Last week, Devex reported on documents circulated by the Trump administration indicating that it “aims to pay a significant portion” of what it owes for the 2026 regular budget on the condition that the secretary-general implements a series of “quick win” reforms. According to the documents, the administration also “intends to make an additional, significant payment conditional on achieving a 10% reduction in long-standing, ineffective peacekeeping missions.”

The problem, of course, is that the United States is not making these demands in good faith, as it has no intention of fully honoring its financial obligations to the United Nations. The Trump administration made clear in its January memo on withdrawing from international organizations that it will not fund many UN entities, including several funded at least in part through assessed contributions. Moreover, the FY2027 budget request from the White House includes no funding for either the UN regular budget or UN peacekeeping operations.[1] One lesson that should have been learned from the UN80 initiative is that no amount of reform or cost-cutting will satisfy the United States and get it to pay what it owes.

Moreover, some of the “quick win” demands are ones that the United Nations is unlikely to entertain, such as the call to end single-donor trust funds, a fairly obvious reference to the China-funded UN Peace and Development Trust Fund. The United States understandably wants to limit Chinese influence in the United Nations and multilateral organizations, but at the end of the day, China is now the de facto largest contributor to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets; although it pays late in the year—thus exacerbating liquidity challenges in the Secretariat—it pays in full. And the failure of the United States to pay its assessed contributions only increases the reliance of the Secretariat on trust funds, even ones with obvious strings attached. If the United States truly cared about combatting the growing Chinese influence in international organizations, it should not have the created space for China to assert leadership by withdrawing from or suspending funding to UN entities and organizations.

It’s time that the Secretariat and member states accept the new funding reality at the United Nations. The base case for program planning moving forward should be that no funding will be forthcoming from the Trump administration. Given the à la carte approach the United States has adopted, some funding for priorities and pet projects—such as support to the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti—could still materialize, but this should be treated as a windfall rather than as something that can be relied upon. The United States may also make another payment this year if necessary to avoid the loss of its vote in the General Assembly for 2027 on account of its mounting arrears, but significant payments next year are hard to imagine. This is because the amount the United States would have to pay in 2027 to avoid losing its vote in 2028 would be comparable to a full year’s contributions, an amount the Trump administration is unlikely to pay due to legislative restrictions and opposition to activities it considers to be “DEI”-related. The US also has few incentives to pay in 2027 considering that the loss of its vote in the General Assembly is essentially a fait accompli unless upcoming negotiations on the scales of assessments yield a bargain akin to the deal struck in 2000, which reduced US assessment rates in exchange for payment of arrears.

That being said, several of the “quick wins” touch upon longstanding problems at the United Nations that deserve the attention of member states and the Secretariat. Take, for example, trust funds. The proliferation of trust funds where donor preferences drive decision-making undermines performance and undercuts intergovernmental mandates and priorities. The United Nations should institute policies and standards for the acceptance of voluntary contributions to avoid the hijacking of programs and the creation of siloes of influence outside of intergovernmental oversight. A rethink of the staff compensation package is also overdue to better support program delivery and take into account the significant changes in society, the workforce, and the nature of the work performed by UN staff since the existing arrangements were put in place. This is necessary to ensure that these arrangements remain politically and financially sustainable while allowing the UN system to attract and retain qualified candidates from all member states.

Such measures should be pursued because they are necessary, not just because of the demands by the United States. Many of them are likely to reduce costs, which many member states will no doubt welcome. What member states that remain committed to multilateralism should avoid, however, are arbitrary budget cuts. These will worsen the liquidity situation in the Secretariat and hamstring the United Nations’ ability to implement its mandates, including in the context of peacekeeping operations already reeling from the large-scale repatriation of military and police units to address the funding shortfall caused by US nonpayment.

What is required more than ever is for member states and the Secretariat alike to adopt new ways of working that allow the United Nations to function at this time of upheaval in international relations. First and foremost, all stakeholders need to accept that the United States under the Trump administration is not going to honor its financial obligations to the United Nations. This is not a tacit endorsement of US noncompliance with the UN Charter but simply an acknowledgement of reality. There are ways to stabilize the financial situation caused by US withholding without absolving the United States of its debts to the United Nations and its member states. The organization simply cannot afford to continue operating under the fantasy that the United States considers itself bound by its obligations under international law.

This shift in mindset is needed to drive changes in behavior that will allow the organization to effectively adapt to changed circumstances. It can help spur the Secretariat to stop its long practice of self-censoring its budget requests and be honest about the resources it requires to implement its programs. It can also help member states get out of the rut of their post–Cold War routine and begin to think and act outside the box, finding the creativity that in the past allowed the General Assembly to step up when the Security Council was deadlocked. What is clear is that, unless member states and the Secretariat both accept the new normal and significantly rethink how both the intergovernmental and bureaucratic machinery of the organization function, the United Nations may never fully recover from its current crisis.

This article was originally published in Eugene Chen’s weekly column on Substack, “Blue Helmets, Red Tape.” It has been edited from the original version.

[1] The Trump Administration’s budget request includes the possibility that some funding could be provided at the discretion of the administration from a new account—the America First Opportunity Fund—that does not currently exist. This same fund was proposed for establishment in the FY2026 request but was not approved by Congress. The House appears more receptive to the fund this time around, though the current bill provides only half of what was requested and does not explicitly allow for the funding to be used to pay UN assessed contributions. In previous years, most of the funding cuts requested by the Trump administration were reversed by Congress, but this time around the Republican-controlled House of Representatives appears likely to maintain the bulk of the cuts.