Sudan’s humanitarian response has been chronically underfunded. In 2024, only 37% of requested funding was received. In 2025, less than 40% was secured. The 2026 plan requires $2.9 billion. As of April 2026, only 16% of it has been funded. Pledges of €1.5 billion were announced at the third International Sudan Conference in Berlin on April 15, 2026. But pledges are not cash. While some community members are aware of international aid flows, many report not receiving any direct assistance. Sudan’s communities cannot wait.

The visible consequences are documented: famine has been confirmed in parts of the country, with 20 areas at immediate risk across Darfur and Kordofan. Over 4.2 million children under five are acutely malnourished,  more than 80% of health facilities in conflict zones are nonfunctional, about 13 million of 17 million school-age children in the country are out of school, and some community kitchens run by emergency response rooms are closing due to lack of funding.

However, beneath these documented crises, a deeper and more far-reaching destruction is taking place. The conflict—together with the cuts in international funding—is also eroding Sudan’s productive capacity: people’s livelihoods and the community-rooted infrastructure that will be essential for recovery.

Yet Sudanese communities are not passively waiting for help. Across conflict-affected areas, farmers, herders, and grassroots organizations are actively working to preserve what remains and to build the foundations for recovery—in the midst of the conflict, under extreme conditions, and with almost no external support. Drawing on interviews with Sudanese across Darfur, Kordofan, and Gezira, as well as organizational documents from affected communities, this article shines a light on these early recovery efforts and the challenges they face.

The conflict’s impact on agricultural and livestock productive capacity varies significantly by region. Across conflict-affected areas, productive assets—land, livestock, infrastructure and market access—are being systematically destroyed. The primary driver of this destruction is the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whose systematic targeting of agricultural communities, livestock, infrastructure, and market systems has been documented across Darfur, Kordofan, and Gezira—the main focus of this article. At the same time, conflict monitoring data documents 64 incidents of markets being struck by aerial and drone attacks between April 2023 and November 2024—the majority attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and concentrated in Khartoum state. The third International Sudan Conference in Berlin called on both warring parties to guarantee full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access throughout Sudan.

Agriculture: Lost Harvests and Damaged Infrastructure

Insecurity has become a major barrier to agriculture. In North Darfur, satellite analysis identified 41 farming communities razed by the RSF between March and June 2024 before the main farming season, with ten communities targeted more than once. Darfur historically produced around two thirds of Sudan’s millet supply, meaning the destruction of its agricultural capacity has food security consequences that extend far beyond the region. Moreover, many producers across these sectors have abandoned their professions, leading to the destruction of the livelihoods that sustain community life.

In Kordofan, insecurity, the collapse of transport systems, and lack of government financing have disrupted supply chains for seeds. Interviewees said that seeds did not reach many areas, reducing crop output. The inability to access pest-control materials has also allowed desert locusts and starlings to destroy crops. Other interviewees in West Kordofan described how tractors, combine harvesters, and agricultural machinery have been robbed.

In Gezira, some farmers describe the RSF’s control of the state between December 2023 and January 2025 as having a wide-ranging impact on an agricultural system that was already in structural decline before the conflict. Some crops were lost before harvest, some harvested produce was taken by force, and seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers were robbed and sold in markets. Machinery was also robbed.

Farmers interviewed described how RSF forces also damaged agricultural infrastructure by closing the main water sources haphazardly, breaking gates and cutting chains. This resulted in simultaneous water deprivation in some areas and flooding in others. Displacement of farmers, they added, allowed weeds to grow and block the irrigation canals, with the Gezira and Managil Farmers Alliance documenting  over 1,000 breaches in irrigation canals documented in Gezira, wasting water, flooding villages, and causing the spread of waterborne disease.

The alliance noted in October 2025 that farmers entered the post-RSF growing season unprepared. Fertilizer prices had risen fivefold. Banks refused financing. Irrigation canals remained uncleaned. And following the dissolution of the Farmers Union, the alliance’s spokesperson observed that farmers now lack any representative body to defend their interests.

The sharp rise in fuel prices has also been disruptive, leaving most farmers who relied on harvesters unable to work. The impact has only worsened since the disruption of trade through the Strait of Hormuz. Fuel prices inside Sudan have already risen by nearly 30% as a result of disruptions to supply chains from the Gulf. Sudan sources approximately 54% of its fertilizers through those same supply chains.

Anticipating that any harvest would be looted or unable to reach the market, some farmers have resorted to cultivating small plots immediately adjacent to homes as the only viable option. Yet even these plots are not safe. RSF fighters attacked farmers preparing their land for cultivation and confiscated their machinery, demanding extortion payments. At least 236 documented incidents of food-related violence impacted markets across Sudan between April 2023 and November 2024 alone.

Herding: Killed Livestock and Loss of Market Routes

The conflict has been devastating for herders. In Al-Khuway in West Kordofan, one interviewee reported how livestock were killed or injured in the crossfire during fighting between the RSF and SAF. Barrel bombs dropped from aircraft have also killed animals.

Armed groups have also systematically looted livestock. One interviewee described how RSF forces arrived every other day to extract between five and eight animals from every livestock-owning household. Livestock were forcibly taken on at least 85 documented occasions between April 2023 and November 2024, mainly attributed to RSF and allied militias across Darfur and Kordofan.

This insecurity has disrupted herding patterns. In Al-Khuway, the intensification of RSF livestock raids, combined with the fighting, forced some owners to move earlier than usual, reaching water-scarce areas before conditions were viable. An interviewee described how they were forced to buy water at high prices, and surviving herds deteriorated in quality and number.

In addition to this direct combat and systematic looting, livestock owners faced additional and simultaneous pressures. Interviewees in Kordofan describe a complete breakdown of animal vaccination, with large numbers of livestock dying as a result. The structural cause is the destruction of Sudan’s central veterinary laboratory in Khartoum, which has severed vaccine supply chains across the region. This has left millions of animals exposed to disease, and livestock interventions are critically underfunded. Vaccines were unavailable and medication was inaccessible. Treating disease became impossible. Water scarcity meant that cattle suffered from thirst. Combined, these overlapping pressures, losses, systematic extraction, disease without treatment, and thirst resulted in a serious and ongoing loss of livestock.

RSF restrictions on the movement of livestock from areas under their control to SAF-held territories have severed the production-consumption link between Darfur’s western livestock areas and northern markets. This has resulted in market glut and price collapse in production areas. A single bull in Darfur fetches only a fraction of what it would bring in SAF-controlled markets in North Kordofan and White Nile. To reach higher-value markets in SAF-controlled areas, many have resorted to smuggling. Herders have to navigate routes lasting days or weeks and face RSF checkpoints where they are subject to extortion, confiscation, and violence. Productive economic activity is thus being replaced by an economy built on extraction, levies, and theft.

The destruction of productive systems goes beyond agriculture and livestock to other rural livelihoods. According to interviewees and community sources in Al-Nuhud and Al-Khuway in West Kordofan, RSF forces are destroying large areas of hashab gardens and looting harvested gum arabic—one of the main sources of rural income in the region. Women producers who depend on harvesting gum arabic as their main livelihood were among those directly targeted.

The Destruction’s Cascading Impacts

The conflict is not producing a single crisis but multiple, overlapping ones, each making the others worse and creating a chain of vulnerabilities.

Displacement is one of the biggest drivers of these cascading impacts. Interviewees described how the forced displacement of small farmers and producers to other parts of Sudan or neighboring countries has eroded productive forces. The displacement of farmers from their lands has become an ongoing and deepening crisis.

Another driver is the broader disruption of markets. Small farmers, herders, and producers in Darfur and Kordofan have traditionally supplied local markets in their villages and neighborhoods. As an interviewee described it, these local markets fed into larger ones, with bigger merchants, export traders, and national livestock markets moving produce up the chain. But the conflict has disrupted the goods flowing into these local markets and displaced the small producers who fed them, collapsing the whole market chain.

The destruction of water infrastructure has deepened the crisis across all sectors. RSF forces have targeted transport vehicles across West Kordofan, causing water transporters to stop traveling to water-scarce areas north of Al-Khuway out of fear. Rising fuel costs have also impacted fuel-powered systems used to pump groundwater. Across West Kordofan, according to community sources, groundwater wells—the main water source in the region—have been disabled or sabotaged and solar-powered water stations looted and dismantled. Some communities have been forced to bring water in barrels on donkey-drawn carts over very long distances.

The destruction of productive capacity also exacerbates the conflict. Interviewees in Kordofan said that the loss of household income, combined with the interruption of education for large numbers of young people in RSF-controlled areas, has left many youths without viable alternatives. This is increasing their vulnerability to recruitment by armed groups or participation in theft or smuggling.

Solidarity in the Face of Destruction

Despite this destruction, communities have not been passive. In April 2026, for example, the Gezira and Managil Farmers Alliance announced the second phase of its community-led “We Must Farm” campaign, framing farming both as a way to provide food but as a defense of the land. The plan includes establishing a seed bank, strengthening cooperative associations, and organizing training for youth and women. Implementation rests entirely on village and district committees. The alliance explicitly praised women’s initiatives as central to recovery efforts. This is an example of Sudanese farmers organizing their own recovery without waiting for external support. Similarly, water center owners whose facilities have been robbed are forming groups to plan solar-powered well restoration for when security conditions allow it.

Sudan’s emergency response rooms are the most well-known example of solidarity in the face of destruction. These mutual-aid structures operate on a model of reciprocity and dignity rather than traditional humanitarian aid. The emergency response rooms have developed their own internal systems for identifying and prioritizing community needs, delivering support, and maintaining accountability.

Several interviewees said that women have demonstrated particularly adaptive livelihood strategies. This pattern is not confined to the regions documented in this paper. For example, women’s organizations in Blue Nile established a collective seed-saving and seed-distribution mechanism and launched a community-funded agricultural campaign—financed entirely without external support—that enabled families to resume farming. The group founded and maintained itself independently through women’s collective self-help before later receiving support from PAX to continue its work. In West Kordofan, one grassroots organization developed an integrated support model from inside the community. It began by giving displaced women food baskets, moved to training them in food processing, provided raw materials for that work, created a fund from the proceeds, and used that fund to train further groups in handicrafts. It also provides trauma and psychological support.

In Nyala, South Darfur, a community association has been providing production tools and direct livelihood support to vulnerable households. Its work centers on restoring their productive capacity. In the same city, local organizations have worked together to distribute food baskets to displaced families from El Fasher and have provided health workshops and psychosocial care for displaced women and girls. Their stated goals were to improve food security, support the most vulnerable among the displaced, and strengthen community solidarity.

Sudanese organizations have also been working across borders. One ran a program for Sudanese refugees in camps in Chad that combined health awareness, reproductive health, psychosocial support, and training in handicrafts and income-generating activities.

The Invisible Damage of the Loss of International Support

The grassroots associations, emergency response rooms, women’s self-help groups, and community committees that will lead Sudan’s recovery are already working in the midst of the conflict. And they are doing so with far less external support than their work requires.

The impact of this lack of funding runs deeper than what’s immediately visible on the surface. When emergency response rooms lose funding, as an interviewee described, it is not only the community kitchens that are lost; it is also the organizational infrastructure, accumulated knowledge, and community processes built over years—an infrastructure that will be critical to rapid community-led recovery when the conflict ends. This is not a post-conflict problem. What is lost now cannot be restored later through “reconstruction funding.” This infrastructure is critical not only for the immediate humanitarian response or the restoration of livelihoods but for what comes after. As an agricultural expert interviewed for this paper notes, investing in smallholder productive capacity is also an investment in structural peacebuilding.

It is easy for international donors to overlook these Sudanese grassroots solidarity structures. They are not easy to find if you are not looking. They do not have websites. Many of them do not speak English or speak the language of donors or write donor proposals. But they are there, doing the work that no international actor can do or replicate. The question is whether those who have the power and resources are serious about finding them, removing barriers to providing support, and funding them directly.

The lack of support for these Sudanese community-built formations ties into a broader lack of support for early recovery efforts. The international community’s response in Sudan until now has rightly prioritized the most urgent visible needs: hunger, malnutrition, and displacement. These deserve full and immediate funding. But they are not the whole crisis. In its Emergency and Resilience Plan for Sudan 2026—2028, FAO explicitly links emergency needs with long-term resilience. The plan calls for scaling up crop, livestock, and fisheries support for vulnerable households and distributing seeds, tools, and fertilizers to ensure farmers do not miss the 2026 planting season. In 2026, the plan requires $99 million to reach 1.5 million households. As of April 2026, only $5 million has been secured. The plan is there, but the funding is not.

What the past three years reveal is the persistent indifference of international donors to the depth of Sudan’s crisis and to the Sudanese people’s determination to survive and reclaim their lives and livelihoods. Supporting the recovery efforts of Sudanese—on their own terms and in the ways they themselves identify as useful—is a moral obligation.