Since the start of the US and Israel’s war on Iran on February 28th, more than 20 ships have been attacked by aerial drones, missiles, or surface vessels in the Gulf, according to the US-led Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) based in Bahrain. The UN’s shipping regulator, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), estimates that nearly 2,000 ships and 20,000 seafarers are stuck in the Gulf. Before the war, approximately 140 ships usually passed through the strait daily; this has now dropped to two to four. Up to 25% of the world’s oil and gas supplies usually transit through the strait, making it a critical energy chokepoint. The region is also central to global supply chains: Qatar is a major producer of helium used in chipmaking, and ports such as Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates and Hamad in Qatar serve as key logistics hubs for global container shipping.

The economic consequences of the closure of the strait have been felt around the world. Oil and gas prices have spiked, raising prices for any kind of transport—road, air, or maritime—as well as electricity and cooking gas globally. Prices for fertilizers and their fossil fuel–based precursors are rising, with implications for international food security. The delivery of humanitarian aid has also become more costly. The longer the strait remains closed, the higher the risk for ripple effects, including supply chain disruptions, port congestion, inflation, and even famine and broader humanitarian crises.

Reopening the Strait

The need to reopen the strait has been widely recognized. A strong focus has been placed on military options. However, military efforts to protect merchant vessels that do not directly involve Iran are unlikely to provide the level of risk reduction required by the shipping industry. The United States has pointed to naval escorts by warships as a solution, but such escorts have not materialized, nor have other states shown willingness to participate.

Successful efforts to protect shipping during the Tanker Wars of the 1980s, when a US-led coalition escorted ships through the region, are often referred to as a historical precedent and model. However, there are at least three reasons why the analogy does not hold and a military option is unlikely to work this time. First, contrary to the 1980s, the scale of shipping in the region today has multiplied—hundreds of ships would require protection daily. Second, the proliferation of low-cost weapons, particularly aerial, surface, and underwater drones, has created a broad spectrum of hybrid threats that is extremely difficult to defend against. The failure of international naval efforts to protect shipping in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks illustrates this challenge. Third, the risk of escalation is severe. Any deployed naval vessel could be targeted, and contributing states could be seen as belligerent parties by Iran.

Therefore, the path forward requires diplomacy.

Multilateral Emergency Solutions

A few vessels continue to transit the strait, most of which are directly linked to Iranian oil trade. Yet states such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia have successfully negotiated safe passage of ships directly with Tehran. Reports suggest that Japan and South Korea are similarly negotiating passage with the regime. This indicates that Iran recognizes the strategic need for selectively enabling maritime flows and remains open to negotiated access. But if kept on a bilateral level, these negotiations will be selective and unwieldy, far short of the scale required.

Several ideas have been floated for multilateral solutions, despite ongoing hostilities, with the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative being brought forward as a potential template. Facilitated by different UN bodies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development as well as Türkiye, this initiative enabled safe maritime corridors for food and fertilizer exports through the Black Sea amidst ongoing hostilities. A Joint Coordination Center staffed by the belligerent parties (Russia and Ukraine) and mediators (Türkiye and the UN) oversaw the implementation of the agreement and enabled about 1,000 safe passages within a year. However, Russia’s withdrawal from the arrangement in July 2023 demonstrated the fragility of such arrangements.

While providing a beacon of hope, a similar model for the Strait of Hormuz would not only have to operate at a much larger scale but would also require strong incentives for Iran to participate. Moreover, identifying a credible mediator acceptable to all parties remains uncertain. Member states have tasked the secretary-general of the IMO with exploring options, initially focusing on a humanitarian corridor for safe passage of the ships and seafarers currently stranded in the Gulf. If successful, this could provide the basis for a broader arrangement.

Whether the IMO succeeds in this important effort will largely depend on Iran’s willingness to cooperate. Yet given that the regime has demonstrated its readiness to further escalate the war, it is questionable that it will agree to a humanitarian corridor soon.

Planning Ahead

It is critical not only to develop options for an emergency mechanism but also to start planning for the post-conflict period. Even after hostilities cease, the shipping industry will continue to see the region as a high-risk zone for the foreseeable future. A single incident could quickly bring shipping back to a halt. Some layer of protection and security guarantees will therefore be needed.

Several mechanisms in the region already support information sharing between navies and the shipping industry and can be used for this purpose. Examples include the US-led JMIC initiative under the Combined Maritime Forces, the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre  –  Indian Ocean Region, the European Union’s Maritime Security Center – Indian Ocean, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Unified Maritime Operations Center, and the UK’s Maritime Trade Organisation.

India and the EU, which already cooperate closely on maritime security under a recently signed security and defense partnership, could task their centers to act as a dedicated coordination and clearinghouse mechanism for the shipping industry, ensuring rapid alerts and threat analyses. Yet some level of physical protection will be required. This could be organized under a UN-mandated framework to ensure the return of freedom of navigation.

The UN Security Council’s Prospective Role

In Resolution 2817 (2026), the Security Council strongly condemned the attacks by Iran. Importantly, the resolution passed with near consensus and was sponsored by a record 135 member states, though Russia and China abstained. Discussions on a follow-up resolution, indicate that members of the council, including the United States, agree that the UN should play a major role in opening the strait. On the one hand, this reflects a strong consensus on maritime security as emphasized during two high-level council debates on the matter in 2025. On the other hand, it opens the possibility for the council to do more. This could be the UN’s first maritime peacekeeping mission.

UN peace operations, such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, have had maritime components in the past, and the possibility of UN-led maritime operations was recently proposed in a paper by the UN Department of Peace Operations.

A Security Council mandate would provide the legal basis many countries would need to send warships. Ships under a UN flag would ensure the necessary impartiality, which is important in an environment that will continue to be volatile. In practical terms, the EU has nearly two decades of experience in organizing multilateral naval operations and could take the lead, setting up headquarters in Djibouti or Bahrain, where logistical infrastructure already exists, with the EU’s Maritime Security Center – Indian Ocean and its widely used secure communication platform Mercury supporting the operation.

The EU lacks the capabilities to do this on its own, not least because navies are already busy in the Red Sea protecting critical maritime infrastructure and deterring Russia in the North Sea and Baltic Sea. Yet in a joint statement, 22 countries have declared their willingness to contribute to a solution. This includes countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, such as the UAE, but also Japan and Australia. A UN mission, moreover, would allow countries to contribute financially without getting involved with their navies and coastguards.

Now is the time for the Security Council to evaluate such options so that when hostilities end, the tools for stability are already in place.