President Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan and the New York Declaration on a two-state solution have created an opening for peace in Gaza—though one that is fragile and fraught with danger. These blueprints are wide in scope but light on detail where it matters, including on stabilization support, which must be carefully designed if it is to contribute to longer-term peace in Palestine and Israel.

Trump’s plan announces that the United States, together with its Arab and international partners, will immediately deploy a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The ISF, it states, will train and support Palestinian police, help secure borders, stop munitions from entering Gaza, and secure the rapid flow of goods. The plan also announces the transitional governance of Gaza under a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, overseen by an international “Board of Peace.” On October 17th, the US military’s Central Command opened a Civil-Military Coordination Center in Israel to support stabilization efforts, monitor the ceasefire, and assist the flow of international humanitarian, logistical, and security assistance into Gaza. On November 6th, the US formally circulated a draft resolution to the Security Council to authorize the deployment of the ISF.

In this context, the Uniting for a Shared Future (USF) coalition convened in Geneva in late October to discuss the new developments and blueprints for Gaza. This coalition includes 500 Israeli and Palestinian leaders in the fields of politics, security, business, diplomacy, negotiations, media, and civil society who are working together to promote an end to the war based on common principles. Alongside this meeting, a group of 260 high-level regional stakeholders also convened to discuss the situation and the way forward at a discreet conference hosted by the Principles for Peace (P4P) foundation and UCLA in Geneva. Drawing on these deliberations, as well as their reflections on the peace operations and initiatives they have personally led, we believe that international stabilization support in Gaza must meet five tests.

1. A Credible, Sustainable, and Precise Mandate

Any stabilization mission in Gaza needs to ground international support in a credible, sustainable political and legal mandate that meets the needs of the moment while paving the way to a long-term vision. This opportunity will close if the mission is designed as a security fix detached from politics, public consent, and regional guarantees.

While the mandate must not be overloaded, it needs to address the linkages between diverse, interdependent priorities. The mission should provide security, oversee disarmament, protect civilians, unlock humanitarian access, assist in restoring basic services, and enable a political horizon for Palestinian governance under clear benchmarks. At the same time, it must reassure Israel by verifiably reducing the risk of security threats. It must also bring together and promote effective collaboration among the broader network of actors delivering on stabilization tasks, including by setting out a clear leadership structure, divisions of responsibility, and coordination arrangements.

As intimated in the New York Declaration, a UN Security Council mandate for the mission is preferable. If that is unattainable, the legal and political basis should be clear and sustainable, with sponsors who will stay the course in keeping the mission on track and pressuring the parties to engage constructively.

2. A Political Dimension and a Path toward Sustainable Peace

International security support must not be detached from, but rather support, a political transition that puts Israel and Palestine on the trajectory toward a long-term resolution of the conflict. This political pathway begins with a Palestinian-led transitional administration and must lead toward the eventual reunification of an independent, well-governed Palestinian state that includes both Gaza and the West Bank. International security support must also reinforce, and not undermine, a time-bound pathway to regional normalization of ties with Israel—sequenced to incentivize and consolidate progress toward lasting conflict resolution.

3. Stakeholder Consent, Reassurance, and a Plan for Dealing with Hamas

To be viable, any mission mandate must be based on consent from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The main fear of Israelis is that Hamas will not disarm. Urgent attention is needed to address this critical concern, which could easily derail the peace effort. The disarmament of Hamas is also essential for Palestinians: until Hamas and other militant groups renounce power and arms, Palestinians will not be widely recognized as partners for peace.

To ensure security, disarm Hamas, and handle moments of crisis, the stabilization mission will need the ability to use force to protect civilians, including quick-reaction forces. However, forcible disarmament would be a recipe for disaster. For the mission to be viable, it needs to involve regional players such as Egypt, which will not provide troops unless Hamas, the PA, and Israel all buy in to a bespoke, sequenced plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), peace, and governance with a clear political horizon. All parties will thus need to come to a common understanding of the mission’s use of force mandate, including the level of risk troops are willing to assume to protect civilians

DDR should be a sequenced process with safe surrender, screening, cantonment, vetting, and reintegration pathways. It should differentiate leaders and ideologues within Hamas and other armed groups from coerced, rank-and-file, or nonmilitary personnel. To ensure Hamas and other armed groups have an exit they can walk through, they need to be offered reintegration assistance to enable their transition into constructive roles and be permitted to participate in politics as long as they renounce violence and accept the rights of others. There should also be clarity on Hamas’s preconditions for beginning disarmament, which will likely include the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, the establishment of basic security, and Palestinian ownership of the transition.

Mechanisms will be needed to monitor ceasefire compliance, human rights, the protection of civilians, border security, and illicit finance and arms flows. This monitoring could be done by standing mechanisms involving Israel, the PA, Egypt, and Jordan, with US and EU oversight. The monitors must anticipate and seek to practically and politically constrain spoilers before they can collapse progress. When spoilers violate the peace deal, leaders on both sides must condemn the violence and call for acceleration on the peace agenda and toward the political horizon.

4. Only as International as Necessary, as Palestinian as Possible

Any governance structure or stabilization mission imposed without the involvement of the PA or consultation with Palestinians will lack local legitimacy, risking backlash or rejection. Every effort must therefore be made to avoid the perception that the stabilization mission is a new occupation force. The mission’s legitimacy will depend on a clear mandate, an exit strategy, and robust rules of engagement centered on stopping flare-ups and provocations to ensure civilian protection and public safety. Governance and security responsibilities should be transferred to Palestinian institutions as early as possible.

This will require the PA to build its legitimacy in Gaza.  Toward this end, the PA will need to be entrusted with the requisite resources and decision-making authority to deliver public services without unreasonable obstructions. There will also be a need for safe, pluralistic, and inclusive processes for Palestinian political dialogue and renewal, culminating in democratic elections at the appropriate moment.

5. Legitimacy and Public Support

The needs in Gaza are massive and must be met with urgency if the public is to accept the stabilization plan on offer. The public will not buy in to peace and reject calls to violent rebellion unless stabilization offers them safety, justice, services, and jobs and opens political channels for tackling grievances and pursuing inclusive governance. The public should also be offered voice and agency in the stabilization process. It should be involved in planning, decision making, and problem solving and have access to mechanisms to have its grievances heard and responded to.

The military component of the stabilization mission should not be asked to meet the public’s needs. However, it must enable and support the civilian humanitarian, development, and political players within and beyond the mission that are delivering on these needs, including by communicating successes and owning the challenges. The Trump plan talks of aid entering Gaza via the UN, the Red Crescent, and “other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party” and mentions proposals for development and investment from “well-meaning international groups.” Yet it is not yet clear who these players might be. What is clear from past experience—including military efforts to deliver “government in a box” in Afghanistan—is that military stabilization missions cannot be expected to lead in areas beyond their expertise.

A core, urgent deliverable for the public is a sense of safety. Accountable community policing and civilian protection capacities will therefore be as essential as the military capacities that oversee disarmament and tackle flare-ups. Countries with strong community policing and rights-based criminal justice systems should ensure the mission has these capabilities at its core and is ready to work with the PA from day one to establish the right kind of Palestinian police force.

The mission must also be given the capacity to communicate effectively against the strong currents of polarization and disinformation. It will need to be “first with the truth”—communicating clearly and proactively to all relevant stakeholders and the public what the mission and other actors are trying to do to make the situation better while dispelling disinformation. To enhance its transparency, effectiveness, and learning, the mission should also listen to public feedback, publish open dashboards with data on its activities, solicit independent reviews, and establish verified benchmarks for its transition and exit.

What Stabilization Efforts Should Avoid

Alongside these essential design features, there are some things stabilization efforts in Gaza should avoid. First, it is vital to rule out a separate counterterrorism track in parallel to the mission. Past experiences in Afghanistan and elsewhere have shown that aggressive security operations divorced from the wider stabilization structure can undermine stabilization efforts.

Second, forcible disarmament is rarely viable and would not work in Gaza. As mentioned above, this would be a recipe for disaster, and potential troop contributors will be reluctant to join any operation seen as an extension of Israel’s war in Gaza, which has not succeeded in dismantling Hamas despite an all-out military effort resulting in mass death and destruction.

Third, private military companies must not be allowed to use lethal force in Gaza. It is possible that such companies will be asked to provide security for stabilization efforts, transitional governance arrangements, and aid delivery—in line with arrangements surrounding the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation established earlier this year by Israel with US backing. Relying on private military companies in this way would put an extremely fragile but important opportunity in the hands of unaccountable players rather than a structure that commands buy-in from all the key stakeholders and operates according to a lawful, rules-based, and principled mandate.

The international community faces consequential, historic decisions about the stabilization of Gaza in coming days. To build on the ambitious but insufficiently detailed peace plans on the table, we must inject missing detail, fix what can be fixed, and mark clearly what cannot. International stabilization efforts have helped end wars and support transitions in many other settings—though they also provide cautionary tales. All these experiences should underpin a careful search for lessons that can help design a mission that can respond to Gaza’s challenges and help it move forward.