The UN’s 80th anniversary has set off an ambitious round of institutional soul-searching. Member states are engaging with the UN80 reform agenda along several workstreams: an Informal Ad Hoc Working Group is finalizing its review of mandates, the Fifth Committee has negotiated budget cuts across the UN system, and member states are beginning to engage with the secretary-general’s proposals for structural realignment. One of the goals of UN80 is to reform the UN development system.

Yet as these workstreams advance, a fundamental question keeps getting sidestepped: who actually governs the UN development system? The reform proposals leave the overall funding architecture of the UN—increasingly dominated by voluntary, earmarked contributions—largely untouched. UN80 may streamline what the UN does, but it does not address who actually governs it.

A System at a Turning Point

Whether or not the next secretary-general chooses to build on UN80’s unfinished agenda, the structural pressures will not wait. The implementation of the Pact for the Future, the Compromiso de Sevilla emerging from the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, and preparations for the post–2030 Agenda create a rare opening to reset how the system works. But meaningful reform depends on understanding where power truly lies, not where formal structures suggest it should.

Research by Cepei, in collaboration with IDOS, shows that the UN development system is not failing for lack of purpose or relevance. Its comparative advantage remains clear: political legitimacy, convening authority, and the ability to coordinate global responses. Yet its effectiveness is constrained by structural power imbalances. Those formally responsible for governance often lack control over resources. Those providing resources frequently operate outside formal oversight. And those most affected by UN programs have the least influence over priorities. These dynamics are not inevitable, but they shape what the system can—and cannot—deliver.

The Triple Disconnect Undermining Multilateralism

Three gaps define how power operates within the UN development system.

First, governance bodies lack meaningful control over funding. The executive boards of major UN agencies, funds, and programs—including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), and UN Women—provide oversight and approve strategies, but they influence only a small share of overall resources. Around 80% of UN funding comes from voluntary contributions, and about 85% of that voluntary funding is now earmarked by donors through bilateral arrangements with agencies, bypassing collective governance. This share has grown steadily since earmarked contributions first exceeded non-earmarked ones three decades ago. This limits the ability of formal intergovernmental bodies, including ECOSOC and the General Assembly, to steer system-wide priorities. They can provide policy direction, but financial decisions often follow a different logic.

Second, financial contributors exercise influence informally. Just ten countries—the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Norway, Canada, France, Sweden, and Switzerland—provide roughly three quarters of all voluntary contributions. This extreme concentration translates into disproportionate agenda-setting power. Earmarked funding allows donors to shape programs directly, often outside multilateral scrutiny. Informal coordination among major donors further amplifies their influence, while program countries—despite hosting most UN activities—have fewer resources and less capacity to shape system-wide decisions.

Third, those most affected by UN programs remain structurally underrepresented. Program countries—despite hosting most UN activities and bearing their consequences—have fewer resources to staff missions in Geneva and New York, engage across multiple simultaneous intergovernmental processes, and develop the technical expertise needed to scrutinize agency budgets or challenge donor-driven priorities. Capacity constraints are not just an inconvenience; they create a structural advantage for those that fund the system. Civil society access to UN intergovernmental processes is also narrowing. Accreditation remains slow, speaking opportunities are limited, and formal consultation mechanisms rarely translate into meaningful influence over outcomes. Together, these trends weaken the inclusiveness that gives multilateral institutions their legitimacy and authority.

The result is a system where authority, resources, and voice are misaligned. Governance structures exist, but real influence often flows through financial leverage and informal channels.

Why This Matters Now

When governance is structured around donor preferences rather than collective priorities, it creates a fairness deficit. The structural disconnect our research reveals—between who formally governs and who actually controls resources—creates a credibility problem that program delivery alone cannot resolve. When stakeholders across the Global South consistently perceive the system as donor-driven rather than collectively governed, the legitimacy gap is real regardless of technical outputs.

The UN80 reform process has so far focused largely on efficiency, mandate rationalization, and structural streamlining—necessary work, but insufficient to address the governance dynamics described above. The proposals on the table do not fundamentally alter how funding flows, who controls it, or how decisions are made. As one interviewee put it bluntly, UN80 is tackling the symptoms of the problem, not its roots.

This is not a criticism of process alone. These are politically difficult questions that no secretary-general can resolve unilaterally. But it does mean that the incoming secretary-general will inherit not only an unreformed system but also an unfulfilled reform mandate—and a narrowing window to act on it. The next secretary-general will therefore face a fundamental choice: manage existing constraints or work to shift the conditions that produce them.

The Secretary-General’s Underestimated Leverage

The office of the secretary-general is often described as limited by member-state authority—which to some extent it is. Yet the secretary-general holds significant influence across four domains, each of which offers concrete entry points for the next incumbent.

Symbolically, the secretary-general can shape narratives about what effective multilateralism requires. By explicitly naming the governance gap—including the concentration of funding among a handful of donors and the marginalization of those most affected—the next secretary-general can reframe reform not as a technocratic exercise but as a question of legitimacy and fairness. This framing matters: it changes the political terrain on which member states must take positions.

Managerially, the secretary-general controls senior appointments, internal coordination mechanisms, and transparency practices. Publishing the rationale for senior nominations, making voluntary contribution flows more visible, and strengthening the resident coordinator system’s accountability to broader governance structures are all within the secretary-general’s existing authority—and none of these actions require member-state agreement to initiate.

Politically, the secretary-general can convene actors across institutional and regional divides, building coalitions that would not otherwise form. For example, encouraging bridges with the G77+China, some middle powers and coalitions of countries grouped around a shared interest, and civil society around specific governance reforms—rather than waiting for consensus to emerge—is a form of political leadership the Charter does not prohibit.

Constitutionally, Article 99 of the UN Charter grants the secretary-general authority to bring issues to the attention of member states. This power has historically been used sparingly, but it could be deployed to elevate governance reform as a system-wide priority rather than leaving it as a technical issue on intergovernmental agendas.

None of this influence is decisive on its own. Real change ultimately depends on political choices by member states, particularly those with financial and diplomatic leverage. But the secretary-general can shape the environment in which those choices are made—and that is not insignificant.

A Narrow but Critical Window

The UN is no longer the only actor shaping global development. Regional institutions, informal coalitions, and new financial mechanisms increasingly influence priorities and mobilize resources. The UN’s relevance will depend less on its size than on its credibility as a platform for fair and inclusive cooperation.

The next secretary-general will inherit a system whose effectiveness depends on whether it can adapt to this changing landscape. The task is not simply to improve efficiency but to ensure that governance structures reflect the principles of shared responsibility and collective decision-making that underpin multilateralism.

The opportunity exists. The structural barriers are understood. What remains uncertain is whether political leadership within the Secretariat and among member states will be sufficient to address them. The future of multilateral cooperation may well depend on that choice.

This article draws on research by Cepei and IDOS, including comprehensive stakeholder surveys, interviews with UN officials and diplomats, and analysis of institutional dynamics within the UN development system. In addition to the full research report (“The Triple Disconnect. Power, Money, and Voice in the UN Development System”), a policy brief “Governing The Ungovernable: A Strategic Agenda for the (Next) UN Secretary-General” will be published outlining concrete actions for the next UN secretary-general to take with an actionable roadmap for their first 1,000 days. The reports are or will be available at www.cepei.org