On November 26, 2025, the UN Security Council and General Assembly adopted twin resolutions on the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBAR), an intergovernmental review process that takes place every five years. The PBAR provides UN member states, UN entities, civil society, and other stakeholders the opportunity to enhance the implementation and impact of the UN’s peacebuilding efforts in the field.

The 2025 PBAR marked the fourth review since 2005 following the creation of the UN peacebuilding architecture, which comprises the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This year’s review took place within the context of historically high levels of conflict worldwide, record global military expenditures, deepening geopolitical tensions, growing skepticism toward multilateralism among some member states, and a UN liquidity and budget crisis that has triggered the UN80 reform initiative. Against this backdrop, it was unsurprising that the PBAR negotiations were lengthy and challenging. Nevertheless, the review resulted in substantive twin resolutions (A/RES/80/11 and S/RES/2805) containing several new provisions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the UN’s peacebuilding institutions to build and sustain peace.

Progress from 2020 but Signs of Strain

The 2020 PBAR resolutions were essentially technical rollovers from 2016. Limited to just five operative paragraphs, they lacked concrete recommendations to improve the peacebuilding architecture. This largely reflected a perception among member states that the comprehensive 2016 resolutions remained relevant and did not require reopening negotiations on sensitive topics. Unlike in 2020, the resolutions adopted in late 2025 contain 31 operative paragraphs with specific provisions directed at the PBC, PBSO, the broader UN system, the secretary-general, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and member states at large.

On the one hand, the decision to move beyond a technical rollover showcases a renewed commitment by member states to enhance the UN peacebuilding architecture. On the other hand, the omission or dilution of certain language reveals divisions among member states on several key issues.

First, the resolutions contain no reference to multilateralism or the Pact for the Future, adopted by member states in 2024. Both the US and China pushed back on the inclusion of the pact, with negotiations ultimately settling on a compromise reference to the “provisions adopted at the Summit of the Future” instead.

Second, references to gender—previously included in the substantive resolutions in 2005 and 2016—were removed in the 2025 review at the insistence of the US. This included dropping a provision explicitly requesting the PBC to monitor the implementation of its Gender Strategy, which the US had welcomed at the time of its adoption in 2016. References to the PBC’s Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding were also dropped. Instead, the resolutions now call for monitoring the implementation of the PBC’s “existing strategies and action plans… to advance the women and peace and security and youth, peace and security agendas.”

Third, language on prevention was contested. While some member states emphasized the primary role of national governments, others called for more inclusive language that explicitly recognizes the role of local peacebuilders, grassroots organizations, and civil society. Overall, while the resolutions emphasize the role of national governments, a provision encouraging the PBC to consult with “relevant civil society organizations, especially local peacebuilders, grass-roots organizations, and women-led and youth-led organizations from countries considered by the Commission,” was maintained.

Fourth, member states failed to agree on the need for adequate, predictable, and sustained financing for peacebuilding or on referencing Resolution A/78/257 (2023), through which the General Assembly approved the allocation of $50 million in assessed contributions for the PBF. While such language featured in the 2020 PBAR and the Pact for the Future, the 2025 resolutions instead include a more limited call for “the full implementation of relevant resolutions on financing for peacebuilding.” Some member states also took issue with the proposed inclusion of language on the impacts of rising military expenditures on peacebuilding, although a reference to conflict prevention “reducing the need for costly military responses” was maintained.

Finally, the relationship between the PBC and the Security Council was another point of contention. Some member states pushed back against any provisions perceived as undermining the council’s authority. For example, provisions calling on the PBC to conduct an annual mapping of activities on the council’s agenda to facilitate early consultations or deciding that the council should make specific asks when requesting advice from the PBC were removed.

What’s New in the Resolutions?

The inability to reach consensus on the inclusion of these items points to a fraught political climate, from which the UN peacebuilding architecture is not immune. Nonetheless, member states reached consensus on several new recommendations.

1. Strengthening the PBC: Much of the resolutions’ text aims to enhance the PBC’s existing mandate, particularly its bridging, advisory, and convening roles. This includes language encouraging closer cooperation between the PBC and the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC, as well as more “systematic engagement” with regional and subregional organizations. There is also a provision on strengthening the relationship between the PBC and the African Union.

Regarding the PBC’s advisory role, the resolutions note that the Security Council and General Assembly may consider “diverse formats of engagement” when seeking the PBC’s advice, including “briefings, written submissions, informal interactive dialogues, and other informal consultations.” These modalities could significantly expand the PBC’s historically limited engagement with the General Assembly. Consideration could also be given to other types of engagement such as joint site visits. In addition, the resolutions address long-standing practical issues by calling for a predictable program of work, dedicated meeting space, and greater media visibility. In this context, member states established an annual “peacebuilding week,” which will take place in June.

2. Supporting national prevention strategies: Despite the contestation over prevention, following the recommendations of the Pact for the Future and the secretary-general’s latest report on peacebuilding, the PBAR resolutions incorporate three references to national prevention and peacebuilding strategies. These include provisions tasking the PBC with assisting member states in promoting, developing, and implementing such strategies, encouraging the PBC to invite international financial institutions (IFIs) and regional development banks to engage on these strategies at the request of the country concerned, and urging the secretary-general to use the PBF to support such strategies.

3. Emphasizing impact: The word “impact” appears 12 times in the resolutions, reflecting concerns about the PBC’s perceived impact and relevance. Member states request the PBC to “strengthen its impact through regular follow-up, monitoring and assessment of the implementation of its outcomes, and diversified modalities of engagement with relevant stakeholders.” The resolutions also encourage the secretary-general to leverage PBSO’s expertise in “measuring impact for an evidence-based and more cohesive approach to peacebuilding impact.” In this regard, PBSO’s nascent but rapidly expanding Peacebuilding Impact Hub could play an important role in consolidating and disseminating information related to peacebuilding impact for both the PBC and the broader UN system.

4. Enhancing UN system-wide coherence: For the first time, the PBAR explicitly references resident coordinators, reflecting a shift away from seeing resident coordinators as focused solely on development. The resolutions also encourage resident coordinators and UN leadership in countries considered by the PBC to contribute to the commission’s efforts. In addition, the resolutions request the secretary-general to “encourage systematic and strategic collaboration” with IFIs at the country-level, including by requesting resident coordinators to “make systematic use of partnership tools.” More frequent consultations and engagement with resident coordinators can inform the PBC’s advice to the Security Council and the General Assembly, support resource mobilization efforts, and reinforce the peacebuilding architecture’s “hinge” role within the UN system.

5. Promoting synergies in the peace operations–peacebuilding nexus: The resolutions reference the ongoing review of the future of peace operations and expand language on the peace operations–peacebuilding nexus. They encourage “more regular, demand-driven interactions” between the PBC and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and invite the secretary-general to “further enhance” the PBF’s support to countries preparing for or undergoing transitions from peace operations. Finally, while language on the Security Council seeking advice from the PBC on the formation, review, and drawdown of peace operations is not new, the resolutions reference the council considering, at the host country’s request, referring situations transitioning off the council’s agenda to the PBC.

Next Step: Implementation

The twin resolutions include at least 44 actions to be undertaken by the PBC, PBSO, the broader UN system, the secretary-general, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and member states. The first step—one that the International Peace Institute will undertake with partners in 2026—is the development of an implementation framework mapping what is required from the resolution and what actors are responsible. This framework will include a strategy to monitor implementation over the five-year period leading to the next PBAR in 2030.

Implementation will not be easy and will require real political commitment from member states. While several provisions reiterate existing mandates, many introduce new tasks that will require additional capacity—particularly for PBSO. Yet the PBAR did not escape the UN80 process, as evidenced by the phrase “within existing resources,” which appears ten times. Simply put, there is a risk that the UN system is being asked “to do more with less.” Like much of the Secretariat, PBSO has already faced staff cuts as part of UN80 and the ongoing liquidity crisis. Meaningful implementation of the PBAR will therefore require maintaining, if not expanding, PBSO’s capacity.

For the PBC, implementation will necessitate sustained discussions on working methods during its twentieth session (2026–2027), under the leadership of the incoming chair and four vice-chairs. In coordination with PBSO, the PBC chair and vice-chairs could prioritize several provisions early on, including: (1) developing a more predictable program of work in coordination with relevant charter bodies; (2) elaborating procedures for regular follow-up, monitoring, and assessment of PBC outcomes; (3) tracking progress on resource mobilization; and (4) identifying modalities for consulting with a broader set of actors, including “local peacebuilders,” as called for in the resolutions.

The adoption of the twin resolutions charts an important path forward for the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. But the provisions vary in feasibility, specificity, and operability. Going into 2026, the next challenge for UN member states, UN entities, civil society, and other actors will be translating political commitments into sustained implementation.