On Wednesday, the Security Council will convene a high-level debate on “Advancing Political Solutions in the Middle East: Mediation and Dialogue for Lasting Peace.” Secretary-General António Guterres is expected to brief. The meeting is a fitting occasion to ask a simple question: Who will actually be doing the job of mediating in the Middle East on the UN’s behalf in the months and years ahead?

The answer, unless action is taken, may remain nearly no one. The post of UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process has been without a permanent occupant since December 2024. Sigrid Kaag held the post ad interim until June 2025, and the portfolio has since been managed by a deputy in an acting capacity. This post thus remained empty in a year that has included diminished but ongoing fighting in Gaza, continued civilian casualties, and a ceasefire on the verge of collapse, with deepening uncertainty over the political future of the occupied Palestinian territory.

Since Geir Pedersen stepped down in September 2025 after more than six years on the job, no special envoy for Syria has been appointed, even as Syria navigates an uncertain political transition. In Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert has just stepped down as UN special coordinator for Lebanon to take on a new UN role without a named successor at a moment when the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel remains fragile and fighting continues.

While the deputies managing these offices in an acting capacity are capable professionals, a deputy acting as officer-in-charge is not a substitute for a full-time envoy with the mandate, political standing, and direct access to the secretary-general that the role requires.

Special envoys are the UN’s primary instrument of political engagement at the country level. They maintain relationships across conflict lines, provide the secretary-general with political advice, conduct his good offices on the ground, and give the UN presence and voice in processes where it might otherwise be excluded. Filling these posts—and backing them with senior-level engagement from headquarters—is among the most consequential actions the next secretary-general will have to take.

The UN’s engagement in the Middle East depends on more than individual envoys; it also requires active political engagement from UN headquarters. The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) is the institutional home of the UN’s good offices function and the backbone of its envoy architecture.

Past under-secretaries-general for political affairs carried genuine weight in the Middle East, traveling regularly to the region and engaging as political actors with standing in their own right. Restoring that model of active, senior-level field engagement of the under-secretary-general will be as important as the appointment of envoys.

One recent move in the right direction was the secretary-general’s appointment of Jean Arnault as his personal envoy on the Middle East conflict and its consequences in March 2026, a post focused on the Iran war and its ramifications. This illustrates what is possible when there is will to act.

In the current polarized environment, envoy appointments are not straightforward. Some of these posts require official member-state approval, while personal envoys of the secretary-general do not. But all envoys need the parties to agree to work with them. Efforts to appoint envoys to these positions have taken place but have encountered pushback.

That difficulty is itself an argument for greater investment and intensive engagement with the conflict parties to find a suitable and acceptable candidate. Similarly, the unfavorable conditions in the Middle East, with a hostile geopolitical environment and the UN’s constrained leverage, complicate the work of UN envoys but also make their presence even more important.

The outgoing secretary-general may reasonably decide to leave these consequential appointments to his successor. In that case, whoever takes office in January will have to act swiftly. The choices made in the first weeks and months of their mandate will determine whether the UN remains a relevant actor in the region or cedes that ground entirely.

Diplomacy in the region is fractured with various initiatives on different tracks. This is not necessarily a negative thing, but the UN can bring greater coherence to these efforts. In addition, bilateral arrangements cannot substitute for the UN’s unique added value as a universal organization with legitimacy and unparalleled operational experience. But the organization’s advantages will only come to fruition when the right people lead its operations on the ground.