The question of how the UN should best support non-UN peace operations is longstanding, however a UN support office for the G5 Sahel Joint Force is a bad idea.
Author: Paul D. Williams
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A closer look at the last decade of peace operations highlights ten macro-level trends.
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Peace operations are a highly resilient international institution for managing armed conflict.
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Overall, AMISOM had made progress on its three current strategic objectives, however, the mission continues to face difficult challenges and limitations.
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New evidence comes from independent research, newly-released financial statements, a dataset listing attacks on peacekeepers, and the erection of a memorial.
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Debate continues over who should authorize, finance, and provide them with various forms of assistance. Outside of their benefits and drawbacks, it is clear that the coalitions pose particular challenges for the African Union (AU).
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The UN’s special political missions are paid for out of the UN’s regular budget, but paying for most peacekeeping missions involving police and military contingents is much more complicated.
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Implementing the Cruz report’s recommendations will help, but it won’t resolve the UN’s peacekeeping trilemma.
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So far, ECOMIG’s deployment appears to be a successful case of coercion engineered through the coordinated activities of ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN Security Council.
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Changes to financing have had the predictable knock-on effect of causing political arguments between the African Union, AMISOM troop-contributing countries, and some of the mission’s key partners, most notably the European Union.
