There is much speculation over the appointment of the next United Nations secretary-general. Many remain hopeful that the successful candidate will be a woman. According to the tradition of regional rotation, the next secretary-general should also be from Latin America. And many hope that the next secretary-general will be “bold” in the face of the crises of credibility and finance facing the UN and ongoing efforts at reform. There are currently seven declared candidates, with others bound to emerge over the next weeks and even months.

Article 97 of the UN Charter requires that secretaries-general be appointed by the General Assembly on a simple majority vote (unless the General Assembly requires a two-third majority in accordance with Article 18 of the UN Charter) upon the recommendation of at least nine members of the Security Council and with no veto from any of the permanent members. But with no clear front runner, and at a time of fracture and polarization within the Security Council, there is a risk of deadlock. This is a possibility member states should be preparing for.

As part of the selection process, the Security Council is likely to rely on the informal system of “straw votes,” which emerged after a previous deadlock in 1981. This deadlock came when Kurt Waldheim ran for an unprecedented third term. China repeatedly vetoed Waldheim’s third run because it wanted a secretary-general from a developing country. At the same time, the United States repeatedly vetoed the Tanzanian candidate Salim Ahmed Salim. After 16 rounds of formal voting and vetoes over a period of six weeks, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar emerged as the compromise candidate in December 1981, just before the end of Waldheim’s term.

Since then, rounds of straw votes have been used to determine a likely successor before formal voting begins. During these rounds, Security Council members indicate their intention to “encourage or discourage” the recommendation of declared candidates to identify a candidate who can secure the nine required votes and will not be vetoed before the formal vote. Member states can also indicate they have no opinion about any candidate. It is expected that the first straw votes will be cast on July 30th.

If there is no agreement on a candidate to recommend, Council members can continue to negotiate or can seek or wait for new candidates to emerge or current candidates to withdraw from the process. Voting and negotiations could drag on for weeks or even months. A deadlock that continues beyond Secretary-General António Guterres’s current term—which ends on December 31, 2026—should not be discounted.

The impact of such a prolonged deadlock on the functioning and credibility of the organization could be devastating given the functions assigned exclusively to the secretary-general. The UN Charter designates the secretary-general as the  organization’s sole “chief administrative officer,” and all legal and operational powers vested exclusively in the secretary-general are nontransferable. This includes appointing senior leaders, enforcing staff regulations, preparing and submitting the core budget to the General Assembly, and communicating between UN organs and member-state governments. Additionally, the duty to formally bring any matter threatening international peace and security directly to the Security Council pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter rests solely with the secretary-general. And finally, with limitations placed on the creation of new political missions by the divided Security Council,  the secretary-general’s good offices, appointments of personal envoys, and independent diplomatic initiatives are increasingly central to the UN’s ability to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.

It is therefore instructive to look back at two previous cases where the Security Council’s deadlock in appointing the next secretary-general created great uncertainty.

Precedents for Gaps in UN Leadership

The first was when the Soviet Union vetoed Secretary-General Trygve Lie’s bid for a second term in October 1950, leading to the then president of the Security Council informing the General Assembly that no agreed recommendation could be made. In response, on November 1, 1950, the General Assembly considered “the necessity to ensure the uninterrupted exercise of the functions… of the Secretary-General” and decided that Trygve Lie’s tenure could be continued for a period of three years.

The General Assembly had previously established that Lie’s term would be five years—and that his specific term would be open for another five years (although future appointments could modify the secretary-general’s term “in light of experience”). To bypass the need for a recommendation by the Security Council for another five-year term, supporters of Lie argued that the General Assembly was not reappointing Lie for another five-year term but simply amending its own 1946 resolution appointing Lie as the first secretary-general.

Furthering the confusion, and amid pressure from both the Soviet Union and the United States, Lie resigned before the end of his extended term on November 10, 1952. Whether or not it was his intention, member states largely treated Lie’s resignation letter as a statement of “intent” to resign, and he continued in the role until Dag Hammarskjöld took office five months later on April 10, 1953. While expedient, this option may have weakened the institutional position and autonomy of the secretary-general by creating a “lame duck” period. Indeed, decisions were made that were questioned at the time, including Lie giving officers of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation access to the UN Secretariat building in New York to investigate and fingerprint staff members with American citizenship pursuant to the January 1953 Executive Order 10422 of President Truman, which aimed to investigate the loyalty of Americans already employed by the UN.

The second case of deadlock occurred when Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash while on mission to the Congo on September 18, 1961. Nearly seven weeks passed before the Security Council agreed on a temporary replacement. During that time, the then executive assistant to the secretary-general (akin to today’s “chef de cabinet”), the American Andrew Cordier, informally assumed the role of caretaker of the UN over the objections of the Soviet Union. Among the most important consequences of the limitations to Cordier’s caretaker role was his inability to authorize operational changes to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), including its rules of engagement, deployment size, or strategy. This came at a time when some were accusing the UN of interfering with the contested leadership of the Congo itself. In the absence of an appointed secretary-general, those changes needed explicit authorization by the Security Council and General Assembly at a time when the Security Council was paralyzed by Cold War politics, with the direction of the Congo among the most contentious issues.

At the same time, the Soviet Union used the gap to advocate for the abolition of the position of secretary-general itself, arguing that no one person could be truly neutral. The Soviets suggested replacing the post of secretary-general with a three-person “troika” representing the Western, Communist, and Non-Aligned blocs.

Given the ultimate lack of support for a “troika,” and given his perceived neutrality, the Soviets relented and the Security Council agreed to recommend Burmese permanent representative U Thant, who was unanimously appointed as acting secretary-general on November 3, 1961. His term was set until April 10, 1963, the end of Hammarskjöld’s term. After his much-lauded handling of the Cuban missile crisis, Thant was appointed for a four-year term by the General Assembly on November 30, 1962, until November 3, 1966. It is worth noting that this date gave Thant a de facto five-year term, presumably as a nod to the General Assembly resolution establishing a five-year term for secretaries-general.

Options if the Council Deadlocks

While in both the Lie and Hammarskjöld cases the UN “muddled along,” member states should carefully consider their options in the event of a deadlock in 2026, especially because the stakes for the organization are so high. In addition to the turmoil facing current peacekeeping missions due to budget constraints and recent withdrawals forced by host countries, many administrative decisions will be required for the UN80 reform initiative, which cannot afford to stall. A gap could also allow member states to seize the moment outside any considered process to rush through reform of the UN Charter, including the Security Council itself.

Neither the UN Charter nor any other legal instrument limits the number of terms for a secretary-general, although no secretary-general to date has served more than two full terms. One option in the event of a deadlock would therefore be to extend Guterres’s term, whether by formal agreement by the Security Council and General Assembly or in the absence of any objection, as in Lie’s case.

Another option would be to appoint the deputy secretary-general (DSG) as acting secretary-general. It is not clear whether the current DSG, Amina Mohammed, could automatically serve as an acting secretary-general without a recommendation from the Security Council and appointment by the General Assembly in the event of a deadlock. The post of DSG was created in 1998 by a General Assembly resolution, which authorizes the DSG to assist, act for, support, or represent the secretary-general or “take on such assignments as may be determined by the Secretary-General.” But in all cases, there is an existing secretary-general to assist, support, and represent. Still, the ambiguity of the 1998 resolution could allow the DSG to take the reins, at least temporarily.

Granted, if there is a deadlock and no agreement for an interim appointment, and assuming  Guterres does not seek an extension, one can foresee that the current DSG might do what Cordier did: assume de facto control. In that case, any decisions made by her that are within the exclusive purview of the secretary-general would have no legal basis.

A third option would be for the General Assembly to act on its own, whether to extend  Guterres’s term, appoint DSG Mohammed, or even appoint another compromise candidate for a full or interim term. The 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution allows the General Assembly to “make recommendations to Members for collective measures… if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Although this resolution has historically been used to address specific conflicts,[1] a gap in UN leadership could pose a global threat to peace. Reliance on the Uniting for Peace resolution would give added legal protection to the appointment and any decisions made during the secretary-general’s tenure compared to any creative interpretation of existing but ambiguous provisions.

Conclusion

In the current context, it is not difficult to foresee how one of these measures might be necessary. In addition to seeking a “bold” secretary-general, member states should be engaging in contingency planning to avoid further turmoil in UN operations and leadership. The cases of Lie and Hammarskjöld illustrate how the deadlock was managed during peak moments of Cold War division—but one could see how that management could have become a house of cards in a moment. These two cases also demonstrate the possible dangers of “muddling through,” leading to questionable decisions and decisions without any legal basis.

Beyond the current moment, the General Assembly should also adopt procedures to account for the possibility of deadlock in appointments of secretaries-general beyond 2026. These could include ensuring that any interim or acting appointees are fully empowered to take on the responsibilities and obligations of the secretary-general within an identified timeframe. While ambiguity suits some cases, the appointment of the secretary-general is not one of them.

[1] It has been used in (1) the Korean War in 1951 after the  Soviets vetoed efforts to coordinate international military action against North Korea’s invasion; (2) the Suez Crisis (1956) to bypass British and French vetoes to establish the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to secure the Suez Canal; (3) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) to bypass a Soviet veto preventing Security Council action; (4) Namibia (1981) to bypass the vetoes of France, the UK, and the US against sanctions against South Africa and Namibia; (5) Palestine (1997, 2000s) to bypass multiple US vetoes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and (6) Ukraine, when it was invoked to condemn the Russian invasion and demand the withdrawal of Russian troops.