, slowly pushing down from Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa into Deir-ez-Zor, via the Khabur and Euphrates rivers. These two rivers come together at al-Basrah, southeast of Deir-ez-Zor city. The opposition was expelled and IS seized large parts of the Governorate. Deir-ez-Zor city has been blockaded since June 3 when IS seized control of the a-Siyasiya Bridge, on the Euphrates River. A few days before the fall of Mosul in Iraq, IS was besieging opposition forces inside the city of Deir-ez-Zor, which is divided between opposition forces and Government forces. The siege is mostly on opposition-held neighborhoods of Deir-ez-Zor, except the al-Qusour and al-Joura neighborhoods, which are under Government control. Airplanes and artillery continually bombard the blockaded neighborhoods. Due to the deteriorated humanitarian situation in the opposition held areas, an agreement with IS might take place in the near future in order to allow trapped civilians to leave the area and humanitarian assistance to enter, a similar agreement might include Ba’aa to IS leaders, which means that the opposition forces in the city will obey IS orders and fight under IS’s flag, which already took place between Jabhat al Nusra and IS locally in Abu Kamal town, and might be expected to spread to other areas. (*Zaman Al-Wasl* 2014/06/12, *Syriaidirect* 2014/06/18, *ISW 2014/06/18*, *Syriadeeply* 2014/05/21, *Assafir* 2014/06/18, *Syriadeeply* 2014/05/13)
**Access:** The overall security situation has been deteriorating hindering the delivery of vital humanitarian supplies as well as the free movement of commodities and people, aggravating the poor living conditions of IDPs and local populations. Roads leading to Deir-ez-Zor from Damascus and Al-Hasakeh cities are reported to have been cut-off, reducing the opportunity to provide for supplies and services from Damascus and northern areas. (UNICEF 2014/05/19, Zaman Al Wsl 2014/06/12). Assistance in Deir-ez-Zor governorate is highly dependent on local relief actors, and with the possible continuity of access constraints in the governorate due to the continued fighting and to IS’s control of the main roads, there is no horizon in the near future for humanitarian access to be improved. Deir-ez-Zor governorate reported some life threatening problems during the SINA in November 2013 in the health and WASH sectors. If access to the governorate remains limited by the situation on the ground the humanitarian situation might worsen, unless vital materials are allowed to enter the governorate either from Damascus or from other areas in the north and Turkey. (SINA 2014/01) The city of Deir-ez-Zor After seizing the Bridge, IS prevented the entry of any relief or medical supplies, imposing a severe siege on the city that lasted for eight days on the row, and even forbidden the movement of ambulances to transport injured. There is reportedly access by boat into town across the Euphrates. (Syriadirect 2014/06/18, Zaman Al Wsl 2014/06/12, Trusted sources 2014/06)

**Displacement:** On 10 June, As Safir reported an overall number of 250,000 displaced in rural Deir-ez-Zor. Out of which 140,000 were already IDPs living in Deir-ez-Zor city and fled to the countryside following the fighting for control of the city in the last few weeks. (WFP 2014/06/16, As Safir 2014/06/10, Zaman Al Wsl 2014/06/12). On May 4, IS captured the village of Jadid Bakkara. Around 3000 people from the village and from surrounding areas fled across the Euphrates and then, in FSA cars to areas supervised by the local council of Muhasann village where they were placed them in homes and schools. (Syriadependy 2014/05/13) Although the governorate witnessed a wider and bigger movement of IDPs in the last 3 months comparing to the first 3 months of the year, this movement is expected to slow in the near future in case IS and its rivals reach an agreement, which means there will be a possible movement for returnees to their original areas.

**Humanitarian needs:**
**Protection:** With the continuing violence, physical safety of the population in the conflict areas is of great concern. At least 7 people were killed and ten others wounded on 16 June as a car bomb explosion hit the village of al-Shamiyya in Deir-ez-Zor countryside. At least 7 civilians were killed and dozens were injured on 19 May in the city of Deir-ez-Zor amid artillery shelling and air strikes by the GoS forces. (ARA news 2014/06/18, ARA news 2014/05/20) On 7 May IS executed 20 civilians in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor, east of Syria, on charges of family members fighting in the ranks of the Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic Front and Free Syrian Army (FSA). IS members also arrested hundreds of civilians in several villages of Deir-ez-Zor, including Egedat, al-Sabha, al-Dahla and Jideed Baggara. (ARA news 2014/05/09) With the near total absence of the Syrian government from most of Deir-ez-Zor city, the so-called “Sharia boards” have begun to enforce their own rules, using violence where necessary to force civilians, particularly women, to abide by them. On April 20, members of Deir-ez-Zor’s Al Sharia Law Authority, stormed an all-female wedding celebration at a private home and detained some women for several hours, because of listening to loud music and not wearing Islamic dress. (Syriadeeply 2014/05/23) With IS controlling wider areas in the governorate, more protection issues are expected to be reported, including random arrests, execution and child recruitment in armed groups, which is a pattern that can be noticed in all areas controlled by IS.

**Livelihood and Food Security:** The limited agricultural production together with restricted humanitarian access to Deir-ez-Zor is likely to cause an increase in the number of people in need for food supply, and a severely hampered nutritional situation. According to the Socioeconomic Monitoring Report issued by Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) in May, Deir-ez-Zor showed a high rate of overall poverty with almost 80% of the population below the poverty line. The capacity of households to access food is expected to deteriorate further, as a result of high levels of unemployment, reduced income generating opportunities. (SCPR 2014/05/27) With more than half of the agricultural sector damaged through the crisis overall, and livestock production (sheep, cattle, goats) heavily impacted a further decrease in agricultural production is expected, limiting the amount of crops available for own consumption and / or for sale and income prospects. The production has also been affected by drought conditions, with FAO’s Agricultural Stress Index indicating that in some areas 25 40 % of cropland were affected by drought according to the April calculations. The amount of water available for irrigation will be affected by current low levels of water in the Euphrates lake, further reducing expected harvest amounts of irrigated crops. (Zaman Al Wsl 2014/06/12, FAO/GIEWS 2014/05/15) The SCPR projected an unemployment rate of 59% in Deir-ez-Zor for the end of 2013. Following Ar-Raqqa and Al Hasakeh, and equal to Aleppo, this is one of the highest projected rates among all Governorates intense levels of armed-conflict and lowest levels of security. The same report shows that all industrial enterprises in Deir-ez-Zor industrial zone were closed. Reasons given for closures in Deir-ez-Zor and other governorates were pillage, looting and bankruptcy as well as the abduction of managers and workers. In Deir-ez-Zor the continuing conflict situation and insecurity and related limited availability of investment sources are likely to be one of the main reasons that businesses will remain abandoned. With the high damages in the agricultural sector, employment in that sector is likely to remain low as well, reducing the livelihood opportunities of the population. (SCPR 2014/05/27) Migrant workers from Deir-ez-Zor who used to go to work on the cotton farms in Al Hasakeh are prevented from going due to the deteriorating security situations, limiting the income generation possibilities for these people. (ARA 2014/05/25) As a direct
impact of recent fighting, most of the shops in Deir-ez-Zor city were closed in mid-June due to the lack of food supplies and that the food that was left was very limited. (Zaman Al Wal 2014/06/12)

Health: Functionality of health facilities in Deir-ez-Zor is becoming increasingly limited as the area is engulfed in fighting and attacks. The closure of transport corridors, particularly en route to Deir-ez-Zor city, reduces the amount of medications and medical supplies reaching the area and severely curtailing health services. Apart from reducing the existing health infrastructure’s capability of addressing the population’s basic health needs, these constraints have had an impact on various vaccination activities – including those for polio and measles. To date, the majority of confirmed polio cases (10) and AFP cases have been identified in inaccessible areas in Deir-ez-Zor, particularly in Ashara. As these areas grow to be further inaccessible, it is expected that vaccination and health service coverage will be limited. This is a particular concern when considering highly contagious diseases such as polio and measles. The low vaccination coverage, continued fighting and inaccessibility, limited health services and identification of cases in nearby areas (e.g. polio in neighbouring Iraq) underscore a true risk of these diseases spreading and low capacity of controlling them. (ACU-EWARN Poliomyelitis Outbreak Report 2014/06/07)

Infectious diseases that have been identified in the Governorate include polio, whooping cough, Tuberculosis (TB), measles, smallpox, urticarial and skin conditions, and respiratory diseases, such as asthma. A lack of required medication to treat these cases has been identified. By the end of May, one source stated that 25 cases of tuberculosis had been identified in the cities of Deir-ez-Zor, al-Ashara, al-Mayadeen, Sabikhan, al-Basira, Buqrus and al-Tiyaneh. With increased airstrikes and fighting, there is also a likely increase in the number of trauma and war-related injuries in the area. (SyriaDeeply 2014/05/28)

In addition to potential besiegement and the subsequent curtailment of services available in certain areas, particularly Deir-ez-Zor city, a growing concern remains with regards to attacks on health personnel and facilities and the denial of care. During the fights over control of Deir-ez-Zor city the GoS forces launched 8 airstrikes on the city, wounding many people. Some of these people reportedly were in critical conditions which required them to be taken to hospitals in the suburbs, as they are more capable of addressing emergency cases than the hospitals inside the city. IS has reportedly fired on the ambulances forcing them to return to the city. There are accounts that wounded people are not allowed out of the city for treatment, neither by IS nor by the GoS. A severe shortage of medicines and medical equipment in the city’s hospital has been observed. (Zaman Al Wal 2014/06/12)

Air and water pollution and the lack of clean drinking water play a big role in contributing to the outbreak of diseases and remain major health hazards in the Governorate. The pollution is a direct result of people randomly extracting and burning petrol. (syriadeeply 2014/05/28)

WASH: The Dynamo issued in May 2014 identified WASH as the first priority in half of the 10 covered sub-districts in the Governorate, an increase compared to the previous Dynamo issued in March when the most frequent first priority issue was Health. With the high temperatures in summer arriving, WASH is expected to remain high priority throughout the monitored sub-districts in the Governorate, with the lack of clean drinking water posing a problem. The fighting in the last few month has increased the water supply problem, with water supply infrastructure damaged, water supply cut offs, such as experienced in Deir-ez-Zor on 8 June, and electricity cut offs and blackouts that affected the water supply. The water purification plant for the city of Deir-ez-Zor has been completely damaged. With a lack of access to safe drinking water water-bourne diseases might be on the increase in the coming month, a problem that will be aggravated by the high summer temperatures. (Dynamo, 2014/05, Andalou Agency, 2014/06/08, Zaman Al Wal, 2014/06/12, UNICEF, 2014/05/19, PI, 2014/05/15). The WASH situation in the governorate is expected to further deteriorate in the coming summer months, mainly due to the instability of water levels in the Euphrates, the main source for drinking water in the governorate. The availability of drinking water and for irrigation will be hampered badly in case the flow of water from the Euphrates lake stopped suddenly.

Shelter: The electricity supply had reportedly been cut off across Deir-ez-Zor city on 8 June but was back three days later according to some sources. (Andalou Agency, 2014/06/08, Zaman Al Wal, 2014/06/12) In May, a main power supply station was reportedly damaged causing the power to be cut across the entire governorate for four days. Power cuts have led to severe water shortages and are expected to aggravate the already hampered water supply situation. As the accessibility and affordability of generators and fuel is likely not given for a large part of the population, the lack of electricity is expected to lead to further deprivation of the population. (UNICEF, 2014/05/19)
Key issues: In April, a village in Hama suffered a suspected chlorine gas attack while escalating conflict during May caused mass displacement.

Context: Hama has seen intense fighting over the last 3 months, with some areas changing hands several times. On 14 May, government forces took control of the villages of Tal Malh and Al Jalma in the countryside. Tal Malh lies on a road linking two Christian towns in Hama province – Sqailbieh and Mhardeh – and is also close to several Alawite villages. (Daily Star 2014/05/19, Assafir 2014/05/14) Within days of the offensives, opposition fighters re-took 2 checkpoints, in Tal Malh and Al Jalma, and heavily attacked Salamiyeh city. Controlling the city implies control of the supply routes towards Idlib and Aleppo cities. (Assafir 2014/05/19) Government forces and paramilitary allies gained control of parts of the village of Morek on 14 April. Morek, which had been taken a month previously by opposition groups, lies on the main highway between Hama and Aleppo. (Daily Star 2014/04/14)

In a statement issued 31 May, opposition groups in Hama declared the governorate to be a military zone by 2 June, a day before the presidential elections. The opposition called for coordination and cooperation with military council of Hama province and the Shariah Authority. (Zaman al-wasl 2014/06/02) The governorate has also witnessed bomb attacks on predominantly Alawite communities. On 2 May, 12 children were among 20 people killed in two bombings targeting the mostly Alawite towns of Jidrin and Al-Humairi. The attacks, in which suicide bombers blew themselves up in vehicles, came after a double car bombing killed 100 people in an Alawite district of Homs. (AFP 2014/05/02, DW, 2014/05/02)

On 11 April, both Syrian state television and opposition sources reported a suspected chlorine gas attack in Kfar Zeita, each party accusing the other of being responsible. A second attack on Kfar Zeita was reported on 18 April. According to activists, Kfar Zeita was previously hit three times in April by barrel bombs dropped from helicopters, killing one and wounding 132 people. (CSM, 2014/04/18, Reuters 2014/05/27, Reuters 2014/06/17)
Access: When the joint OPCW/UN fact-finding team travelled to Kfar Zeita to investigate the allegations of chlorine attacks their convoy came under attack, forcing them to abandon the mission.  
(Reuters 2014/06/17) On 19 April a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was detonated at Salamiyeh and disabled 4 trucks transporting WFP aid for more than 10,000 people in Aleppo. One driver was killed and another critically wounded.  
(WFP 2014/05/04)

Displacement: Heavy fighting in northern and eastern Hama resulted in WFP partners registering 2,000 newly displaced people in Salamiyeh and 7,000 in Hama city between 30 April and 13 May.  
(WFP 2014/05/20) The escalation of fighting in eastern rural Hama in the last 2 weeks of May forced the flight of thousands more families to Hama city, where they sought refuge in public buildings, parks and mosques. Clashes in the governorate’s eastern rural areas pushed an estimated 20,000 people to seek safety in Hama city as well as in the northwestern villages of Msiaf and Sqilbie between 27 May and 10 June.  
(WFP 2014/06/16) According to OCHA, the largest numbers of people have displaced from opposition-held areas, often into areas under government control, which people deem to be safer. Around 40,000 people are estimated to have fled to Hama city owing to the fighting around Morek.  
(UN Security Council 2014/04/29)

Humanitarian needs:
Protection: As of 15 June, the Attorney General of Hama province stated that 130 inmates have been released according to the presidential decree.  
(SANA 2014/06/15)

Livelihood and Food Security: In May, state media reported that the planned areas for wheat cultivation in Hama had not been fully planted due to the difficulty of securing fertilizers and its high price, irrigation problems, instability in some areas and access difficulties. Additionally, most of the crops were affected by frost on 31 March, particularly affecting spring potato and fruit trees with losses ranging between 40% and 60% especially in low areas. The quality of the irrigated crops is described as medium by officials while the quality of the rainfed crops is bad because of the low rainfall levels and the frost.  
(Tishreen 2014/05/18, Tishreen 2014/05/11)

Nutrition: In Hama governorate, an average of 30–35 malnutrition cases are reported every day by Charity for Social Care, a local NGO running a clinic.  
(Physicians for Human Rights 2014/05)

Health: 36 confirmed cases of polio have been reported in Syria, with 1 case reported from Hama. The latest round of monthly polio vaccinations was held 4-8 May. According to the Ministry of Health, areas in 29 districts in 11 governorates were not accessible during the May round due to active fighting and access restrictions, 5 of which were in Hama.  
(UNICEF 2014/05/19)
Key issues and possible developments: April saw the commencement of an uptick in bomb attacks in mostly Alawite neighbourhoods, which has continued through a truce between Government and opposition forces over the Old City of Homs. After the truce, thousands returned to the Old City, where destruction of infrastructure is heavy. Homs has suffered more damage than any other governorate; WASH and shelter issues may be expected.

Context: Conflict in Homs intensified in the Government’s campaign to gain more territory prior to the elections. After a heavy bombing campaign and the advance of ground troops, government forces made significant gains in the governorate. By mid-April, talks emerged of a truce over the neighborhoods of Old Homs, besieged by government forces for a year and a half. This came after a UN operation to evacuate some 1,400 people trapped inside army-besieged neighbourhoods of Homs in February. A number of armed fighters submitted
themselves to the Syrian authorities. Other fighters withdrew towards the north of the city where the siege was less tight. Activists reported a marked increase in the bombings of the besieged areas, which as of mid-April were thought to house some 180 civilians including 60 activists, and 1,200-1,300 opposition fighters. (AFP 2014/04/14, Assafir 2014/04/12) Syrian government troops fought their way into opposition-held neighbourhoods of the central city of Homs on 15 April. This was the first time government forces had entered the besieged areas since it took the Khalidieh district in summer 2013. By 22 April, government forces had regained control over the Homs neighborhood of Jub Jandal and had made progress in the western neighborhoods, meaning most of the central city was under government control. (AFP 2014/04/15, Daily Star 2014/04/16, Daily Star 2014/04/23, Al Akhbar 2014/04/23) Government and opposition struck a deal for opposition fighters to withdraw from their besieged strongholds in the city of Homs, effective from 7 May. The deal brought together for the first time representatives of government security forces, opposition voices and Iranian negotiators. The deal stipulated a ceasefire and the withdrawal of opposition fighters, who were allowed to take light weapons with them, from the Old City and included the exchange of a number of Iranian and Lebanese prisoners held by the Islamic Front and aid access to the opposition- besieged Nobol and Zahra. The truce meant all but one district of Homs, Al-Waer, encircled by government armed forces, was under government control in the runup to elections. (AFP 2014/05/02, Amnesty International 2014/06/10, DW 2014/05/02) Heavy shelling on Al-Waer, the only remaining opposition stronghold in the governorate and home to tens of thousands of civilians, took place on 12 May. On 20 May, SAF began to infiltrate Al-Waer neighborhood and local agreements were negotiated with the fighters there. Shelling and clashes also concentrated on northern areas. (Daily Star 2014/05/12, Zaman Alawite 2014/05/20) On 23 May, activists announced a truce between the Government and opposition forces in Al-Waer. The cease-fire was expected to last 3 days and to enable opposition fighters to leave the area without being attacked or later arrested. Al-Waer has been under a siege that has blocked food and fuel from entering the area for at least 6 months. By 9 June, negotiations for Al-Waer were put on hold after a failure by both sides to reach an agreement. The terms included: armed men handing in their weapons, wanted and defected men surrendering, the opening up all roads to Al-Waer, releasing detainees and the exit of foreign fighters outside the neighbourhood in return for releasing more than 40 men, women and children kidnapped from the Nobol and Zahra neighbourhoods of Aleppo. Negotiations were underway in the al-Dar al-Kabira neighbourhood of northern rural Homs, which opposition fighters from Old Homs resorted to following the truce, under the supervision of the UN delegate in Syria and the reconciliation committee. (Al Akhbar 2014/06/09) On 12 June, Al-Nusra Front launched an attack on villages in northern Homs, taking control of Umm Sharshooh in western Talbisseh. Clashes then moved to Jabbourin and lead to population displacement, though figures are unclear. By 15 June, Government forces retook Umm Sharshooh amid aerial bombardments on the villages' perimeters. (SOHR 2014/06/15)

**Humanitarian needs:** According to OCHA, at least one million of the estimated 2.5 million people in Homs are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. (UN News Service 2014/04/30)

**Protection:** According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Homs has suffered the most casualties of any governorates other than Damascus and has had the largest number of victims over the last a year and a half. The largest portion of victims who died under torture came from Homs, with 746 victims that died under torture inside the detention centers. (Worldbulletin 2014/04/21) Amnesty International reported that the Government continues to detain some 200 men who were among the 1,366 people who were evacuated from Old Homs in February. Most have been held at the al-Andalus school, which the Syrian authorities use as a “screening” centre. Those detained appear not to have had any charges brought against them. Some have reportedly been taken away to other detention centers and then tortured or otherwise ill-treated there, as well as being removed to unknown locations and disappearing, with 8 individuals whereabouts unknown. (Amnesty International 2014/06/10) According to an activist, during the presidential elections, civilians were afraid of being punished by government authorities if they did not vote, but also feared the dangers of going to the ballot box. (Telegraph 2014/06/02) In Deir Fouh, Talbisseh, which has 2000 residents, there still remain Syrians of Dagestani origins. Most residents fled after IS took control. IS has imposed strict laws on the village and reportedly flogs those who do not pray or women who do not cover their faces. The village is also subject to clashes between IS and the Islamic Front/Al-Nusra Front. (Al Akhbar 2014/04/24) Dutch priest Frans van der Lugt, was killed in the Old City of Homs in April. He had become a well-known figure due to his solidarity with residents of the besieged area. (Al-Jazeera 2014/04/07).

**Physical safety and security (incl. indiscriminate weapons):** 12 June, seven people were killed by a car bomb in the Alawite Wadi Dahab neighbourhood of Homs city. (AFP 2014/06/13) On 2 June, a bomb-laden truck reportedly killed at least 10 people when it exploded in Haraqi, a predominantly Alawite government-held village in Homs. Syrian television said the explosion caused major damage in nearby houses. (Reuters 2014/06/02) A car bomb struck a pro-government neighbourhood in the central Syrian city of Homs on 25 May, killing at least 10 people. The blast was in the Zahra district, which is predominantly inhabited by Alawites and Christians. A second car bomb exploded in another district of the city, wounding three people but causing no deaths. (Daily Star 2014/05/25) On 29 April, a twin suicide attack struck in the Zahra neighbourhood, a predominantly Christian and Alawite area of Homs, killing 100. Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for the attack. (CrisisWatch 2014/05/01, Daily Star 2014/04/30). As
government forces made advances in Old Homs on 18 April, a car bomb in Homs city killed 14 people. The blast occurred in front of Bilal Al-Habshi mosque in Akrama neighborhood as worshipers were leaving after Friday prayers. (Daily Star 2014/04/18, AFP 2014/04/19). On 14 April, 9 people were killed by opposition fire on the government-held Hamra and Karam al-Shami neighbourhoods of Homs. (Zamanawal 2014/04/12). On 5 April at least 13 opposition fighters died in a blast in the city of Homs as they primed a car bomb for an attack. (AFP 2014/04/05). Two car bombs killed at least 25 people, including women and children, in a government-held Karam al-Luz neighbourhood of Homs city on 9 April. Another 100 people were wounded in the mostly Alawite neighbourhood. The first explosion was followed after half an hour by another explosion in the same area as bystanders and SARC workers gathered to aid those wounded. That evening, at least 14 people were killed in Homs when pro-government forces opened fire on a bus. Activists said the killing were a revenge act, where the 14 victims were mostly Sunnis. (AFP 2014/04/09, Al Akhbar 2014/04/12).

Livelihood and Food Security: On 8 April, food assistance reached the towns of Ghanto and Tir Maallah in rural Homs, which had not been reached since October 2013, which rations to support the food needs of 70% of the 30,000 people estimated to be living in the 2 locations. A rapid assessment conducted by inter-agency mission members showed that food prices were about 25% higher than pre-crisis levels. It also revealed significant disruptions to the local economy and a shortage of employment opportunities, not least because insecurity is limiting farming, traditionally the main livelihood in the area. (WFP 2014/04/17).

WASH: Due to the intense conflict the governorate has seen, power cuts, fuel shortages, and limited maintenance work have worsened the WASH situation. (UNICEF 2014/06/06). According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as of 25 June, water has been cut off in Al Rastan city for 10 days. The local council of the besieged town made a distress call to the humanitarian community as living conditions have become dire. (SOHR 2014/06/25). Within 2 weeks of the Government retaking control of Homs, state media reported that 20% of damage to the water network had been repaired, but the real challenge will be repairing the sewage system. (SANA 2014/05/24).

Shelter: On 1 June, an armed group attacked the gas pipeline between al-Shamer Mountain power plant and Ebla Gas Factory in Homs countryside. The pipeline produces two million cubic meters of gas daily and 100 tons of domestic gas. (SANA 2014/06/02). According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Homs is the governorate that suffered the most property damage. About 850,000 buildings have been destroyed, including houses, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, and workshops. (Worldbulletin 2014/04/21). By 10 May, people began returning to the Old City of Homs on Saturday. Some areas were over 70% destroyed and require extensive repairs, specifically in Jouret al-Shiyah, al-Qarabis, and al-Qusour neighborhoods. Officials stated that priorities were established to provide power to essential utilities and lighting. Homs’ Governor predicted that it would take one week at the most to restore basic and essential services to the areas that were not extensively damaged. (SANA 2014/05/12, AFP 2014/05/10).
Idleb

**Key issues and possible developments:** IDPs and camps: The Governorate has seen new and renewed displacement caused by the continuing conflict within the Governorate itself and in Aleppo to the East and Hama to the South. The North of Idleb currently hosts a large and growing number of camps, and existing camps see an influx of new residents. The movement of people into rapidly proliferating camps is currently not tracked systematically which makes it difficult to identify the needs. Cross-border access: The Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey remains open border and continues to service a high number of people in need and, directly or indirectly, reaches a large catchment population.

**Context:** From April onwards, the military operations of opposition groups in the governorate have significantly increased as part of an offensive along a section of the main highway linking Damascus to the northern city of Aleppo. The opposition forces achieved steady progress between northern Hama and southern Idleb and took control of Khan Sheikhoun in late May. Barrel bombing by the GoS and clashes have also escalated along the supply routes towards Idleb city, namely around the Al Arba’een mountains in Ariha, Saraqeb, Bennish and Ma’arrat Annu’man. These areas also saw car bomb attacks and bomb explosions: about 30 Syrian government fighters were killed when rebels set off a bomb in a tunnel beneath a checkpoint in early May. Fighters of al-Nusra Front launched two car-bomb attacks against a regime headquarter in the southern countryside of Idleb near Khazzanat military check point in early April. (ARA News 2014/04/09, worldbulletin 2014/04/05, Assafir 2014/05/13, Zamanalwasl 2014/05/26, Al-Watan 2014/05/25, Daily Star 2014/05/29, Alertnet 2014/04/03, AFP 2014/05/26, Assafir 2014/05/31, DailyStar, 2014/05/06)

**Access:** The Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey has remained open for cross-border humanitarian assistance in the last quarter and access has been relatively unrestricted. In most of the areas under control of GoS in the governorate, there is restricted humanitarian access, such as to Idleb city, Ariha, Mhambel and Jisr ash Shoghour city, due to the high number of check points and security concerns on the main roads. In some cases these conditions force people and humanitarian actors to take longer roads from the north of the
Governorate in order to reach certain areas with humanitarian assistance, such as using the road from the northern areas of Dana and Harim through Taftanaz and Saraqeb in order to reach Ariha and Mhambel sub-districts. Damascus based actors reported at the end of May that the only reported mechanism to deliver aid is through unaccompanied cross line missions. (UNICEF 2014/05/19). A humanitarian aid convoy consisting of 16 trucks carrying food, medical supplies and furniture arrived in the town of Saraqeb in Idleb province on 12 April and one consisting of 12 trucks into Bannish and al-Faw’a cities and Kfarya town in Idleb countryside on 26 April. The trucks carried food and medical aid to the locals in the towns. (SANA, 2014/04/26, SANA, 2014/04/12).

Displacement: April and May saw new displacement within Idleb Governorate caused by escalating violent clashes around Khan Sheikhoun, Mhambal, Jabal Al Zawya, Binish and Abul Thur. IDPs fled to Idleb city and to the camps in Harim sub-district. (WFP, 2014/05/19). In mid-April, some 117,500 newly displaced people were reported to have sought shelter in IDP camps in northern and central Idlib. These people had fled fighting in rural Aleppo and northern Hama. Escalating clashes around Khan Sheikhou in Idleb governorate contributed to these numbers of displaced people. (WFP, 2014/04/17). In late May, Idleb hosted 9 camp clusters comprised of 85 camps in total. Around 104,000 of the almost 155,000 people in organized camps in Northern Syria were residing in one of the camps in Idleb Governorate. (Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), 2014/05). Only 6 months earlier, the SINA reported 28 camps, a third of the current number. (SINA, 2014/01)

Humanitarian needs:

Protection: One of the major protection concerns in Idleb is physical security. Certain areas in Idleb have experienced an intensification of violence in March, April and May 2014. The physical security of people is most critical in areas where intense fighting has occurred in the last few months and is continuing, including Khan Sheikhou, surroundings of Idlib city and the city itself and areas along the road between Lattakia and Idlib. In late May a car bomb in a diesel fuel market in the rebel-held town of Maaret al-Naasen killed at least 16 people. On 16 May a car bomb exploded outside a mosque in the northwestern town of Binnish, at a time when worshippers were attending Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque. The car bomb killed several people and wounded dozens more. 21 people, including women, were killed in air strikes on the Sarmada area in northwestern Idleb province. (AlJazeera America, 2014/04/22, DailyStar, 2014/05/16, DailyStar, 2014/05/15). In May 2014 the creation of four “civil” courts under the supervision of the Syria Rebel Front in rebel-held areas in Idleb was announced. In other rebel-held areas, Sharia courts have been created. (DailyStar, 2014/05/12). With livelihood opportunities increasingly rare due to the conflict, children are engaged in various income-generating activities to support or ensure the family income. Particularly boys are reported by trusted sources to be selling items such as fuel and cigarettes on the streets along major routes. (Trusted sources 2014/05). Another account by trusted sources indicated that in some communities in particular sub-districts such as Tamanaa young boys (ages 16-17) were seen carrying weapons and serving as paid “security guards”, escorting drivers through certain unsafe areas. (Trusted sources 2014/05).

Livelihood Food Security: Idleb is one of the Governorates with a high percentage of cropland affected by drought according to the Agriculture Stress Index (ASI), an indicator that highlights anomalous vegetation growth and potential drought in arable land during a given cropping season. In most of the Governorate more than 70% of the cropland is affected, increasing the risk of low harvests of food crops, potentially contributing to shortages in food supply and rising prices. (FAO/GIEWS, 2014/04/15).

Health: The Ministry of Health reportedly confirmed a measles outbreak in several governorates including Idleb. In parts of the Governorate that are difficult to access routine immunisation has not taken place. Idleb is among the governorates with the highest number of suspected measles cases. (UNICEF 2014/06/12, ACU-EWARN 2014/05/18-2014/06/14, EWARS 2014/03/30-2014/05/31). In the 7 sub-districts assessed by Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) in May 2014, a high number of cases of Leishmaniasis were reported. During the summer months, cases are expected to increase due to the current health situation in the Governorate, the disease’s seasonal transmission patterns, as well as lower availability of clean water and regular sanitation services. (PAH 2014). Idleb is reporting higher numbers of cases of typhoid and acute diarrhoea and a rise is anticipated due to the water and sanitary situation in the Governorate. (ACU-EWARN 2014/05/18-2014/06/14, EWARS 2014/03/30-2014/05/31). As of May 2014, three confirmed Polio cases were reported in Idleb. 248,985 children were vaccinated in the 6th round of the house-to-house polio vaccination campaign carried out by the Polio Task Force in the last week of May. (WHO, 2014/03/09, UNICEF 2013/10/10, UNICEF 2013/10/24, Polio Task Force 2014/06, ACU-EWARN 2014/06/07, UNICEF 2014/05/19).

WASH: An assessment in nine Idleb sub-districts (Armanaz, Badama, Darkoush, Harim, Janudiyeh, Kafr Takharim, Maaret Tamsrin, Qourqaena, and Salqin) published early 2014 reveals that there has been a sharp fall in water availability through mains compared to the situation before the crisis (95% versus 33%). The main challenges identified are the loss of mains power followed by loss of equipment due to theft, loss of staff due to non-payment, lack of funds to purchase diesel, and lack of funds to carry out repairs. Prior to the conflict the system was heavily subsidised by the government. The assessment also showed an increase of water tankers as a source of water from 5% to 79% in the surveyed sub-districts. The importance of water trucking was highlighted in an assessment carried out in the spring 2014 in Kafr Nobol, Ma’arat an Numan, Ariha, Khan Sheikhoun and Ehsim sub-districts. The assessment showed that all...
but one of the sub-districts relied very heavily on water trucking as a source of water. Piped water was a significant source of water only in Khan Sheikhoun. (PAH, 2014, GOAL, 2014/01/01) Trusted sources have observed that households burn their waste or dump it because of the unavailability of fuel, equipment or collection services. (PAH, 2014, Trusted Sources 2014/05). The accumulation of garbage around houses and in streets, especially with summer arriving, increases sand fly breeding grounds, which is likely to add to the already rising number of leishmaniasis cases. Accumulations of rubbish can attract other insects and vermin, potentially affecting the health and psychological well-being of populations. According to SINA, the main problems related to sewage were damage of sewage system, stoppage of sewage treatment and the stoppage of dislodging services (SINA 2014/01). In many cases, people were forced to start using septic tanks, which can cause surface water pollution, as reported in April in the sub-district of Ehsim. (PAH 2014).

Shelter: The number of IDPs and IDP camps in Idleb has increased over the last few months; there were 17% more IDPs in May compared to the previous month, and 15 new camps have been identified in May. IDP numbers are expected to rise further as a consequence of continued conflict in Aleppo and Hama governorates. Food and Shelter provision in camps has been identified as a high priority. With continued displacement and limited remaining safe spaces available in the Governorate, the number and size of IDP camps is expected to further increase in the next months, putting pressure on existing camp facilities and service provision. According to CCCM, as a result of the increased vulnerability of IDPs in general, there are indications that, increasingly, displaced people who had the financial means to previously rent accommodation are running out of money and see themselves forced to move into camps. The provision of needs-based humanitarian assistance is further hampered by lack of access and lack of engagement mechanisms with the diversity of camp leaders. (CCCM, 2014/06)

NFI: Electricity is generated by stations in areas under the control of the GoS, but regular power cuts occur and shortages of electricity are experienced that affect households and businesses. In some towns citizens have pooled their resources to buy big generators in order to provide shops and residential areas with electricity in return for a monthly subscription fee. (Damascusbureau, 2014/02/25). Cooking gas is in short supply leading to the fact that many families who are reliant on gas for cooking share the cooking or eat dried food as trusted sources report. The limited possibility to cook food could have a negative impact on nutrition and health. (Trusted sources, 2014/05). Clothes and mosquito nets for the summer are lacking in some villages as trusted sources report. Prices for clothes have gone up and are not affordable for those who currently have no or little income. For the summer months, mosquito nets offering protection from insect bites are lacking. (Trusted sources, 2014/05).

Education: Education in Idleb continues to be hampered due to several factors, including mainly the high level of damage and destruction in some areas caused by shelling and aerial bombardment such as in Saraqeb, Ariha, Ehsim, Kafr Nobol and Ma’arrat an Numan. The use of schools as collective shelters is another issue that limits the available learning spaces, and was reported by trusted sources in several areas such as Kafr Nobol, Ma’arrat an Numan and Khan Sheikhoun.

A severe lack of education materials including furniture, books, stationary and other materials was reported by trusted sources as well. The quality of education in areas affected by violence is perceived as low due to lack of qualified teachers in non GoS run schools and the lack of possibility for certification. (Trusted sources 2014/05, PAH 2014).
Lattakia

**Key issues and possible developments:** The offensive started by opposition groups at the end of March was ended by Government forces in mid-June and areas were retaken from the opposition, including the border town of Kasab. Lattakia has a large IDP population of an estimated 1 million people who have fled into the relatively safe governorate. The demand on shelter and other sectors is high and there is the need for continued support of IDPs and host communities.

**Context:** In late March, opposition groups launched an offensive in the Northern parts of Lattakia, capturing a string of villages and towns near the Turkish border, among them Kasab. Despite Government success in some areas in fighting the offensive, rebels initially held captured ground in Lattakia Governorate. On 28 April Al Samra beach, an outlet to the sea which the opposition had kept for weeks was back under the control of the SAF. By mid-June the SAF took control of the hills the southeast of Observatory 45 in Kasab. On 15 June Syrian government forces retook Kasab, ousting the opposition from the town on the Turkish border. ([Ara, 2014/06/17, CrisisGroup, 2014/05/01, Al-akhbar 2014/04/17, Al-akhbar 2014/04/28, ARA, 2014/06/16, Al-akhbar 2014/06/14, DailyStar 2014/03/31])

**Access:** In the course of escalating clashes in northern parts of Lattakia, the security situation deteriorated and access was constrained in mid-May. Restricted access and active fighting had an impact on the May round of polio vaccinations as, according to the Ministry of Health, a couple of districts in Lattakia were not accessible. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19]) Lattakia is expected to still have good access from Damascus mainly into government held areas in the governorate. Access to the opposition held areas in the north east of the governorate in Kurds and Turkmen mountain areas is expected to be more dependent on unofficial border crossing with Turkey close to Yamadiyeh and Badama.

**Displacement:** The violent clashes over recent months have caused displacement. 450 Kasab families left town, many to Lattakia city where they
reportedly rented apartments, others to Beirut. The residents from Kasab began returning home on 16 June, a day after the army retook the area from the opposition. (Al akhbar 2014/04/16, DailyStar 2014/06/17). From mid-April to mid-May, SARC reported a new arrival of 2,500 displaced people, mainly from Aleppo, at the Sports City shelter in Lattakia. Over 37,000 people are currently residing in the shelter, reportedly far exceeding its capacity. (UNICEF, 2014/05/19). It is not highly expected in the near future to witness any significant displacement movements inside Lattakia. The only possible displacement that could be expected is in case GoS forces progressed more in the north eastern areas of the governorate, which are opposition held areas, in Rabe’a and Salma. This may lead people to seek refuge in Idleb IDP camps, especially the ones in Badama and Salqin.

**Humanitarian needs**

**Protection:** During the fights around Kasab, around 150 of its predominantly Armenian-Christian residents, a minority in the Governorate, had taken shelter in the Armenian Church in Lattakia. (Aljazeera, 2014/05/27) The release of 40 out of 95 prisoners who were arrested by the opposition forces in Salanfa in eastern Lattakia in August 2013 has not been completed yet. 11 children and 4 women have been set free until now and have arrived at the National hospital in Lattakia. (Al Akhbar 2014/05/08)

**Livelihood and Food Security:** Lattakia is one of the governorates that remains at the drought “warning” phase, with cumulative rains below 50 percent of the seasonal average. In how far the below average rainfalls have affected the crop growth and will influence the capacity to supply food and water supply needs to be monitored. (FAO, 2014/05/15) Residents of the town of Beit Yashout in Jableh district requested the setup of a subsidised bakery from their local government, arguing that an influx of displaced people has created added pressures. The request for the bakery was turned down by the authorities. The incident might be indicative of rising prices for food and possibly limited supply of bread through bakeries given the large number of IDPs in the Governorate. (IWPR 2014/04/25). There have been reports that formerly abandoned industrial regions of Lattakia have been re-vitalised by IDPs, mostly by craftsmen from Aleppo having started small textile, metal and mechanical workshops. The coastal regions also appear to have attracted investment as a result of an influx of funds from Aleppo businessmen. Indications of competition of IDPs with the host community on the local labour markets and related social tensions have not been reported. (DailyStar 2014/05/24, ALMonitor, 2014/06/04) In mid-June the Syrian Minister of Economy and External Trade announced that large amounts of food materials had arrived to Lattakia and Tartous Ports which were to be put into the markets in order to meet citizens’ needs and ensure the stability of prices. (SANA 2014/06/19)

**Health:** The Ministry of Health has confirmed a measles outbreak in several governorates, with confirmed cases based on blood samples observed also in certain districts of Lattakia. (UNICEF, 2014/06/20). At the end of March, the WHO noted that with 1.2 million inhabitants and more than 1 million IDPs the health system in the governorate was heavily overburdened. (WHO, 2014/03/30)

**Education:** Education for IDP children is hampered by insufficient supply of school services. UNICEF reported that field monitoring showed an increase in IDP children dropping out of school in the area around the Sports City shelter in Lattakia. The monitoring revealed that especially those children residing in the in the Sports City shelter are dropping, as the nearest school to the shelter is overcrowded. (UNICEF, 2014/05/19)
Quneitra

Key issues and possible developments: The conflict further escalated in Quneitra in early 2014, peaking during February and March. In April and May, the number of conflict incidents recorded dropped significantly. Quneitra’s conflict dynamics are heavily influenced by those in Dar’a governorate. The ongoing battle between the GoS and opposition forces for control of Nawa town and the surrounding hills around Ghadir Elbostan and Kodneh in southern Quneitra has resulted in significant humanitarian needs in an area which was already severely affected according to a March assessment. (UNMAS 2014/05, AWG-SS 2014/03/20)

After a June missile strike on a vehicle in the occupied Golan Heights killed an Israeli teenager and injured 2 others, Israel retaliated with airstrikes against 7 GoS positions, killing at least 4 people. (AFP 2014/06/22, CS Monitor 2014/06/23)

Context: This rural and sparsely populated governorate is particularly delicate given its proximity to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. A 1974 armistice prohibits the GoS from engaging in military activity within the buffer zone that runs along the border between Quneitra and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Although the terms of the agreement have not been strictly followed, the GoS has avoided using significant airstrikes in Quneitra, allowing opposition forces more operational space. Nonetheless, Quneitra witnesses frequent clashes and shelling between the opposition and GoS forces.

Displacement: There was scarce information on displacement in or from Quneitra in the second quarter, with only 1 WFP report noting that there was significant displacement from Quneitra to Damascus and Rural Damascus in early May. A March assessment concluded that about 60% of residents in Quneitra were displaced. (WFP 2014/05/20, AWG-SS 2014/03/20)

Humanitarian needs

Health: 11 cases of suspected measles have been reported through the ERWARS since the beginning of the year, 8 of which were reported in 1 week in late May. Although access to health facilities for many residents in Quneitra is a major challenge, this spike in cases is notable and should be monitored in the coming months, particularly due to seasonal water shortages. (WHO 2014/05)
Food security and livelihoods: According to FAO, rainfall in Quneitra governorate through April was more than 50% below the seasonal average and has issued a warning for drought conditions. Those in besieged areas in northwestern Quneitra are particularly vulnerable as local agricultural production was reported to be their main source of food. [FAO 2014/05/15, AWG-SS 2014/03/20]
Tartous

Key issues: Although the governorate has been distant from the widespread armed conflict, IDPs and local residents still require humanitarian assistance. Tartous is home to some 570,000 IDPs, mainly from Aleppo, Homs and Hama, who reside in rented apartments, government facilities and outdoor spaces. (UN Children’s Fund 2014/04/11, UN Children’s Fund 2014/04/11)

Context: Tartous has been relatively quieter than other areas in Syria, and Tartous city has been almost free from fighting and violent activities. Many businessmen are investing in the city and as such some private sector companies have relocated there due to the relative stability and security the city offers. Tartous has been a refuge for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) escaping nearby conflict areas. (Jadaliyya 2014/04/13)

Displacement: Since the beginning of the fighting in Syria, 570,000 IDPs reportedly took refuge in Tartous, the majority of which are from Aleppo, Homs and Hama. However, UNFPA reports more than one million internally displaced persons in Tartous and its surrounding areas. (UNFPA 2014/03/31, UN Children’s Fund 2014/04/11)

Humanitarian needs

Health: 900,000 persons are reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance in Tartous. An overburdened health system leaves many civilians without proper health care, particularly women who have been reportedly forced to give birth at home in unhygienic circumstances and without medical supervision due to the absence of skilled birth attendance. Because the area did not witness any violent attacks, hospitals and medical centers are still functional but lack the capacity to withstand the increasing number of IDPs to the city. (UNFPA 2014/03/31, UN Children’s Fund 2014/04/11)

Shelter: While middle class people who fled to Tartous are mainly accommodated in rented apartments and chalets, other less well-off IDPs live in government facilities and buildings, mainly in schools. 12,000 IDPs reportedly live in public buildings and outdoor spaces in and around the city while some have managed to stay with friends and family members from the host community. (UN Children’s Fund 2014/04/11, Jadaliyya 2014/04/13)
Protection: Despite the relative security and stability in Tartous, civilians in the city of Banyas and its surrounding areas are regularly subject to arbitrary arrests and house raids by GoS forces, for instance 3 civilians from one family were detained by GoS forces in the Alqin village in the outskirts of Banyas. On June 23, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that 2 men from the city were tortured to death under GoS detainment (SOHR 2014/06/23)
Annex B – Information gaps and data limitations

Data limitations

Information available on the humanitarian situation, specifically primary data, is extremely limited. To obtain a countrywide and objective picture of the needs and priorities, SNAP analyses a multitude of sources. In addition to consolidating the reports and assessments of humanitarian organisations SNAP collates information from GoS, opposition groups and media sources to research this document.

While some information from Government of Syria (GoS) held areas and hard-to-reach areas is available, huge gaps remain. In some cases, restrictions on information sharing hamper SNAP’s ability to form a comprehensive picture on several regions in the country.

All these sources, however, are subject to specific limitations:

- **Syrian media:** Access for journalists to and within Syria is highly constrained. Freedom of press is limited and many media sources are dependent on their political allegiances to continue to operate, leaving limited space for independent analysis. The media landscape in Syria is shaped by sources that are affiliated with the GoS, such as the state-run SANA News, and sources affiliated with the opposition, such as Eqtisad. Although local activists are vocal in sharing their experiences, this information is often impossible to verify. ([Guardian 2014/01/07, RSF 2013/12/18]

- **Relief actors:** Movement for international and national organisations is severely limited and publications are subject to scrutiny by armed groups and the GoS. Publication of information or advocacy deemed controversial by any party to the conflict has direct implications on humanitarian access. Protection concerns, for instance, are often too politically sensitive to be included in assessments or publicly available reports.

- **Monitoring systems:** The fracturing of the country into areas controlled by the GoS, contested areas and areas led by non-state actors make a countrywide monitoring of the situation by one actor next to impossible. Multi-sectoral joint assessments in Syria are similarly difficult. Although several structures were in place prior to the crisis (including monitoring of disease outbreaks through the Early Warning and Response System EWARS), the security situation hampers countrywide coverage.

**Publicly available assessments and reports**

Despite the constraints, several assessments and studies have been made available, including:

- **Shelter:** In the absence of a large-scale shelter assessment, numerous small-scale assessments are conducted, mostly focusing on the situation of IDPs in camps and collective shelters. However, no reports comprehensively assessed the overall damage to homes and shelters by the ongoing conflict.

- **Displacement:** Very little information is available on displacement movements within, to and from governorates. There is also limited information on the number of returnees to conflict areas that have regained relative stability and IDP numbers from conflict areas, namely returnees to Qalamoun region, old Homs and Kasab, as well as displacement movements from Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Aleppo and Western Ghouta. The number of IDPs throughout Syria has not been updated since the end of 2013 in the SHARP December report.

- **Protection:** The Commission of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council publishes periodic reports on the human rights situation in Syria, as does Human Rights Watch (HRW). For example, HRW issued a report in June on human rights abuses carried out in Kurdish areas under YPG control. ([HRW 2014/06/01]

- **Health:** The Early Warning and Response System (EWARS) publishes regular reports on health issues. However, communication channels are often interrupted and some areas are not included in the system. The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) established a parallel surveillance system – the Early Warning Alert and Response Network (EWARN) – in opposition-held areas in September. Amnesty international published a report in mid-June on the besieged areas in Syria and the humanitarian impact on besieged populations. ([Amnesty 2014/06/12]

- **Wash:** There is limited information on the effect of the dry weather conditions on crop production, income generation possibilities and water shortages. There were reports on water shortages and poor water quality in several governorates, especially Der-az-Zour and Rural Damascus, however no reports were able to specify the number of people affected by water shortages, areas experiencing water shortages, the destruction of water infrastructure, alternative sources of water and available sources for clean drinking water.

- **Livelihoods and Food Security:** There are major information gaps on sources, availability and affordability of food for IDPs and host communities. A significant part of food shortages result from the large number of IDPs in concentrated areas and the quantity of food products not being able to meet the needs of IDPs coming in. The number of people in need of nutrition and the effect of IDP influx on host communities are however both underreported.
Monitoring: In addition to the EWARS and EWAR, WFP runs a price and market monitoring system and a MoH/WHO early warning and response system. The ACU, in cooperation with international partners, leads several monitoring systems in northern governorates, including the regularly updated EWARN system and an IDP camp monitoring system. However, due to the significant access constraints, these systems are often not comprehensive, covering only parts of Syria.

Recent information sources

Reports on the humanitarian needs in Syria that have become available in March, May and June:

- UNICEF published two monthly humanitarian situation reports in May and June 2014. (UNICEF 2014/05/19, UNICEF 2014/06/12)
- WFP published a crisis response situation update in June. (WFP /06/10)
- Save the Children published a multi sector report on the impact of three years of war on the health of Syria’s children. (Save the Children 2014/03/09)
Annex C – Expanded sections

Armed conflict and possible developments

Opposition VS GoS forces: Opposition forces made progress in Lattakia in March when they took control of Kasab, a town bordering Turkey, and other strategic locations in the north of the governorate. Since March clashes continued in various locations as GoS forces, supported by the National Defence Army (Paramilitary group), and attempted to retake control of strategic sites such as Nab’aen hill, Tchalma Mountain and Observatory 45 military base. Ongoing clashes have been reported since 21 March and GoS forces made at the end a significant progress starting from 14 June and push opposition fighters back closer to the Turkish borders regaining almost all the land they lost since the battle of the coast has started. The speed of this victory may encourage GoS forces and within the next 3 months they may be expected to push forward into the north east rural parts of the governorate and attempt to control other areas in Turkmen and Kurds mountains. (AFP 2014/03/31, SOHR 2014/04/12, As Safir 2014/05/13, Daily Star 2014/06/15, ARA News 2014/06/16)

In Idlib governorate the opposite occurred, with opposition fighters making significant progress and taking control of some strategic areas such as the city of Khan Sheikhoun, which they took at the end of May. Progress in the south of Idlib was connected to progress in the North of Hama, where opposition fighters took control of the majority of Morek town and cut off a main supply route to the military bases of GoS forces in Wadi Ad Deif military camp. This camp had been under tighter siege since the beginning of April and was targeted with a massive tunnel bomb attack on 4 May. In the near future, opposition forces are expected to attempt to control other strategic towns linking Idlib with Lattakia such as Jisr ash Shoghour and Ariha, and to tighten the siege on the capital of the governorate. Air strikes by GoS forces are expected to target villages around the towns of Ehsim, Saraqeb and Ma’ara, since no real ground progress is anticipated and there is a strong presence of opposition fighters in these areas. (Alertnet 2014/04/03, AFP 2014/05/04, Al Watan 2014/05/25, Daily Star 2014/05/29)

In Aleppo, opposition fighters made significant progress at the beginning of May, taking control of Rashedeen, a strategic area of the city. They also targeted some key military and intelligence points in the western part of the city, which is currently under GoS control. GoS forces regained control of the strategic neighbourhood of Ramouseh and made important gains in Sheikh Najjar industrial town, and took as well full control of Aleppo central prison, where it was reported in 23 May that 150 prisoners died due to shelling and lack of medical supplies. As in the first quarter of 2014, the ongoing use of barrel bombing was the main conflict-related issue-. According to SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), the number of dead by the end of May due to barrel bombs reached 2000 people, the use of barrel bombs continues to cause waves of displacement from eastern neighbourhoods under opposition control, such as Haidariyeh, Fardoos and Al Sukkari. The level of destruction is quite high and a very high level of damage to infrastructure was also reported. Use of barrel bombs targeting opposition held areas is expected to continue in the near future, and attempts by opposition fighters to make gains in the southern parts of the governorate are expected, especially around As Safira area. At the same time, GoS forces are expected to keep trying to secure the road between Aleppo international airport and the western neighbourhoods of the city and potential clashes are expected around military and intelligence bases in the western neighbourhoods of Aleppo city. (ARA News 2014/04/10, AFP 2014/04/13, Al Akhbar 2014/04/17, Daily Star 2014/04/21, Daily Star 2014/05/05, As Safir 2014/05/23, Al Jazeera 2014/06/17, BBC 2014/05/30)

In Hama, fighting around the strategic town of Morek, on the road linking Aleppo with Hama city has been reported over the last 3 months. This is part of an offensive by opposition fighters in the south of Idlib and the north of Hama who are attempting to cut off supply routes to the 2 main army bases in the south of Idlib (Wadi ad Deif and Hamidiyeh). They also want to control the supply route between Hama city and Aleppo through Idlib governorate. Opposition fighters seized control of the majority of Morek town in March but GoS forces retook control of parts of it in April. The clashes there are expected to continue due to the strategic value of the town. In April, the town of Kafr Zeita was allegedly attacked with chlorine gas, having been targeted on various occasions in the last 3 months with barrel bombs. Suicide attacks targeted As Salamiyeh city to the east of the governorate in April, killing at least 10 people. The conflict in Hama is expected to continue in the near future with GoS forces shelling and bombing opposition held areas in the North of the governorate. GoS forces are expected to keep the strategic road linking Khanaser in the south of Aleppo and As Salamiyeh in Hama fortified. Opposition fighters will focus more on controlling points on the road linking Aleppo with Hama city. (Daily Star 2014/04/14, Daily Star 2014/04/19, Al Jazeera 2014/04/22, SOHR 2014/05/21)

In the central governorate of Homs, nearly 2 years of fighting and besiegement of the old city ended following an agreement between opposition fighters and GoS forces at the beginning of May. 1200 opposition fighters left the old neighbourhoods of the city and headed towards opposition held areas in the north of the governorate. The heavily damaged neighbourhoods of old Homs were handed to GoS forces, which means the GoS have now almost full control of the city, except of few pockets of opposition in Wa’ar neighbourhood. This neighbourhood hosts a large number of IDPs, estimated around 350,000, and has been targeted by shelling over the last 3 months. Many car bombs attacks have been reported in government held neighbourhoods in the last 3 months, causing casualties among both civilians and GoS forces. The city of Homs is expected to be under full control of GoS forces in the next few months, as a result of heavy besiegement of opposition held areas in Wa’ar. Car bombs are
also highly likely in government held areas. Opposition held areas around Talbiseh and Ar Rastan in the north of the governorate are also expected to be targeted with shelling and aerial bombardment and GoS forces will keep pushing hard to seize full control of areas along the road between Homs and Hama. (AFP 2014/04/05, BBC 2014/04/09, Al Akhbar 2014/04/12, Daily Star 2014/04/18, AFP 2014/04/29, AFP 2014/05/02, Daily Star 2014/05/12)

Further south, in Damascus and Rural Damascus, conflict has continued over the last 3 months with GoS forces focusing on opposition held neighbourhoods inside the capital, especially Joubar and Harasta. The main focus of fighting over the last 3 months was in April in the Qalamoun area in Rural Damascus. This is a continuation of the heavy conflict the area has witnessed since the beginning of the year. The conflict concentrated on Rankoos, Hosh Arab, Falita and other areas held by the opposition in the Qalamoun area. By mid April, GoS forces announced full control of Qalamoun area. However clashes are still being reported in the area and total stability in the area’s security situation is not expected in the near future, especially around Rankus. After Qalamoun, the focus of GoS forces turned immediately to Eastern Ghouta (and Western Ghouta) and Zabadani, with air strikes and shelling against Malih, Duma, Kafr Batna and Arbin. Other areas in Rural Damascus were subject to barrel bombs and shelling, especially in Darayya. The focus of GoS forces over the last 3 months on the Eastern Ghouta front was to take control of the strategic town of Malih, close to Damascus international airport. The town, especially Duma area, the main opposition stronghold close to the capital, is considered as an access point to Eastern Ghouta. Taking it will likely lead to the gradual fall of other opposition held towns such as Deir Elasafer, Kafr Batna and eventually Duma. Opposition forces will not give up this area easily and fierce battles are likely in the very near future. Several GoS held neighbourhoods in the capital were targeted with mortar shells on various occasions over the last 3 months and this is expected to continue in the near future, due to the opposition’s inability to launch larger scale ground attacks against GoS forces. (AFP 2014/03/31, AFP 2014/04/05, BBC 2014/04/09, Al Jazeera 2014/04/11, Daily Star 2014/04/16, Al Akhbar 2014/04/16, Al Jazeera 2014/04/22, AFP 2014/05/03, Daily Star 2014/05/05, Al Akhbar 2014/05/12, Al Akhbar 2014/06/03, ARA News 2014/06/12)

Further south in Dar’a and Quneitra, GoS forces continued shelling and bombing opposition held areas, such as al Rafid and Nasiriyah in Quneitra and Sheikh Meskin, Nawa, Inkhil and Da’el in Dar’a. Opposition forces made progress in Quneitra and controlled Tal al Ahmar. The Israeli army expects the whole governorate to fall into the hands of opposition fighters in the near future. Opposition forces in Dar’a were also reported to have progressed: with opposition fighters taking control of the strategic hill of Tal al Jamou’a, which is considered as one of the main bases of GoS forces in the south and an access point to Nawa city. GoS forces are expected to focus on the fighting in Dar’a city and Nawa, and will keep pushing to control Sheikh Miskeen areas. Areas such as Al Lajat and Nawa are expected to be targeted with aerial bombing and shelling in the near future. Opposition forces will focus more on maintaining the territories they control in Dar’a city and on progressing further inside it using street fighting. Attacks by car bombs against GoS military check points on the way to Damascus are also expected. Opposition fighters in Quneitra will keep pushing towards the capital of the governorate after their latest strategic gains. (SOHR 2014/04/10, SOHR 2014/04/22, Al Akhbar 2014/04/28, As Safir 2014/04/28, Al Akhbar 2014/05/17, AFP 2014/05/24, As Safir 2014/06/16)

Opposition VS IS: Having retreated from Idleb and western rural Aleppo, IS have been focussing on strengthening their control in areas of north eastern Aleppo, Ar Raqq, the south and the east of Al Hasakeh and Deir ez Zor. Opposition fighters in Al Bab and Ar Raee launched an offensive against IS in May and took control of 4 villages. No major battles took place around IS strongholds in Jarablus and Menbij, while Ar Raqq remained totally under IS control following the retreat of many opposition fighters toward Deir ez Zor or Ain al Arab ( Popular Protection Units (YPG) held area). Clashes between IS on one side and Islamic front and Jabhat al Nusra together on the other side in Deir-ez-Zor have reached a critical stage over the past 3 months and, in a dangerous indication of tribal conflict, it was noted that the main tribes had started taking sides in the battle, either with Jabhat al Nusra or with IS. This development could have dangerous future implications for eastern parts of Syria and western parts of Iraq, due to the complexity of tribal relations in the 2 areas. The number of casualties from the conflict in Deir ez Zor and the south of Al Hasakeh was high, especially among civilians. In April, some of the main strategic towns in Deir ez Zor, such as Basira, Sur, Hajin and Khasham, were reported to be under IS’s control. Brutal violence against civilians was reported in many of these places. Opposition held neighbourhoods in the city of Deir ez Zor came under siege by IS, which has prevented supplies from entering these neighbourhoods since mid May. The conflict caused a huge wave of displacement, with some reports estimating 250,000 IDPs. Following its progress in Iraq, the relationship between IS and other Islamic groups was seen to have improved slightly. Some trusted sources reported that IS was using the Abu Kamal border crossing, controlled by Jabhat an Nusra, to send fighters in and out of Iraq. IS has now reached the stage where its areas of control in Syria and Iraq are connected. The future of conflict in that area will be closely related to the development of the situation in Iraq, and an agreement between IS and Jabhat al Nusra is a highly possible scenario in the near future, in fact, the two sides reached an agreement at the end of May locally in Abu Kamal in Deir-ez-Zor governorate, and this local agreement might expand to reach other areas in the governorate. Should this happen, the oil-rich area may be divided unofficially between the 2 sides, assuming they are able to reach an agreement with local tribes. On the use of this important economic resource. (AFP 2014/04/11, Daily Star 2014/04/14, Al Akhbar 2014/05/01, As Safir 2014/05/17, As Safir 2014/06/10)
YPG VS IS: the conflict between the two sides continued on the same front lines as in the first quarter of the year, with continual attempts from IS to control more territories with Kurdish majority population. The focus of battles during the past 3 months concentrated around Ras al Ain and Tal Hamis in Al Hasakeh, and Ain Issa and Tal Abiad in Ar Raqqa, and Ain al Arab in Aleppo. IS targeted the Kurdish towns of Tal Hajar, Tal Halaf and Tirbespi in Al Hasakeh with car bombs. In Ar-Raqqa IS attacked several Kurdish villages in Ain Issa sub-district during April and May and the attacks caused casualties between civilians. None of the two sides could achieve a significant progress during the last 3 months, but the conflict continued on the same rhythm, which is not expected to change in the near future. IS is expected to continue targeting the main Kurdish towns in Ras al Ain and Qamishli with car bombs, and possibly the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Al-Hasakeh city. Clashes are expected to continue on the fronts of Ras al Ain, Ain Issa and Ain al Arab, but no significant change in balance is expected, especially with IS focusing more on its new battle in Iraq. High cooperation between YPG forces and the Kurdish Peshmarga of Kurdistan government might be in place especially with the absence of fighting actors against IS in Al Hasakeh in the northeast of Syria and Mowsel and Ninawa in Iraq. (ARA News 2014/04/18, Al Akhbar 2014/04/25, ARA News 2014/05/08, As Safir 2014/05/13, Daily Star 2014/05/29, ARA News 2014/06/16)

Operational constraints

- Unimproved aid access after the UN resolution: In March, WFP reported that access had improved following successful negotiations and February's UN Security Council resolution 2139, which demanded that all parties in Syria allow the provision of humanitarian assistance, cease depriving civilians of food and medicine, and enable the rapid, safe, and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who wish to leave. This initially appeared to enable WFP to increase its reach to beneficiaries compared to February, with WFP reporting that it was the first time in 6 months that access was permitted into all Syrian governorates. However, the deteriorating security situation later on resulted in fewer WFP distributions in April and May, especially in Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Al- Hasakeh. For other NGOs, humanitarian access has further shrunk, with access being entirely cut-off to governorates in the north since the start of 2014, such as Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Al- Hasakeh, and Rural Damascus. By the end of May and beginning of June, some humanitarian assistance reached hard-to-reach or besieged areas such as Ar-Raqqa, Eastern Ghouta and the opposition-held part of Aleppo. An agreement reached between opposition fighters and IS by mid-June opened an important access route (Al Siyesieh Bridge) for the delivery of relief and foodstuffs to the city of Deir-ez-Zor, which was besieged by IS. (WFP 2014/04/03, WFP 2014/04/17, WFP 2014/05/04) WHO 2014/04/15, WFP 2014/05/20, Daily Star 22/04/2014, Daily Star 2014/04/28, al-akhbar 2014/06/19)

- Overall, the UN Security Council Resolution has largely been defied by the GoS. Furthermore, access to the besieged areas is still restricted except for the areas where truces have been reached as in Yarmouk. On 22 May, the UN chief, in a report to the Security Council, stated that none of the parties to the conflict in Syria are heeding the demands of resolution 2139. The ongoing operational constraints and blockades induced multiple UN calls to warring parties to allow aid deliveries countrywide. The resolution authorises the Security Council to take “further steps,” like sanctions, in case of non-compliance, but no such steps have been taken until now. (Daily Star 2014/04/24, Daily Star 2014/04/28, UNFPA 2014/04/30, USAID 2014/05/08, UN News Service 2014/02/22, Reuters 2014/05/22)

- New UN resolution draft: UN Security Council members have been considering a new resolution to authorise cross-border aid deliveries into Syria at 4 crossing points with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. The Government of Syria (GoS) has indicated that it would consider the proposal if a number of restrictions were put in place, such as GoS approval of the implementing partners used, locations of distributions and type of assistance. If the resolution were to pass, it is possible that all other humanitarian aid, which do not meet these conditions, even if crossing through these points, would be considered unauthorised/illegal. In addition, it is unlikely that cross-border assistance approved by the GoS would be allowed to areas under the control of opposition groups. (Daily Star 2014/05/30, SyriaDeeply 2014/05/30, Reuters 2014/06/20)

- GoS impediments to humanitarian access: The head of the UN reported in May that “bureaucratic resistance” by the GoS was preventing the delivery of aid to millions of Syrians in need of assistance. These bureaucratic procedures are mainly related to visas for international staff of humanitarian organisations and the movement of goods. (Daily Star 2014/05/05)

- Aid group Mercy Corps was forced to close its Damascus operation at the end of April following a request from the GoS to stop delivering humanitarian assistance from neighbouring countries, across the border into opposition-controlled areas. The GoS request was in clear defiance to the UN resolution. In 2013, Mercy Corps had been delivering relief from Damascus into south-central Syria with the consent of the Syrian government and to opposition-held areas in the north. (Guardian 2014/05/23, Mercy Corps 2014/05/23)

- The GoS has allegedly channeled most of the international aid to areas under its control. Most of the aid was reported to reach government-held

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areas, while opposition-controlled zones remain in need of food and medicine. (SyriaDeeply 2014/05/30, ECFR 2014/05)

- **New GoS restrictions on aid convoys:** On 5 May, Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs started implementing new guidelines requiring that all aid convoys be sealed at departure points in the presence of Syrian security authorities and Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to monitor the loading and sealing of trucks and to limit any losses on the road. The GoS’ objective is also to create a single process for all truck movements within the country. However, the new procedure has caused major delays in deliveries to target locations, WFP reported. It was also reported that the implementation of the new mechanism is not clear and obtaining national security approval is not possible for humanitarian actors. WFP was able to dispatch assistance for just over 3.2 million people in May, 14% less than the previous cycle and a 20% decrease from March, due to troubles in the implementation of the new mechanism. The inter-agency humanitarian convoy to Rural Homs (Rastan) and Adra (Rural Damascus) was also put on hold because of the requirements of the new official procedure. (WFP 2014/05/20, logcluster 2014/05/25, WFP 2014/06/10, logcluster 2014/05/22, logcluster 2014/05/12).

- **Cross-border aid:** Cross-border relief operations are important sources of basic food items for the population, particularly in areas difficult to reach from Damascus. However, the border crossings between Syria and its neighbouring countries have been subject to intermittent openings and closures. The Jordan/Syria official border crossing point 'Al-Naseeb', a vital point for the entry of goods before the conflict, has been sealed off since 2013. In Lebanon, no security incidents affecting cross-border aid delivery have been reported since April.

- From Turkey: By mid-May, aid convoys for WFP had entered Al-Hasakeh from the Nusaybin- Qamishli border crossing point, following approval by the Turkish and Syrian Governments. This cross-border assistance was preceded by the entry of aid convoys carrying vital aid on 20 March to the people of Al-Hasakeh from Turkey. This aid delivery reached 80% of targeted beneficiaries, yet they only represented 20% of people in need, especially in the opposition-controlled southern part of the governorate. (USAID 2014/05/22, UNICEF 2014/05/19, AlertNet 2014/05/13, WFP 2014/05/04, OCHA 2014/03/26, AlertNet 2014/03/19, UN Security Council 2014/05/22).

- From Iraq: The Syrian border crossing with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), Simalka-Peshkhabour, has remained closed since April for the entry of refugees into KR-I. However, in late May, the border crossing re-opened for medical cases and some humanitarian assistance into Al-Hasakeh governorate. On 10 June, an agreement was reached between the 2 Kurdish parties on the Syrian and Iraqi sides and the border crossing has reportedly been officially opened for the crossing of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees to north-eastern Syria. In early June, the Va’robayh border crossing between Al-Hasakeh and Iraq fell under control of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces on the Iraq side. With Kurdish political parties controlling both sides of the border, increased coordination is expected to increase humanitarian access and commercial trade. Al-Qaim-Abu Kamal and Al-Waleed-Al Tanf border crossings fell under the control of ISIS in June. This will most likely affect cross-border trade and reduce smuggling activities. (UNHCR 2014/04/13, FikraForum 2014/05/01, Hawarnews 2014/06/11, Hawar 2014/06/10, Al-akhbar 2014/06/18).

- **Truces enable limited access:** In early January, a partial lifting of blockades allowed humanitarian assistance to reach Yarmouk camp, though the truce collapsed again the following month. On 22 June, it was announced that a ceasefire between the GoS and opposition groups has been mediated by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). According to the agreement, access to the besieged camp would be opened and basic services restored. Several other ceasefires in Yarmouk have already been broken. Truces were also reached in Barzeh in Damascus city and in some other towns on the southern outskirts, allowing for intermittent access. (BBC 2014/06/23, WHO 2014/04/15, WFP 2014/04/17, UN security council 2014/04/29).

- Following the truce reached in the old City of Homs, a UN inter-agency mission delivered food rations and critical humanitarian supplies to 6 besieged or hard-to-reach villages in rural northern Aleppo on 8 and 9 May. These included some opposition-held villages and the 2 mostly Alawi villages of Nabul and Az-Zahra, which have been besieged for more than a year. (WFP 2014/05/20)

- **Hard to reach and besieged areas:** Despite the increasing truces around Damascus and Homs, many areas remain inaccessible. Estimates indicate up to 3.5 million vulnerable people still living in inaccessible locations such as cross-fire or besieged areas.

- **Active hostilities against humanitarian personnel and aid:** So far in the conflict, 12 UNRWA staff members have been killed, 24 injured and 25 detained or missing. At least 34 SARC staff or volunteers were killed while a number of others were seriously injured. Other humanitarian personnel and activists continue to face the risk of shelling and detention during their relief missions. (UNRWA 2014/04/07, IFRC 2014/04/28, SARC 2014/03/12, Irishtimes 2014/04/21)

- The hostilities also affect aid warehouses and convoys. Syrian warplanes hit 2 trucks carrying aid on behalf of a Turkish charity (IHH) in mid-May in the
city of Aleppo. A Syrian aid worker was confirmed dead and 2 others were injured. The airstrikes also hit an area adjacent to an aid warehouse in Douma town in Rural Damascus, during a UN delegation visit to the town. The aid was distributed nonetheless to the whole of Eastern Ghouta, which had been inaccessible since March 2013. Due to intense fighting around Yarmouk camp, UNRWA aid distribution was blocked for 40 days over 2 months between 1 April and 2 June. Coupled with intensified fighting in Kisweh, this prevented WFP access to storage facilities in Rural Damascus for some days, resulting in deliveries being particularly low in the southern governorates of Dar’a, Damascus and Rural Damascus. (Al-akhbar 2014/04/24, Daily Star 2014/05/2, Worldbulletin 09/05/2014, WFP 2014/06/10)

- Restriction by multiple armed groups: Humanitarian actors continue to face many challenges in terms of access. Interagency convoys are becoming more complex to organise and require extensive negotiations with many parties, a significant challenge given the multiplicity of armed opposition groups. Multiple interagency missions and convoys to Douma, for example, have been postponed several times due to security-related challenges and difficulties liaising with different parties. Aid delivery is especially challenged in some IS-controlled areas. Access restrictions and continuous population movements also continue to impede the assessment of needs. (WFP 2014/04/17, UNFPA 2014/04/30, Assafir 2014/05/12)

- Airlifted assistance: Between 26 and 29 May, 4 emergency airlifts were organised from Damascus to Qamishli, moving over 311 m³ of urgent relief cargo. The assistance is expected to be delivered in the hard-to-reach areas of southern Al-Hasakeh. (logcluster 2014/06/10)

- Lack of funding: NGOs and INGOs inside Syria continue to suffer from a lack of funding that affects their relief distributions. At the end of March, WFP reported a 20% reduction in that month’s food aid to the most vulnerable. This reduction affects the average calorie intake by every family. UNHCR also reported limited prospects of additional contributions coming in to support operations from August onwards. (WFP 2014/03/31, UNHCR 2014/05/16)

- The 2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) was launched in December 2013 for the period from January until December 2014. UN agencies, IOM and INGOs working under the 2014 SHARP requested USD 2.28 billion for an estimated 9.3 million people in need in Syria. As of June, only 27% of the funding has been covered for Syria. (OCHA 2014/06)

### Protection – Underlying Problems

**Indiscriminate and disproportionate use of violence**

- The ongoing use of heavy weapons, barrel bombs, car bombs, sniper fire, and alleged chemical attacks, particularly on densely populated areas, continue to take a heavy toll on the civilian population, contributing to the vast majority of all conflict-related deaths and injuries, and creating obstacles to the access and functionality of basic services. Allegations that the GoS is placing industrial strength chemicals into barrel bombs presents major protection and health concerns. According to the Commission of Inquiry for Syria, there has been an increase in the number of civilians killed and injured by opposition attacks, particularly the use of rockets and mortars in GoS-controlled areas.

- Barrel bombs continued to be used with reports of widespread barrel bombs dropped in Aleppo city and towns in Dar’a, as well as in rural Hama. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimates, about 2,000 people were killed in barrel bomb attacks in Aleppo alone from January through to May. An attack at a public children’s art exhibit in Aleppo killed 36 attendees, all but 3 of whom were children. Women and children made up 43% of those killed by barrel bombs in Aleppo, indicating that men make up a disproportionate amount of the victims. Opposition groups in Aleppo and Dar’a reportedly targeted GoS controlled areas’ access to water and electricity in order to stop barrel bombing campaigns, but to little effect. (Al Jazeera 2014/05/30, BBC 2014/05/30)

- An air attack, alleged to be a barrel bomb, occurred in an IDP camp in Dar’a governorate near the Jordanian border, killing an estimated 20 people, including 9 children, and injuring 80. The remaining residents of the attacked camp, as well as a neighbouring camp, have reportedly left to find other shelter. The camp was only 1 of 2 such camps along the Jordan-Syria border and the attack will likely prevent the establishment of any further camps in this area. GoS forces have previously attacked IDP camps, particularly in the north. (AFP 2014/06/18, SNAP 2014/05/06, SOHR 2014/6/18, USAID 2014/06/19)

- Despite ongoing negotiations between the GoS and opposition forces in Homs city, there has been an increase in car bombs in Homs city since March, many of which targeted residential and commercial areas, causing hundreds of casualties. One attack was followed closely by a second car bomb, injuring those who came to the help of those affected in the first explosion. While some car bombs appeared to target GoS forces, such as checkpoints, the explosions inevitably cause significant civilian casualties. (Daily Star 2014/04/18, AFP 2014/04/19, Col 2014/06/16)

- Although the election outcomes were predictable, opposition forces threatened to attack GoS sites in the run up to the vote on 3 June. An election rally in Dar’a city was shelled by opposition groups, killing 43 people, including at least 1 child. In GoS-controlled Idleb city, opposition groups...
Besieged areas

- An estimated 3.5 million Syrians are stuck in areas without access to food or aid. These are either hard-to-reach or besieged areas. (Syria Deeply 2014/05/12, UN 2014/06/20)

- According to the UN, in June approximately 241,000 people remain besieged in Syria. In comparison to the 1st quarter of 2014, official UN figures of those living under siege decreased by just 1,000 due to the evacuation of civilians from the city of Old Homs in April. Over 80%, or 196,000 people, are besieged by GoS and GoS allied forces in areas of Eastern and Western Ghouta, and the remaining 45,000 are in Nubul and Al Zahraa, besieged by opposition forces. In all areas, the distribution of humanitarian aid remains a major challenge. In June, assistance only reached two besieged communities; Yarmouk and Douma. Food aid covered just 1% of the needs of those in besieged areas, and 7% of NFI 7% needs in June. (UN 2014/06/20)

- At the start of May, IS tightened control of the main supply routes to Deir-ez-Zor city, leading to food shortages for an estimated 650,000 people inside the city. Since mid-2013, Deir-ez-Zor has been one of the areas most in need of aid, due to a combination of damage to infrastructure, high intensity conflict and extremely limited humanitarian access for international and local actors. The limited data available highlights that, across all sectors, the population in the governorate faces exceptional hardship. The siege was eased following an agreement between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and IS and access for food aid to the city was permitted. (aawsat 2014/06/17, alquds 2014/06/19, al-akhbar 2014/06/19, al-binaa 2014/06/20)

- On 9 May, the 2-year siege of the Old City of Homs ended. As part of the negotiations linked to the lifting the siege, a joint UN and SARC convoy was able to deliver humanitarian assistance to the population of Nubul and Al-Zahraa in rural Aleppo. Both towns are under at least partial siege by opposition groups. (UNSC 2014/06/20, Amnesty International 2014/06/12)

- Al Wa’er neighbourhood is the only remaining opposition stronghold in Homs city and has been subject to heavy shelling since negotiations in May failed to reach an agreement. Although it is surrounded by military and other pro-government forces and the provision of aid is limited, the UN does not consider it under siege, as some pedestrian traffic and small amounts of goods are allowed to cross checkpoints. (Al Akhbar 2014/06/11, Daily Star 2014/05/30, Zamanalwsl 2014/05/20)

Human Rights Violations

- The main Kurdish political party, the PYD, and its military wing, the YPG, have come under increased scrutiny for human rights violations since late 2013. This follows the major territorial gains they made against other armed groups in Kurdish majority areas in north and northeastern Syria. According to an HRW report, the PYD used arbitrary arrest, disappearances and exile to the KR-I in order to silence its political opponents, particularly those from other Kurdish parties. While the YPG has regulations against recruiting children, there are numerous boys and girls under the age of 18 currently serving. The YPG and its women’s unit signed a commitment to ban the use of anti-personnel mines, prohibit sexual violence and work towards eliminating gender discrimination. (Geneva Call 2014/06/16, HRW 2014/06)

- SAF have long used barrel bombs to target opposition-held areas. During this period and mostly in Aleppo, SAF helicopters have continued to drop barrel bombs on opposition-held districts. Almost 2,000 people have been killed by SAF attacks in the northern city of Aleppo so far this year. The dead included 283 women and 567 children, according to the SOHR. On 18 June, an aerial attack struck a recently established IDP camp near Ash Shajara town in the southeast of Dar’a governorate, killing tens of people. (Daily Star 2014/06/16, BBC 2014/05/30, Alaan 2014/06/19)

- The GoS continues to detain some 200 men who were among those evacuated from Old Homs in February. Most have been held at the al-Andalus school, which the Syrian authorities use as a “screening” centre. Some have reportedly been taken away to other detention centres and then tortured or otherwise ill-treated there, as well as being removed to unknown locations before disappearing. The whereabouts of 8 individuals is unknown. (Amnesty International 2014/06/10)

- Journalists are reportedly not afforded the protections generally afforded to them in crisis zones; in 2014, 3 journalists were killed, bringing the total to 64 killed since the beginning of the conflict. (CPJ 2014/06)

Amnesty

- President Assad issued Legislative Decree no. 22, granting a general amnesty for crimes committed before June 9. The decree commutes sentences to more lenient ones, including commuting the death sentence to life, and life in prison to 20 years in prison. The amnesty allows for the release of prisoners with terminal illness, those who are 70 or above, and for those convicted of lower level crimes. The decree also grants amnesty for foreigners who entered Syria with the purpose of joining a terrorist group or committing a terrorist act if they turn themselves in to the authorities within a month of issuing this decree. Deserter would also be granted full amnesty, as long as they are not wanted for other crimes. (SANA 2014/06/09)
• There have been increasing reports of detainees held by some opposition groups, who also subject detainees to torture and ill-treatment. More than 2,000 detainees, including 150 Kurdish schoolchildren, were allegedly abducted by IS in May. (OHCHR 2014/04/14, AFP 2014/05/14)

Local negotiations and truces

• Settlements in besieged areas continued to be negotiated between opposition and GoS forces throughout the second quarter, although they were rarely adhered to.
• In early May, a truce was reached in the remaining opposition strongholds in Homs City, particularly centred on the Old Quarter, which had been under siege for 2 years. The agreement came following the February evacuation of most of the area’s civilian population. In the latest deal, the remaining 1,000 fighters were allowed to leave Homs in phases, heading for opposition controlled areas. In exchange, opposition groups agreed to ease the siege of the Shia villages of Nubul and Zahraa in Aleppo governorate and to release hostages held by the opposition in the north. The Homs governor stated that 70 people, many of whom were GoS soldiers, but also including 17 women and 5 children, were released. (Reuters 2014/05/07, Guardian 2014/05/07, Reuters 2014/05/08)
• On 21 June, the GoS and opposition groups signed an agreement to open the main entrances to Yarmouk camp and restore basic services. In exchange, opposition fighters agreed to hand over heavy weapons and a security force will be established to maintain stability. While the agreement has the potential to significantly ease the suffering of at least 18,000 people, several past agreements over Yarmouk have failed. As of 1 July, UNRWA reported that it still had not gained access to Yarmouk. (BBC 2014/06/22, Al Jazeera 2014/06/22)

Women and girls

• UNFPA noted increasing reports of sexual violence in Aleppo health facilities in March, with 1-2 cases reported each month and an upward trend in the number of sexually transmitted diseases. These were attributed to an increase in survival sex among displaced women. Lack of services, cultural sensitivities, the lack of proper referral mechanisms, weak case management processes and lack of female staff for GBV cases mean it is likely that this phenomenon is much more prominent than the numbers indicate. (UNFPA 2014/04, UNFPA 2014/04/30)
• Women and girls are also impacted by extremely reduced access to reproductive health services as a result of the violence. According to UNFPA, 50% of delivery centres are not functional. The lack of medicine and supplies, electricity and qualified staff coupled with the high number of patients have overwhelmed facilities that remain functional. (UNFPA 2014/04)

Children

• The UN Col noted an increase in attacks on functioning schools, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus. The high number of child casualties in these attacks, particularly those using barrel bombs, is further traumatizing conflict-affected children. Families are also likely to keep their children away from school out of fear. (Col 2014/06/16)
• The use of child soldiers continues among opposition forces and pro-government armed groups, particularly in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Dar’a and Hama governorates. In Nubul, Al Zahraa and neighbouring villages in Aleppo, both pro-government and opposition groups were reportedly using child soldiers, mostly boys between the ages of 12 and 14. (Col 2014/06/16)

WASH – Underlying problems

• Water shortages related to conflict: Warring parties on both sides have been taking control of water resources, frequently interrupting water supply to each other’s areas. In Aleppo, water shortages were witnessed at the end of April, attributed to control of the water station in Sulaiman Al Halabi neighbourhood by opposition fighters who cut the supply to residents of Western Aleppo. In early May, water was allegedly permitted to reach the western neighbourhoods after an agreement between SARC and armed groups. However, the agreement collapsed and on 11 May, water shortages were again reported in the city. Wells and trucked water have been used as substitutes. People stood in long queues to fill their pots and vessels with water from public and mosques’ taps. It was reported that opposition forces had diverted the flow of the water network toward Queik River, which passes through the middle of the city and has been a long sewage stream for decades. Other sources reported attempts by Jabhat al-Nusra, which controls the neighbourhood where the pumping station is situated (Sulaiman Al Halabi), to redirect the water supply exclusively toward opposition-held areas. These attempts were suspected to have damaged water infrastructure. On 13 May, water supplies were gradually being restored to some neighbourhoods after a local agreement was reached. In early June, renewed shelling caused more damage to the water pumping station. The attack was followed by agreements between relief actors and armed groups to allow the fuel deliveries necessary to run the water pumping station. However, water remains scarce. Due to the importance of water, it is anticipated that this means of warfare will be increasingly used. (Al-akhbar 2014/04/28, Syria Deeply 2014/04/28, Al-akhbar 2014/05/07, Daily Star 11/05/2014, Al-akhbar 2014/08/10, Assafir 12/05/2014, SOHR 10/05/2014, Al-akhbar 2014/05/14, Gulfnews 2014/05/17, Al-akhbar 2014/06/06, Al-akhbar 2014/06/14)
In Eastern Ghouta, the GoS has reportedly cut off drinking water to towns such as Duma, Saqba and Hammorih. The situation is aggravated by attacks on the electricity network and the lack of fuel in the besieged region. (Al-akhbar 2014/05/07, Alaan 2014/04/24, alquuds 2014/04/30, Rozana 2014/04/23, Alaan 2014/05/10)

- Water infrastructure is also affected by damage and looting, especially in areas of conflict where recurrent bombing affects the supply of water. In late April, alleged attacks by opposition forces on gas pipe lines supplying power plants in the southern regions of Syria led to power cuts of up to 20 hours a day in some areas of the capital and its outskirts, such as Sahnaya and Jaramana. This has also affected the water supply to these areas. (Al-akhbar 2014/05/07, Alaan 2014/04/24, alquuds 2014/04/30, Rozana 2014/04/23, Alaan 2014/05/10)

The water purification plant for the city of Deir-ez-Zor has been completely damaged. In Ar-Rashidieh neighbourhood, a major water line has been damaged, affecting the water supply to 5 neighbourhoods. Some families have been forced to use pots to collect water from neighbouring areas. Residents who still have access to the network, which is fed by the Euphrates, have been receiving untreated water. (Daily Star 2014/05/12, PI 2014/05/15)

Returnees to neighbourhoods of the Old City of Homs, which has had its infrastructure destroyed by fierce fighting, are suffering from severe water shortages. Following implementation of the truce in May, the Orthodox Patriarchate has been providing water via water trucking. (Maar 11 2014/06/17, RT 2014/05/16)

- Reduced Euphrates water levels: In May, an unprecedented reduction in water levels at the Euphrates Lake was reported. Multiple factors might have caused this issue. One factor, reported by Syrian officials, is that Turkey completely cut off the water supply to Syria for 13 consecutive days in May, and partially for sporadic days in March and June. The dam system on the Euphrates in Syria consists of 3 dams: Tishreen, Euphrates and Al Baath. These 3 dams are used to generate electricity for various areas in Syria. The IS-controlled Euphrates dam, which could potentially be used by IS as a means of war, currently generates electricity for Ar-Raqqa and very small amounts of electricity to other governorates. Pre-crise, it generated electricity for 7 governorates. Recently, Ar-Raqqa has been receiving even less electricity than it did at the beginning of 2014. This reduction in electricity production has also affected water pumping for domestic use in Ar-Raqqa.

Since the end of March, the lake's water level had decreased by 6 metres, and its capacity had decreased by around 2.7 billion m^3 of its original capacity of 14 billion m^3. This is according to estimated calculations, based on the assumption that the surface area of the lake is 447 Km^2. The losses attributed to the 13 day cut of water supply by Turkey was only 561 million m^3 (regardless of the amount partially lost and based on the fact that water enters Syria at a rate of 500 m^3 per second). Since the difference is very high, the water cut off by Turkish authorities is not the sole cause of the lake’s water reduction. While other factors might include drinking, irrigation, and the excessive use of water for electricity production in the Euphrates dam, which is located in an area under IS control, there are no published reports confirming this and further investigation is needed. Whatever the reasons, the reduction of water in the Euphrates Lake could have a huge humanitarian impact as millions of people in the north, including Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor, who make use of it for electricity, drinking water and irrigation. (PI 2014/06/28)

Aleppo city for example depends on the water that is supplied from the lake through 2 pumping stations. One of these stations - Al Khafsa, from which 4 main drawing lines branch off towards the city, is out of service due to the low level of water in the lake. As a result of the water reduction, the turbines that generate electricity in Tishreen’s dam stopped in May, causing power cuts in some areas of Aleppo. Various sources state that this is an emergent problem that could have a catastrophic impact. These sources mention that with the amount of water the lake is losing on a daily basis, there is a high possibility that in the near future, the Euphrates dam will no longer be able to produce electricity. Reduced water supplies in the dam may cause sediments in the Euphrates Lake to dry off. As drying takes place, the sediments may crack and develop deep fissures in the dam's infrastructure. (Assafir 2014/06/09, media 24 2014/06/11, Assafir 2014/05/12, Rozana 2014/05/10)

- Lack of capacity and access for maintenance and repair: Public workers cannot access their offices for security reasons, making it difficult to contact them with instructions of repair and maintenance work they need to undertake. There are also difficulties in providing repair tools and equipment and difficulties in reaching damaged sites. It was reported that staff were unable to carry out repair and maintenance work in Quneitra, some wells went out of service and access to the work sites was impeded by security concerns. Difficulties in providing spare parts such as electric plates, generators, pipes, cables, pumps and consumable such as chlorine, and diesel were reported in many governorates such as Hama. Al- Hasakeh has also suffered from the lack of diesel, spare parts and other chemicals necessary for water treatment. In recent months, access in the governorate of Deir-ez-Zor has been a major issue and the public institution's administrative building is barely reachable. (MWRI 2014/05, Zamanalwasi 2014/06/12)

The city of Idleb, controlled by the GoS, suffers from water shortages because of attacks on the electricity network linking the electrical plants of Al
Dana and Salqeen to the water station in Idleb. The maintenance team has not been able to reach the damaged areas. People have been increasingly reliant on trucked water, which is provided at a high price. (Al Khabar 2014/04/16)

- **Power outages:** All the governorates suffer from power outages. After the recent attacks on gas lines, power outages reached 10 hours a day and this has resulted in drinking water shortages. To meet their water needs, the Damascenes have been increasingly relying on water trucking, which are provided at a high price. The frequent and long lasting power outages in Homs have increased the costs of water production. In Al-Hasakah, water shortages have increased with the approaching summer season and with long hours of electricity cuts. The lack of electricity affects the functioning of artesian wells and pumping stations. (Tishreen 2014/05/18, PI 2014/05/20, IMWRI 2014/05, PI 2014/04/15, Orient News 2014/04/17, al-iktissadi 2014/06/16, Al-akhbar 2014/06/18)

In the southern region, there are long hours of electricity cuts. Daily power outages reached 16 hours in As-Sweida, causing water shortages. Some water projects such as Al Mzairib project (Dar’a), which used to cover half of the city’s needs, went out of service. (Tishreen 2014/05/19)

- **Low rainfall levels:** Syria is considered a country of limited water resources and is classified as an arid and semi-arid region. Average rainfall ranges between 100 mm -1,500 mm and the country has an average annual water deficit of 1.5 billion m³. This year, the problem is aggravated as parts of Syria witnessed their lowest levels of rainfall in more than half a century, UNICEF reported. (UNICEF 2014/06/09)

There is quite a large reduction in the water levels of Al Fijeh spring (Baradah-north) - by 83% - according to the General Director of the Public Organisation for Potable Water. Al Fijeh is the major source of drinking water in Damascus. As-Sweida is also one of the governorates that suffers most from limited water sources. Its water reserves depend mainly on the amount of annual rainfall. (Damas Media office 2014/04/17, MWRI 2014/05, PI 2014/05/20)

In opposition-held areas of Dar’a, attacks on artesian wells and the electricity supply network have been compounded by the reduction in rainfall, which has reduced the amount of water stored and available for irrigation purposes. (Ala’an 2014/05/10)

Low rainfall in Tartous has caused a decline in levels of underground water and some wells have become semi-arid. In the city of Tartous, rainfall levels did not exceed 220 mm, compared to 1,300 mm in 2013. Generally, there is more abundant rainfall in coastal governorates than central ones. (b2b 2014/03/24, Tishreen 2014/03/04, ruvr 2014/02/26)

According to a recent report from Al Jazeera, the countryside of Lattakia, particularly villages in the Akrad Mountain, has never witnessed such drought-like conditions. Less than a quarter of the average annual rainfall fell in the area. Most of the residents rely on rain for irrigation and the low amount of rainfall has affected agriculture, as well as livestock, which needs the water to survive. (Al-Jazeera 2014/06/06, dampress 2014/05/04)

- **Increased IDPs/ Demographic change:** Some areas in Homs and Dar’a witnessed a huge influx from other neighbourhoods, which increased pressure on the water network. The increase in the number of IDPs in Tartous and Lattakia has required investment in new wells to cover the increased demand. (MWRI 2014/05, b2b 2014/03/24, Tishreen 2014/03/04, ruvr 2014/02/26)

- **Baseline problems:** Several problems existed pre-crisis, including pollution, lack of resources and old water network pipelines. In the summer seasons before the crisis, some wells in Dar’a used to dry up because of overuse of underground water, exacerbated by ad hoc digging of wells for agriculture and increased demand. The town of As-Salamiya, in eastern Hama has long suffered from an acute shortage of potable water supplies, due to its basic dependence on groundwater, which contains high rates of solvent sulphur. (UNICEF 2013/11)

Some sewage from Tartous is directed toward the nearby valleys, polluting the underground water that residents rely on for drinking. Some villages in the Al Qadmous area in particular have reported drinking water problems. Water shortages in the region have been an issue for many years and started before the crisis. (b2b 2014/03/24, Tishreen 2014/03/04, ruvr 2014/02/26)

In the governorate of Al-Hasakeh, most surface water resources (the rivers of Al-Khabour, Jagjag, Jarjub and Al-Zerkan and the fountains of Ras Al-Ain), have dried up, as a result of waves of drought in the governorate over the last 20 years. The last drought to hit the north-eastern region was from 2004 to 2008. (UNICEF 2013/11)

- **Increased costs/reduced revenues and shortages of production inputs:** Due to economic sanctions, the cost of imports has increased. On top of this, the collection of taxes has been hampered by the ongoing conflict, leading to a decline in revenues. Reduced tax collection was reported in various governorates including GoS-held areas such as Damascus. These reduced revenues are not enough to purchase the necessary resources, such as fuel, water treatment chemicals, etc. In Tartous, it is reported that the water authorities face difficulties in collecting fees and water is distributed free to the most affected. (MWRI 2014/05)
Sanitation:

- **Increased pressure on resources:** Sanitation services are strained in collective centres, which were not built to serve the high numbers of users seen since the influx of refugees. The sanitation situation has been very bad in a collective shelter (Sportive City) in Lattakia, which hosts more than 7,000 IDPs. Most latrines inside and outside the city are out of service. (MWRI 2014/05)

  70% of the collective centres in the governorates of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Tartous get rid of their wastewater by directing it to the main sewerage network. Only 55% of the population of these governorates is served by adequate latrines with 40% of these in need of maintenance. (UNICEF 2013/11)

- **Infrastructure damage:** According to OCHA, 33% of water treatment plants have stopped functioning. This is largely due to targeted attacks on the sanitation infrastructure. The sewage treatment plants of Adra and Aleppo, for example, have been exposed to massive damage. (MWRI 2014/05, OCHA 2014/04/23)

- **Operational constraints:** Since the end of 2013, major damages have significantly reduced the capacity of sewerage systems in the governorates of Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo and Rural Damascus. The sewage water authority is not able to access all areas in these governorates in order to carry out repair and maintenance work, due to lack of funds and of necessary equipment. (UNICEF 2013/11)

Health – Key Developments Q2 (Expanded)

The last few months have not seen drastic changes in the health status of the Syrian population. Nevertheless, the summer months and concerns over lower availability of water, coupled with the weakened health system and breakdown of routine immunisation services, are serious risk factors for the spread of communicable diseases. Meanwhile, the increasingly limited availability of medications is heavily affecting those with chronic diseases.

As measles presents a particular concern, health authorities have embarked on measles immunisation activities. The highest numbers of suspected measles cases are reported in the governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and Idleb. Between March and May alone, 965 cases of suspected measles were reported through EWARS. In late April, UNICEF announced its support for an immunisation campaign targeting 1 million children under 5 years old across the country. (UNICEF 2014/04/23, UNICEF 2014/05/19, ACU-EWARN 2014/05/18-2014/06/14, EWARS 2014/03/30-2014/05/31)

- There is an anticipated rise in the number of cases of water-borne diseases such as typhoid, diarrhoea and cholera given the increased scarcity of water and other water issues. Areas reporting issues with water and sanitation services (shortages, contamination, etc.), primarily in Idlib, Deir-ez-Zor and Rural Damascus, are reporting higher numbers of cases of typhoid and acute diarrhoea. Similarly, the number of reported cases of bloody diarrhoea has been highest in Al-Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor and Lattakia, whereas the greatest numbers of cases of acute diarrhoea were recorded in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh. All these areas have reported issues with water and sanitation, and the increased incidence of diarrhoea further reinforces this. In May, power and water cuts in Ain Al-Arab (Aleppo), as well as the drying up of wells, led to the contamination of water sources by sewage. As a result, a number of cholera cases were reported, among other diseases. (ACU-EWARN 2014/05/18-2014/06/14, EWARS 2014/03/30-2014/05/31, ARA News 2014/05/14, UNICEF 2014/05/19)

- Polio vaccination campaigns are currently in their final rounds, achieving targeted coverage in most areas and surpassing it in some areas. However, the security situation in some areas – some of which are unable to maintain the cold chain – blocked vaccination activities and prevented good coverage. Previously inaccessible areas, particularly in Deir-ez-Zor, saw the majority of cases of Wild Polio Virus Type 1 (WPV1); of the 13 cases confirmed in 2013 in northern Syria, 10 were found in Deir-ez-Zor (Ashara, Al-Mayadin, Thiban, Kisreh, Basira). As of mid-June, vulnerable areas, namely in Aleppo (6) and Deir-ez-Zor (12) have seen the majority of Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases (most are awaiting confirmation and none have yet been confirmed as WPV1). Polio is a real and continued threat, considering the low vaccination coverage achieved in the area of Deir-ez-Zor, the continuation of severe fighting and the threat of further inaccessibility as well as the recent identification of a second polio case in Iraq.

  To date, a total of 39 confirmed polio cases have been reported across the entire country. Hardly any of the confirmed polio cases in 5 different governorates had been vaccinated at all or had not participated in enough rounds of vaccination, according to UNICEF and the Syrian Ministry of Health. (GPEI 2014/04/17, ACU-EWARN Poliomyelitis Outbreak Weekly Report 2014/06/07)

  The fourth round of the polio outbreak response campaign in March reached 2.9 million children – the highest number of children immunised since the campaigns began and exceeding the target of 2.6 million children.

  In the March round, for the first time since the launch of the outbreak response, the campaign reached East Ghouta in Rural Damascus with vaccine doses
administered to more than 54,450 children. The April polio vaccination campaign reached more hard-to-reach areas in Rural Damascus, Raqqa, Homs, Aleppo, and the targets in Idleb, Homs, and Lattakia were surpassed.

Some areas were difficult to access, thereby curtailing some of the vaccination efforts in those locations. These include areas primarily in Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, rural Lattakia, Quneitra and Rural Damascus. Vaccination coverage was also reduced as a result of lost cold chain equipment (as in Al-Hasakeh) and the inability of mobile health teams to perform regular visits in particular areas. The number of children estimated to have been missed as a result ranges between 500,000 and 700,000 in these areas. (UNOCHA 2014/04/02, WHO 2014/04/24, WHO 2014/04/07, IFRC 2014/04/16, UNICEF 2014/04/11)

While the health system as a whole has not experienced dramatic changes, it remains weak, as staff, medical equipment and medicines are increasingly in short supply and therefore overstretched. As before, this will continue to affect the quality of care that can be offered, adding a further layer to the existing vulnerability of the population, which struggles to adequately address its health concerns.

In April, only 40 doctors were reported to be in Aleppo, serving a population of 2.5 million people, while in eastern Ghouta the number of doctors dropped to 30 from a previous 1,000. In Ar-Raqqa, inadequate services have been reported, as only 2 out of 4 hospitals are still operating. 80 people there reportedly died as a result of lack of supplies and equipment. Atareb Hospital in Aleppo serves as a hub for treating patients and equipment. In June it was reported that it would be forced to close within a month, as a result of the withdrawal of its funding. This reduction in services will force more people to turn to field hospitals for care. (UNOCHA 2014/04/23, Daily Star 2014/04/25, Daily Star 2014/05/28)

Generally speaking, field hospitals are overwhelmed by the increase in referrals resulting from reduced services in public hospitals. On top of this, field hospitals are primarily equipped to deal with emergencies, meaning other important services, such as reproductive health for women or cancer treatment are further limited. (WHO 2014/05/05, Assafir 2014/05/12, Zaman al-Wasl 2014/06/15)

There are serious concerns about the functionality of health facilities in areas that are under constant attack and on the brink of potential besiegement, such as in Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor. With resources already stretched, such areas will face further shortages and with the likely increase in particular health concerns (e.g. trauma injuries), these health facilities will have an even lower capacity to provide adequate care. For example, following the closure of the northern entrance to Deir-ez-Zor city, there is a growing concern that civilian hospitals will be forced to close due to a lack of medicine and medical equipment. (ARA News 2014/04/13)

A Physicians for Human Rights report stated that 440 medics have been killed by different parties to the conflict, and 3,270 medical workers have been arrested (though an unknown number have also been released). 227 hospitals have been shelled and looted; many are turned into military stations, and there have been reports of ambulances being looted, destroyed or burned. The report also stated that Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) were to blame for 90% of the confirmed 150 attacks on 124 facilities since the start of the conflict. In Deir-ez-Zor, it was reported that IS forces were firing on ambulances attempting to transport patients from Deir-ez-Zor city to field hospitals in the outskirts of the city. (Daily Star 2014/04/25, Guardian 2014/05/14, Tishreen 2014/05/21, Zaman al-Wasl 2014/06/12)

The number of normal deliveries in hospitals has dropped. Records show a significant increase in the number of Caesarean sections, indicating that there are more complicated cases being admitted to hospitals. UNFPA also reported that either more normal births are occurring at home, or women are paying high prices to access private hospitals (an option available to middle-upper class women). Anecdotal evidence indicated that women go to private hospitals because public hospitals offer lower quality services and have limited reproductive health services, especially in Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Homs and Dar'a. Another report indicated that given the presence of IDPs, the health services in Tartous are overextended, leaving more women to deliver at home, raising risks for both mothers and babies. These reports all underscore the increased risks to the maternal and reproductive health of displaced and/or impoverished women in different parts of the country. (UNFPA 2014/04/02, UNFPA 2014/04/30)

UNFPA also reported that clinics in Damascus and Rural Damascus have seen dramatic increases in demand for pre-marital counselling and for the treatment of STIs and vaginal hemorrhage – generating anecdotal evidence of increased gender based violence (GBV) incidents among women in these areas. In Aleppo, shortages in family planning supplies and maternal health medicines were reported, as well as more cases of STIs. (UNFPA 2014/04/02, UNFPA 2014/04/30)

Other Disease & Health Concerns: Specialised treatment centres and medications for chronic and specialised diseases, such as cancer, continue to be in short supply. This was recently underscored in a report documenting hundreds of cases in which refugees in Jordan were denied cancer treatment as a result of limited funds. Additionally, prices for chronic disease medications are rising, either because pharmacies monopolise them or because it is becoming increasingly expensive to transport them from certain warehouses to other locations. (ARA News 2014/04/13 Now Syria 2014/05/26)

Reports of tuberculosis and hepatitis among prisoners emerged when prisoners from Aleppo Prison were transferred to other locations following the SAF takeover. (Zaman al-Wasl 2014/05/28)

There have been a few reports of babies born with birth defects, or dying. Most of these cases were attributed to their mothers’ exposure to chemical attacks in various locations, such as Ghouta in Rural Damascus and Homs. The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has neither confirmed nor ruled out
whether exposure to such chemicals can result in birth defects. They also confirmed that chlorine is not included in the nerve agent category. (Daily Star 2014/05/14)

- Nutrition: Information gaps remain regarding the nutrition status of the population. UNICEF is finalising a rapid nutrition assessment of conflict-affected children across the country, including those residing in hard to reach areas. However, in early June, UNICEF reported that data was not available from Al-Hasakeh or Ar-Raqqa. The results of a recently conducted nutrition survey in Idlib, focusing on severe acute malnutrition, are pending. In the coming months, these assessments should begin to provide some clarity on the nutrition situation in these areas.

Health – Underlying problems

Weakened health system: Syria’s previously lauded public health system is nearing collapse. Insecurity and violence have resulted in the destruction of health facilities, lack of access for patients and the mass displacement and targeting of health workers. As a result, the remaining functional health facilities are overwhelmed by large caseloads, while also suffering major shortages of trained workers, medicines and supplies. According to the MoH and WHO, in the 4th quarter of 2014, only 65% of public hospitals were open and providing services, while 35% were either not open or failed to report. Under half of all public hospitals have escaped any damage. (HeRAMS 2014/03)

Medical staff and equipment remained in short supply, and there continued to be alarming shortages of medicine, as national medicine production has almost ceased. The lack of electricity and gas, needed to store medicines and vaccinations and run medical equipment has also affected their system. It was reported in mid-2013 that 93% of Syria’s ambulances have been damaged, stolen or destroyed. The collapse of the health system has meant that many Syrian children are affected by diseases that are preventable within a functioning health system (e.g. measles, diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses). There are estimates of 200,000 Syrians dying due to lack of treatment for chronic diseases such as cancer, asthma and diabetes. (IFRC 2014/02/20, IOCC 2014/0224, OCHA 2014/02/25, Save the Children 2014/03/09, WHO/MoH 2013/09)

Targeting of health staff and facilities: Since the beginning of the conflict, parties to the conflict have targeted attacks on health facilities and health staff. These instances represent direct violations of humanitarian law and intersect with existing protection concerns, as well as obviously impacting health service delivery.

WASH and malnutrition: Poor nutrition and the lack of adequate clean water supplies have further eroded the Syrian population’s resilience. Living conditions, particularly for those in camps and in displaced and host families, exacerbate susceptibility to communicable diseases and promote their spread.

Livelihoods and food security – Underlying problems

Macro-economics and livelihoods

- GDP has declined by 60% since the beginning of the crisis until the end of 2013, according to the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR), with economic losses reaching USD 144 billion since 2011. About 54% of the working population is unemployed, which has led to ongoing decreases in consumption as inflation has led to extremely high costs for basic commodities. Poverty has become widespread among the population and was highest in Idlib and Deir-ez-Zor governorates. Syria’s previously diverse economy has been increasingly dependent on GoS services and agricultural sectors, which made up about half of the 2013 GDP. GoS debt, which was very low prior to the conflict, has exceeded the annual GDP due to continued spending on public sector salaries and subsidies. It primarily relies on borrowing from Iran. (SCPR 2014/05)

- In mid-April, the exchange rate for the Syrian pound increased from about 150 to 176 to the USD in 1 week, causing a spike in commodity costs. In response, the Syrian central bank reported that it would exchange USD 20 million to support the pound. While the pound’s value returned to a rate of around SYP 150 to the USD, price increases remained high. (Guardian 2014/04/14, PI 2014/04/16)

- Despite numerous reports on the negative impact of IDPs in host communities, in Lattakia, media sources reported that the city was experiencing economic growth due to the influx of IDPs, particularly those with a business background originating from Aleppo. IDPs have reportedly set up factories producing food and industrial products. (AFP 2014/05/22)

- According to credible sources, wheat produced in Syria, particularly in the north and eastern regions, has been sold to Iraq since the onset of the conflict as they give a favourably subsidised price for wheat and also because there are challenges in transporting crops to GoS storage facilities. A Syrian entity reported that it sold 200,000 metric tons of wheat to Iraq, although the Iraqi authorities denied this. It is unclear how the most recent crisis in Iraq will affect the sale of Syrian wheat to Iraq. (Al-Akhbar 2014/06/11, PI 2014/06/04)

- It was reported that the contracts of 4,500 public workers in Ar-Raqqa governorate would not be renewed by the GoS due to budget cuts. If these jobs are cut, it will significantly degrade civilians’ coping mechanisms as public sector salaries are one of the few reliable income sources for Syrians. (Al-Akhbar 2014/04/14)
Local media reported that cotton production has significantly dropped to about one quarter of pre-crisis levels. 6 cotton processors were reportedly closed in Aleppo governorate, while 1 in Al-Hasakeh was closed due to a fire. In addition, farmers faced delays in obtaining payments for their crop, leaving them with little confidence in crop planting, which was also due to mounting concerns of high costs of transport and inputs and insecurity.  

Food prices

At the end of April, the price of unsubsidised bread across Syria ranged from SYP 60 (USD 0.40) to over 550 (USD 3.70), more than 30 times the SYP 15 (USD 0.10) cost of a subsidised bread tie. Bread prices were generally the lowest in Damascus city while areas of Rural Damascus registered the highest prices. In besieged Eastern Ghouta, the price of 1 bread tie reached 1,200 SYP. The stark contrast between these geographically linked areas is down to besiegement policies which have led to massively inflated prices in some areas. 

In April, WFP reported that Al-Hasakeh, As-Sweida and Damascus experienced food price stability due to an increase in cross border trade. Since then, the situation in Al-Hasakeh has likely deteriorated significantly, as the border with Iraq was largely closed to population, commercial and smuggling traffic due to a dispute between Kurdish political parties. Turkey continued to restrict all cross-border movement of goods into Kurdish areas. 

Large scale displacement to a specific area does not automatically lead to price increases. The large scale influx into western Aleppo of IDPs fleeing insecurity in the eastern parts of the city, did not appear to impact the demand for food items, as most families fled with almost no savings or belongings and were unable to buy items. Consequently, commodity prices remained stable, according to a UN inter-agency mission. The closure of key transport routes, however, often has an immediate impact on the prices of food and other key commodities.

High bread prices: Before the crisis, the price of bread was subsided at SYP 15. Since the start of the crisis, prices have increased significantly and by June, the average price accross the country stood at SYP 46, with large geographical variations and dynamic fluctuations.

Inflation and lack of purchasing power: In general, access to, rather than availability of, food is the main food security issue due to high rates of inflation and unemployment, which reduce purchasing power. Despite the deterioration of the formal economy, a black market economy continues to grow. In contested and besieged areas however, food shortages are significant.

Decrease in agricultural production: Agricultural production has been significantly affected. The June 2013 harvest was estimated at 2.5 MT compared to the 10 year average prior to 2010/11 of 4-4.5 MT. Shortages of fertiliser, seed and fuel to operate irrigation pumps and other equipment have compounded the problem. For example, Syria used to produce its own fertiliser but now has limited access to the chemicals needed for manufacturing. In addition, the GoS has limited the movement of fertiliser due to its dual use as an explosive. Persistent civil insecurity and conflict continue to hamper agricultural production, as access to farmlands becomes difficult.

Exchange rate: At the start of the crisis, the exchange rate stood at SYP 47 per USD. The exchange rate has fluctuated greatly during the crisis, with a temporary spike up to SYP 280 per USD in September 2013 when an international military intervention seemed imminent. In 2014, the official exchange rate stands at SYP 149 per USD.

Shelter/NFI – Underlying problems

Destruction of infrastructure: There have been no recent estimates of the number of buildings damaged. In early 2013, it was estimated that 3 million buildings were damaged and the last 18 months of ensuing conflict have turned a significant part of populated centres to rubble. Intense fighting, including the widespread use of heavy weapons and attacks on residential areas has led to extensive damage across Syria and rendered many homes uninhabitable. Some residential areas around strategic locations, such as military bases, or heavily-contested areas have been subject to large-scale demolition by GoS forces.

Lack of safety: Where there may be available shelters, some are rendered uninhabitable due to besiegement policies, lack of access and/or exposure to shelling or other violence.

Fuel and electricity cuts/shortages: Rising fuel prices, subsidy cuts and decreasing purchasing power have led to a lack of access to fuel. This has resulted in the increased costs of transportation and commodities, affecting people’s ability to access livelihoods and services, to cool and heat their homes and to cook food. Electricity cuts have become normal due to the lack of fuel and damage to infrastructure, while areas subject to besiegement and heavy conflict have not had electricity for months. This has a significant negative impact on the supply of water from both piped networks and wells.

Education – Underlying Problems

After over 3 years of conflict, more than 18% about 20% of schools have been either destroyed, militarised or transformed into collective shelters. The precise number of children dropping out of school is difficult to identify in the...
presence of varying estimates and inaccessible areas, yet, at least 40% of children do not go to Syrian schools today. The children in the contested areas or in the areas of high IDP concentration remain the most vulnerable.

- **Attendance rates**: 2.3 million children in Syria have not been attending schools as a result of the crisis entering its 4th year. Thousands of young school-aged children have never been enrolled in any kind of education. In 2010, around 5 million children used to attend primary and secondary education according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. (Al-iqtisadi 2014/03/19, UN childrens fund 2014/01/07, Washington Post 2014/03/11, Al-akhabar 2014/03/27, UNICEF 2014/03/11, CBS 2010)

- The high drop-out rate is attributed to the overcrowding in schools and the inability by households to send their students to schools because of insecurity or their inability to cover the transport and education material costs. Other students have left the country and others are working to support their families. Some others are recruited by armed groups to join the fighting. (alkhabarpress 2014/03/26)

- In Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Dar’a, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama and Idleb less than 50% of the children attend school. Aleppo and Idleb have lost a quarter and a sixth of their schools respectively, with attendance plunging below 30%. (OCHA 2013/12/16)

- **Higher education**: From an estimated 380,000 students eligible to attend university, 204,000 students are currently enrolled while 178,000 are unable to attend university. Insecurity has limited the access of students and academics to universities. It has also caused extensive displacement and students have attempted to continue studying at alternative institutes. The majority of universities are currently under GoS control, which makes it difficult for students from opposition areas or tribes to attend. (Brehon Advisory 2013/10/13)
Annex D – Definitions Humanitarian Profile

Affected
The number of affected refers to people affected by the violence in Syria. The number of affected can be divided into two groups: those non-displaced and those displaced.

Non-Displaced
The non-displaced include all those within Syria that have been, directly or indirectly, affected by the conflict, including those who have been injured, have lost access to essential services, and those whose vulnerability has increased due to the impact of the unrest on livelihoods and access to essential services (OCHA 2012/06/05).

In addition, this group includes the host community, the people who are part of a community or family receiving affected people. Due to the stress placed on the host families and communities, they are considered part of the humanitarian caseload. As there is currently no information available on the needs of the host community, this group is currently excluded from this humanitarian profile.

Displaced
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are those persons or groups of persons who are residing in Syria but who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict. (OCHA 2004)

Refugees and Asylum Seekers are those who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside Syria, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UN 1951).

For the purpose of this document, the category ‘refugees’ includes those registered, awaiting registration as well as those unregistered – despite the fact that unregistered Syrians are technically not refugees as their refugee status has not been established. Within this group, the Iraqi and Palestinian refugees are in a specifically vulnerable position, both within Syria as outside.

Others of Concern - Persons who have been displaced by the emergency and form part of the humanitarian caseload, but do not fall into either of the above categories (e.g. migrants, returnees).

Other definitions
In this report the term ‘opposition forces’ is used to refer to all armed groups and individuals engaged in armed conflict against the Government of Syria.

Previous SNAP reports
- Regional Analysis for Syria
  - January 2013 – June 2014
- Thematic reports
  - Aleppo governorate Profile
    - April 2013
  - Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria
    - June 2013
  - Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods
    - July 2013
  - Syrian border crossings
    - September 2013
  - Assessment Lessons Learned
    - September 2013
  - Lebanon baseline data
    - October 2013
  - Cross-border movements of goods
    - December 2013
  - Relief actors in Syria
    - December 2013
  - Jordan baseline data
    - December 2013
  - Palestinians from Syria
    - February 2014
  - Idleb governorate Profile
    - June 2014

- Scenarios
  - February/September 2013

All reports can be found on: http://www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project

Forthcoming SNAP reports
- RAS (Part I and Part II)
  - Start October 2014

Map data sources
How to use the RAS

This report is divided into three sections:

- The regional overview summarises the whole report into one page, highlighting the key issues and developments of the last month.
- Part I focuses on the situation in Syria, firstly by outlining the issues on a country level and afterwards, in more depth, on a sectoral level.
- Part II deals with the host countries Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, and discusses the main humanitarian issues related to the crisis.

The RAS is intended as a reference document and the different parts and components can be read separately, according to information needs. While those working in a host country or a specific governorate might only be interested in small parts of the report, individuals working on a regional level can benefit from reading all sections.

The information in blue contains explanatory notes on the structure of this report while the information in red boxes outlines SNAP’s analysis.

How to quote this document

The Syria Needs Analysis Project is established to support the humanitarian response by providing an independent analysis of the humanitarian situation of those affected by the Syrian crisis. We support the communication of humanitarian needs and agree to them being used by other organisations to this end. Please note that most information is derived from secondary data and the original source should be quoted when this information is used. The original source can be found at the end of a paragraph and whenever possible, the hyperlink to this source has been made available. All information which is not sourced is based on SNAP’s own analysis and should be quoted as such.

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