After two years of fraught negotiations, discussions over funding the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) are finally drawing to a close. They are almost certain to leave the mission with a substantial funding shortfall. This reality was cemented at a financing event in New York in September, when no substantial new pledges were made. In response to the increasingly concerning funding predicament, UN Security Council Resolution 2809 called on the African Union (AU) to share updated plans that account for the lack of financing. Policymakers must now consider a range of options for the mission’s future—choices that will be critical to shaping Somalia’s trajectory toward peace and stability.

AUSSOM’s Funding Predicament

AU peace operations have been deployed to Somalia since 2007. AUSSOM, the latest iteration, began in January 2025. Mandated to stabilize the country and combat al-Shabaab, AU missions initially scored major military successes. Yet as their offensives slowed and donor priorities shifted, the financing of AU peace operations in the country has come under increasing scrutiny.

Fraught negotiations over funding AUSSOM have been ongoing since 2023. The AU’s latest estimate is that the mission requires $196 million for 2025, mostly to cover stipends paid to troop-contributing countries (TCCs) at a rate of $1,000 per month per soldier. The EU has historically covered the majority of these costs, but in 2022, it signaled that it would substantially reduce its contribution, reflecting a renewed focus on European security and concerns about the AU’s effectiveness.

The EU, with backing from the African Union (AU) and the three African members of the Security Council (A3), instead advocated for using UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) to fund the mission. The resolution provides a mechanism for AU peace operations to receive up to 75% of their funding from UN assessed contributions. Yet successive US administrations have resisted applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM, partly due to pressure from Congress. The transition to the Trump administration at the start of 2025 only hardened this position, and the Security Council failed to reach consensus on using the mechanism.

In response, the AU, UN, Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and UK—the penholder on Somalia—hosted a high-level financing event on September 25th on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The effort yielded no substantial new pledges. The UK’s announcement of $22 million was roughly in line with previous contributions, while the AU’s pledge of $20 million merely confirmed a decision made by the AU Peace and Security Council in July. Expectations that Qatar or other Gulf states might pitch in proved unfounded.

This leaves a major gap in the mission’s estimated budget for 2025. Current pledges add up to just $48.6 million. While diplomats continue to hope that Gulf states will add some money to the pot, the EU is the only donor anticipated to provide a sizeable amount and is set to announce its support package in early 2026. The EU has earmarked €60 million for Somalia through the European Peace Facility (EPF) but has yet to confirm how much will be allocated to AUSSOM versus the Somali National Army (SNA). This process has been complicated by the AU and the FGS each advocating for a greater share, as well as wrangling between the EU and AU over what costs should be covered. Even if the EU were to pledge the majority of its EPF allocation to AUSSOM and some additional funds materialize from the Gulf, the mission is unlikely to receive much more than half of its budget for 2025, adding to existing arrears already totaling $93.9 million.

The mission’s funding challenges have been further compounded by cuts to its logistical support package, the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). With a budget of $537 million for 2025–2026, UNSOS provides fuel, rations, physical infrastructure, aviation support, and reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment. However, in August 2025, the White House’s “pocket-recission” request effectively canceled the US contribution to UNSOS—roughly 25% of its budget. The AU and UN are still negotiating where the cuts will fall, but this will likely seriously diminish the logistical support available to AUSSOM.

Immediate Implications

AUSSOM is set to receive only around half of its required funding for 2025, adding to substantial arrears from previous years, while UNSOS will operate without a quarter of its budget. There is no funding pledged for AUSSOM for 2026 and little indication that this financial situation will improve over the next few years.

In the short term, the funding deficit is unlikely to trigger an immediate collapse of the mission.  A range of incentives are set to keep TCCs engaged. Ethiopia and Kenya, as Somalia’s neighbors, perceive their deployments as national security imperatives regardless of funding; most Ethiopian troops are already deployed bilaterally. Uganda is likely to remain to avoid a reversal of its success in reclaiming Mogadishu and to retain residual financial incentives. Indeed, it has already deployed several thousand soldiers bilaterally in support of AU forces. Djibouti has done the same, albeit to a lesser degree. Funding challenges are therefore unlikely to lead to a sudden drop in the size of the foreign military presence in Somalia.

Yet the funding shortfall will likely have a negative effect on the Somali security situation. A lack of renumeration and the erosion of support from UNSOS may further delay the deployment of Egyptian troops to Middle Shebelle, where they are supposed to replace Burundian contingents that are set to leave some time this year. This could lead to a security vacuum in a region where fighting has recently intensified between al-Shabaab and the FGS, although there is talk of extending Burundi’s deployment or having Uganda step in. Regardless, a lack of funding can hinder effective planning for any eventual handover between TCCs in Middle Shebelle, exacerbating the vulnerability of communities and troops during the process.

The funding deficit is also likely to compound the mission’s operational challenges. The actual amount received by each soldier, though rarely the full stipend even under normal circumstances, will inevitably shrink. Some TCCs have reportedly stopped rotating troops in and out of the country amid funding challenges and, in Burundi’s case, ambiguity over its role in the mission. Troops’ will to fight is therefore expected to decrease, a major concern given long-standing criticism that AU forces conduct few offensive operations or patrols. A growing mismatch between the size of the force (both bilateral and AU) and the overall logistics chain could further erode the will and capacity of troops to secure surrounding communities. Deteriorating physical infrastructure and equipment could also leave AUSSOM bases more vulnerable to deadly attacks.

A greater reliance on bilateral troops is also potentially problematic. Historically, the AU force commander has struggled to direct operations, with most TCCs taking orders from their capitals. More bilateral troops would further fragment any semblance of a chain of command across the foreign military presence in Somalia. The bilateralization of the mission could also lead to political challenges, as troop deployments increasingly rely on often-transactional relations between the FGS and TCCs. A deterioration in these relationships could affect TCCs’ willingness to continue their deployments or conduct operations in line with Somalia’s interests.

Mid-Term Options

AUSSOM troops are set to begin withdrawing in 2028. However, given al-Shabaab’s offensives in 2025, including the recapture of several key towns, there is little indication that the security situation will drastically improve within this timeframe. The next few years are also likely to see growing political instability in Somalia around federal elections. The mid-term future of the foreign military presence therefore needs to be carefully considered.

Resolution 2809’s call for updates on the future configuration of AUSSOM and UNSOS provide a potential avenue for re-thinking the mission’s approach. This should trigger more than just narrow technical discussions on how to trim budgets. Instead, these reporting processes should be leveraged to convene the necessary collective and strategic dialogue over how exactly AUSSOM can support peace and security in Somalia in this new funding environment. Several options are possible.

A budget-driven drawdown and transition to bilateral security arrangements: The AU may reconfigure the mission in line with budget constraints, reducing its force size and footprint commensurately with available funding. In tandem, the external military presence in Somalia would rapidly be replaced with bilateral security arrangements, resembling other ad hoc security initiatives that have proliferated across Africa in the past decade. Ethiopia would most likely remain in Gedo, Bay, Bakool, and Hiraan, while Kenya would maintain positions in Lower Juba. Exactly which foreign militaries might be present in Lower Shebelle, Middle Shebelle, and Banadir is less clear. Türkiye could play a role, especially as its interests in Somalia, particularly the area surrounding the capital, grow. Uganda may also maintain some presence in these areas following its commitment to deploy troops bilaterally.

This option is the most feasible and likely. It avoids the AU accumulating further arrears and is politically amenable to the FGS. However, such an arrangement would increase Somali dependence on often-volatile bilateral relationships, especially between the FGS and its neighbors. Unpredictable shifts in relations between the FGS and TCCs could lead to sudden changes in troop deployments and posture, with negative repercussions for the security environment. The Security Council would also be unlikely to mandate UNSOS to support such a configuration, creating a looming cliff for the operational capacity of foreign troops in 2028, as well as for that of the Somali National Army, which relies heavily on support from UNSOS.

A cost-effective, African-owned AU peace operation: Considering the constrained funding environment, the AU could consider using AUSSOM as a blueprint for a more affordable model for peace operations. This could involve normalizing a further, substantial reduction in the stipend rate to maintain the force size at a lower cost. In tandem, a majority of costs could be covered by AU member states. Discussions to “right-size” UNSOS could also be revived, including reviewing reimbursement processes for contingent-owned equipment, rationalizing staff costs, and exploring pathways to reducing reliance on aviation for supplying and rotating troops.

A more sustainable financial footprint could make AUSSOM’s exit plan needs-based rather than budget-driven while keeping most of the foreign military presence under a multilateral framework. Reducing reliance on Western funding could also empower the AU and African leaders to set policy for the mission. AUSSOM could then serve as a model for cost-effective, AU-led peace operations, a potentially valuable alternative to the regional or ad hoc security initiatives that have dominated in recent years. At the same time, the AU may resist developing a model that is radically cheaper than a UN alternative, which could reinforce—arguably racialized—disparities between renumeration rates of AU and UN peacekeepers. If the stipend rate is reduced, TCCs may also be less incentivized to participate in missions in Somalia and elsewhere.

Most importantly, cost-effectiveness alone cannot make up for the increasing lack of clarity in the mission’s purpose. While the mission has increasingly come to be conceived as a counter-insurgency operation, a military solution to al-Shabaab remains out of reach. Regardless of cost, the mission requires a coherent and feasible objective if it is to support Somalia’s trajectory toward peace and security.

A revitalized AU mission focused on a political solutions: Under this option, AUSSOM would be reconfigured toward an end-state of enabling negotiations with al-Shabaab. AUSSOM’s withdrawal would be contingent on progress in negotiations, providing both sides with an incentive to engage. This would require reinforcing AUSSOM’s defensive capacity—for example through greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—in order to decisively deter al-Shabaab from pursuing a military solution to the conflict. This defensive capacity could also be complemented by a greater role for AUSSOM in supporting the capability of the Somali security sector, drawing on the experience of TCCs in this area. Reinforcing the AU’s political mandate in Somalia could also allow it to play an enabling role in negotiations with al-Shabaab and support political dialogue at times of tension between the FGS, federal member states, and opposition players.

Asserting a clear and realistic notion of the mission’s contribution to Somali security could drastically improve the case for funding it. This approach would also integrate AUSSOM into a wider strategic framework for reducing conflict in Somalia and provide a new model for AU peace operations that uses foreign military presence to incentivize political solutions to conflict. Negotiations between the Somali authorities and al-Shabaab are likely to be fraught with risks— from splits in the group’s leadership, to increased violence, as each side attempts to position itself ahead of a deal. Yet after almost 20 years of counterinsurgency locking Somalia into protracted conflict, exploring alternative approaches increasingly appears to be the only viable option.