This December, the mandate of the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) comes up for its periodic renewal. Established 20 years ago to support diplomats on the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, CTED occupies an unusual position in the UN system: it is a special political mission based at UN headquarters in New York with a specific subject-matter focus, with the United States as the “penholder” for this resolution. At a time when the UN is confronting budget cuts and a reform process and many states are restructuring their counterterrorism architecture, the renewal process is likely to raise questions about CTED’s value, impact, and future. This article examines the evolution of CTED and its contributions to global counterterrorism efforts, with a view to informing strategic debates on its future mandate and the key priorities of its stakeholders.

The Evolution of the UN’s Counterterrorism Architecture

Just days after 9/11, the Security Council condemned the attacks and adopted Resolution 1373 (2001). This sweeping resolution took the unprecedented step of requiring states to adapt their national legal and policy frameworks to criminalize terrorism, address terrorism financing and border management, and ensure state capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases. Since then, the Security Council has adopted more than 40 additional resolutions on counterterrorism, layering on obligations and guidance on issues including incitement (1624), counter-narratives (2354), aviation security (2309), terrorist financing (2462), foreign terrorist fighters (2396), and organized crime (2482). Over time, these resolutions have also come to address norms and obligations on human rights, the gendered dimensions of terrorism and counterterrorism, and engagement with civil society on counterterrorism efforts—framed as part of “whole-of-society” and “whole-of-government” approaches.

Chairs of the CTC, customarily drawn from among the 10 elected members of the Security Council, have also shaped CTED’s priorities and strategic direction. Egypt, in particular, actively advanced resolutions and activities through the CTC while serving as chair in 2016 and 2017. Peru followed with an ambitious program in 2018 and 2019. Following the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Tunisia helped develop innovative ways of working to support business continuity and advance negotiations on prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration. However, the pandemic and the war in Ukraine appear to have dampened the CTC’s activity under subsequent chairs.

CTED is just one part of the multilateral counterterrorism framework. It exists alongside the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), which was established to support implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted by the General Assembly in 2006) and to promote capacity building and international collaboration. Other UN entities have developed their own workstreams on counterterrorism: UN Women and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have focused on preventing violent extremism; the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concentrates on legislative assistance and criminal justice policy support; and UNICEF has emphasized the rights of children in the context of counterterrorism. The evolution of this framework reflects both the evolving demands and priorities of states and shifts in the threat landscape—from an initial focus on al-Qaida to a later concentration on the Islamic State (IS).

Beyond the UN, several regional and subregional bodies, including the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and intergovernmental organizations like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) have also developed their own counterterrorism architectures. These efforts have, in turn, shared the UN’s approach to counterterrorism.

Assessing CTED’s Contributions

In this crowded counterterrorism ecosystem, what have been the main contributions of CTED?

First, through its comprehensive and tailored assessment visits and reports, CTED provides a unique snapshot of terrorism threats, trends, and national and subnational activity. These country assessments examine state efforts to implement Security Council obligations outlined in counterterrorism resolutions through a consistent approach. The visits are often part of a lengthy dialogue with states about their priorities, laws, policies, and resources across a wide range of thematic issues. At the national level, they also often foster intra-governmental dialogue on how to respond to CTED’s queries and raise awareness and engagement about Security Council resolutions. The assessment reports provide a wealth of information, and while they have steadily increased in length and detail, this largely reflects the growing number of resolutions they are expected to cover. Alongside these reports, CTED also produces thematic trend alerts and analytical reports on specific subjects.

Second, CTED has often served as a norm incubator. It has encouraged states to adapt their counterterrorism approaches by integrating global perspectives, lessons learned, and good practices. It has also facilitated dialogue among policymakers and practitioners to build the international consensus needed to agree on global good practices, treaty obligations, and international legal frameworks, advancing a more comprehensive approach to security over the medium and long term. The resulting norms are reflected in initiatives such as the 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles and their 2018 Addendum, which encourage states to complement their hard security goals with a focus on human rights, gendered dimensions, and civil society engagement. CTED has also helped disseminate these norms through dialogues with regional, subregional, and expert bodies.

For example, in 2016, CTED brought together all members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to foster “habits of cooperation” among police, prosecutors, and judges alongside a parallel process that brought together civil society and academics. CTED has also worked closely with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and with specialized bodies like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Biometrics Institute, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and developed or supported related global projects delivered by UNOCT. Through these partnerships, CTED has helped infuse Security Council norms into the work of these organizations while also introducing ideas from these organizations into council resolutions.

In addition, through two decades of counterterrorism negotiations in the Security Council, CTED has helped incubate norms by promoting interactions between the council and external practitioners, academia, and civil society, particularly through open meetings, special briefings, and informal Arria-formula sessions. For example, France and Peru, the penholders on Resolutions 2462 and 2482, respectively, organized several meetings on key issues before initiating negotiations, providing council members with expert perspectives while diffusing council norms to an external audience.

Third, CTED has played an important role connecting strategic policy discussions and technical assistance with experts in civil society, the private sector, and academia. This role has become especially important as counterterrorism approaches expanded beyond responsive “hard” security measures to encompass prevention and mitigation—encapsulated by the term “preventing and countering violent extremism.” With this shift, the Security Council’s counterterrorism resolutions came to address a wider range of themes. This required CTED to engage a broader network of stakeholders and to facilitate technical assistance, notably with implementing partners like UNOCT, and broaden the range of issues covered by its experts and counterparts.

Addressing Criticisms and Concerns

The specialized nature of CTED has allowed for considerable innovation over two decades—from fostering consensus on difficult technical issues to raising awareness and, in many ways, leveling the playing field between states with well-developed counterterrorism capacities and those still building them. Yet this work has not been without criticism. Several reviews of the UN’s counterterrorism architecture have highlighted concerns about the multiplicity of institutions and programs, the proliferation of new legal obligations, and the potential for counterterrorism measures to undermine human rights and civic space and strain local and subnational capacities. Given that the Security Council is a state-driven institution, it is not surprising that the intrusive and unprecedented nature of Resolution 1373, adopted with no human rights safeguards or sunset clauses, has prompted sustained criticism.

The Securing the Future Initiative, for example, which involved consultations with over 500 representatives from civil society, academia, governments, and regional and international organizations, identified numerous shortcomings in approaches to counterterrorism. It noted that policies and dialogues on counterterrorism were often disconnected from local realities; securitized approaches were favored over investments in prevention and resilience; states that wanted to manage threats but lacked the capacity to do so were asked to do too much with too little support; and regional nuances and priorities were systematically sidelined, particularly in Africa.

Stakeholders working on development and conflict management also expressed concerns that resources were being diverted toward counterterrorism efforts at the expense of work on other areas. Likewise, many saw the counterterrorism agenda as being disproportionately elevated in the Security Council at the expense of other pressing transnational threats, largely reflecting the priorities of the five permanent members. While many initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism have sought to complement or build on existing development or violence prevention efforts, skepticism persisted about the intentions and impact of the council’s counterterrorism agenda.

More broadly, diminishing political attention, expertise, and funding have made it difficult to provide meaningful support for the implementation of Resolution 1373 and related mandates. It remains unclear to what extent states review and act upon CTED’s detailed assessment reports or follow up on the recommendations provided. In 2021, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2617, requesting CTED to review the implementation of its mandate, including “the effectiveness, timeliness and impact of its country visits, assessments and recommendations.” To date, however, this review has not been made available to the wider UN membership, entities, and partners or the public. When states such as Switzerland, Greece, the Philippines, South Africa, Qatar, and the Maldives have voluntarily reported back to the CTC on implementation, CTED’s impact has been easier to identify, though states can of course choose which of the many recommendations to highlight.

Although CTED’s assessments were intended to influence the design and delivery of technical assistance by other UN and international bodies, the reports are sometimes finalized long after the actual visit (if ever) and remain inaccessible beyond the CTC members. Finland is a notable example of a state that has made its report public, but it remains the exception. Many of the reports have only become accessible to UN entities within the last few years, and fewer still are available to the wider public. Several states now make their reports available upon request, but the timelines and politics surrounding these decisions limit their utility for implementers and technical experts within or outside the UN system. For the private sector, which often has key resources and tools to address issues relevant to terrorism and violent extremism, access to the reports remains virtually nonexistent.

CTED’s work has also been undercut by broader trends. Budget cuts and geopolitical tensions have reduced opportunities for dialogue and collaboration among states, undermining the exchanges that once made CTED a valued incubator of ideas. More than 20 years on, it is worth asking whether the Council has delivered on its purported goals. The consensus that allowed for nearly twenty years of counterterrorism debate and collaboration in the Council was broken in 2021 and there appears little appetite among States to actively utilize the CTC.

Outside the UN, shifting political and budgetary priorities have created difficult conditions for international organizations and civil society. A recent report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague (ICCT) highlights changes in donor priorities and impacts of several global dynamics. Moreover, ICCT noted, there is a growing trust gap between many citizens and states, shaped by emerging and ongoing armed conflicts and perceptions of double standards in addressing them. At the same time, terrorist threats have diversified, with a shift toward more diffuse, individually driven, and hybrid groups operating both offline and online. In this environment of constrained resources, CTED’s assessment reports may prove especially useful for donors in helping to prioritize and direct resources and better understand national contexts—provided they have access and consult them.

The Future of CTED: A Strategic Reset?

CTED’s mandate renewals have historically provided important opportunities to refine or update its mission, whether by integrating a stronger focus on thematic analysis and reporting, mandating interactions with civil society, or defining priorities for the office’s forthcoming term. This mandate renewal, therefore, comes at a key moment and raises questions about whether and how states envision an entity like CTED—and the UN more broadly—managing contemporary transnational security threats. Member states now hold two decades’ worth of CTED reports and assessments, but it remains unclear how they plan to proceed on the recommendations.

It is also unclear whether many of these recommendations can be applied to the current threat landscape and geopolitical environment, particularly in light of recent budget cuts. At the same time, much remains to be done to follow up on CTED’s foundational work, especially given that its support often benefits states that have not themselves developed strong counterterrorism capacities but remain vulnerable to global and regional risks. Moreover, terrorist threats continue to evolve, and even as new and hybrid threats emerge, more persistent threats from traditional actors may also expand, depending on the trajectories of several armed conflicts.

There is talk of a “technical rollover” this year, which would renew the mandate without substantive changes. However, it would be surprising if the negotiations did not reflect the wider pressures facing the UN system, most clearly articulated in the US statement in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee calling for deeper cuts to the budget. Member states need to ensure the UN has sufficient capacity to support collective efforts and deliver on the given mandate. At the same time, it is important that council members take this opportunity for a strategic assessment about key priorities, resource allocations and consider how to optimize the UN’s work on counterterrorism. Such a reset should focus resources on the areas where CTED has the strongest comparative advantages and can best complement the broader goals of the UN system and its membership in the face of contemporary challenges and needs.

The author is grateful to everyone who provided feedback on early drafts; all errors and omissions belong to the author alone. The views expressed here do not represent those of GIFCT.