The typical account of how the United Nations picks its secretary-general gives the predominant role to the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P5). This is correct, but it risks missing the important role of the ten elected members of the council (the E10). Each permanent member can stop a candidate using their veto, but avoiding a veto is not enough to build a serious candidacy. That task falls to the E10, which cast two-thirds of the votes in every straw poll and provide the candidates with the legitimacy and momentum they need. This will be a key factor, especially in the early stages of the straw poll process, which will start in a few weeks.

Each straw poll is an informal process in which all fifteen members vote on each candidate separately, marking “encourage,” “discourage,” or “no opinion.” A member can encourage several candidates in the same round. In the early rounds, the ballots are identical for all fifteen members, giving no indication of which votes come from permanent members and which from elected ones. Only later, at the council’s discretion and when the field has narrowed, does the council shift to color-coded ballots that distinguish P5 votes from E10 votes, making clear whether any permanent member intends to block a candidate. As detailed in a Security Council Report paper on the selection process, even the timing of that shift is itself a matter of negotiation among council members.

A recommendation for secretary-general needs at least nine votes and no veto. Therefore, seven elected members acting together can block anyone. António Guterres himself has referred to the collective weight of the elected members as a “sixth veto power.”  But this potential to block a candidate is only part of the story. A candidate the P5 merely tolerate but the E10 do not rally behind would be unlikely to gather the momentum that marks a front-runner and tests the determination of a permanent member to use their veto.

The three recent races for secretary-general show this pattern in different ways, with one constant: in each case, it was the E10 that put the top candidates on the menu that the P5 ordered from.

In 1996, after the United States vetoed Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s bid for a second term, four candidates entered the race: Kofi Annan of Ghana, Amara Essy of Côte d’Ivoire, Hamid Algabid of Niger, and Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah of Mauritania. It was the E10 that made clear which two were the real options. By the third round, Annan led with eleven encourage votes against Essy’s six; the other two had already fallen away.

France discouraged Annan from the start, while  Essy faced discourage votes from the United States and the United Kingdom throughout. But the contest the P5 were fighting over was one the elected members had defined. As Annan’s support grew visible round by round and Essy started declining, France’s position became increasingly costly to hold. It eventually abstained, reportedly after reaching an understanding on a senior UN appointment, and Annan was selected.

In 2006, seven candidates entered the field at different stages of the race—some joining early and withdrawing and some joining later. The elected members again made clear who the race was actually between. In the first round, Ban Ki-moon of the Republic of Korea led with twelve encourage votes, and Shashi Tharoor of India followed with ten; the remaining five were peripheral throughout. But the encourage gap between the top two was narrow, and the decisive difference lay with the P5: Ban had no discourages from any permanent member, while Tharoor had a discourage from the US in the color-coded ballot. The elected members had put two candidates on the menu. The P5 chose one.

In 2016, 12 candidates entered the race. In the first round, three candidates reached nine encourage votes, but all carried four or five discourages, and their support was split across a crowded field. Against this fragmented field, Guterres opened with 12 encourages and no discourages, the only candidate without one, while Danilo Turk followed with 11 encourages and two discourages. Few candidates withdrew early, leaving the field crowded through multiple rounds, and E10 support fragmented across the other candidates, leaving them with no realistic path forward. Turk’s support eroded round by round, and the E10 sustained Guterres’s lead across all six rounds. In the final round, the P5 used the color-coded ballot to confirm what the elected members had already established.

In all three races, the P5 retained their decisive influence on the race. But the candidates they were choosing from were on the menu because the E10 had put them there.

Support from the E10 is necessary but not sufficient. A candidate still needs the acquiescence of the P5, and a single color-coded discourage would end any candidacy regardless of E10 support. But momentum with the E10 raises the public cost of a veto. The broader and earlier the support a candidate assembles among the ten, the harder it becomes for any single permanent member to block them without paying a reputational price.

The size of the candidate pool matters, too. Even though members can encourage multiple candidates simultaneously, a larger field reduces the chances of candidates gaining initial momentum and becoming a front-runner. Conversely, in a smaller field, it is easier for the E10 to unite behind one or two candidates, and the cost of a discourage from a permanent member, especially in the color-coded rounds, rises. In a crowded field, the timing of withdrawals of weak candidates matters in determining how the E10 can consolidate their support.

The calculations behind how the E10 votes will reflect their geopolitical positions more than their statements in public. In this cycle, several of the ten have close ties to Washington. That raises several questions: Would a candidate perceived as US-backed receive a wave of support from the E10 in the early straw polls, establishing that person as a front-runner? And if so, would that be enough to overcome any reluctance from other permanent members who may prefer a different outcome? In the end, the P5 will place the order, but the E10 will have written the menu.