As the United Nations General Assembly enters its 80th session, the secretary-general has issued wide-ranging proposals under his latest report under the UN80 initiative, “Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver,” aimed at streamlining, rationalizing, and reforming the UN system. While the proposals in the peace and security pillar are central to improving the UN, reforming the United Nations development system (UNDS) deserves equal attention. If the UN’s three pillars are indeed interdependent and mutually reinforcing, then sustained investment in development and resilience must be seen as central to preventing future crises and conflicts.

Evolution of the UN Development System

Today’s global development landscape is far removed from the postwar decolonization context in which the multilateral system first emerged. Developing countries now have more sophisticated public institutions, more diversified partnerships, and greater access to finance, knowledge, and technology. Yet the challenges they face—poverty, widening inequalities, food insecurity, health emergencies, digital transformation, climate vulnerability, economic shocks, debt distress, and geopolitical fragmentation—require more than service delivery and policy support. They demand strategic partnerships to help navigate complex, interdependent systems.

The UNDS, however, remains fragmented and slow to adapt. It relies heavily on tightly earmarked voluntary contributions that reflect donor preferences more than country needs and fail to ensure predictable, sustainable financing. Overlapping mandates, uneven country-level presence, and institutional competition often undercut collaborative problem-solving. At the same time, repeated reform efforts—through the General Assembly’s Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR), the 2018 Repositioning of the Resident Coordinator system, decisions of the Executive Boards of the Funds and Programmes, and numerous agency-level initiatives—have delivered incremental improvements. Despite strong inertia and persistent financing woes, the system has shown that, when enabled by member states, it can move in the right direction.

As member states deliberate on the secretary-general’s latest proposals to improve efficiency, they must also confront a deeper question: can the UNDS evolve from a fragmented service provider to a coherent platform for nationally led transformation? While the “Shifting Paradigms” report offers notable structural and operational reforms, these reforms fall short of what is required. However, the deliberations around UN80 offer an opportunity for member states to go beyond the report’s proposals and reframe the development system as a vehicle for structural transformation and deliberative global cooperation.

The UN80 Development Proposals

Institutional Reforms: The UN80 report is laudable for proposing a significant restructuring of the UNDS aimed at enhancing coherence, reducing institutional fragmentation, and increasing effectiveness. Notably, it suggests merging the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNOPS as well as the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women into single entities with unified mandates, governance, and funding arrangements. It also recommends sunsetting UNAIDS and mainstreaming its capacity and expertise into relevant entities. Such changes would need to be approved by member states and integrated into the institutional culture of each agency—an inherently difficult task.

Operational and Technical Measures: The report also proposes a set of operational reforms designed to streamline functions and reduce duplication. These include consolidating macroeconomic functions currently divided among the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the regional economic commissions into a single advisory function; creating Joint Knowledge Hubs and pooling technical expertise across agencies; and phasing out obsolete or duplicative programs. It recommends reducing the UN footprint at the country level, with fewer agencies maintaining a physical presence, and empowering the resident coordinator as the single entry point to the UNDS. Additional measures include streamlining support for LDCs, landlocked least developed countries (LLDCs), and SIDS, shifting support functions to lower-cost duty stations, leveraging digital solutions for service delivery, and relocating capacities to the regional economic commissions, where appropriate. Together, these proposals aim to modernize and streamline the UNDS to sharpen its strategic focus and increase its overall impact.

Environmental and Cross-Pillar Dimensions: On the environmental front, the report recognizes that responsibilities are dispersed across UN entities and proposes a thorough assessment of current arrangements before recommending structural changes or program realignments. Some stakeholders have floated ideas such as clustering multilateral environmental agreements or streamlining the functions of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Environment Assembly, though the UN80 document itself does not include these or any concrete proposals in this area.

Cross-Pillar Collaboration: In addition to development-focused restructuring, the report calls for a “Better Together” approach that encourages cross-pillar collaboration rather than siloed, pillar-by-pillar reforms on development, peace, human rights, and humanitarian action. It also proposes a “New Humanitarian Compact” to streamline humanitarian responses and reduce bureaucratic fragmentation, and a “Systemwide Human Rights Group” to embed human rights principles across the UN’s operational work. While both initiatives signal an intent to integrate normative frameworks into programming, many questions remain about their design and their political feasibility.

Data and Technology Innovation: On data and technology, the report envisions the two systemwide mechanisms relevant to the UNDS. The first is a unified “UN System Data Commons” to replace the current fragmented data environment, allowing agencies to pool, access, and share development data through standardized protocols. The second is a “Technology Accelerator Platform”, designed as a cross-agency hub to jointly develop, test, deploy, and scale digital tools and innovations in line with country needs.

Critique and Gaps

These proposals are a move in the right direction. The report reflects a long-standing recognition that the UNDS is too fragmented and expensive to sustain in its current form. The call for shared services, rationalized functions, and better mandate tracking is overdue and could yield real efficiencies. In particular, the creation of Joint Knowledge Hubs, the consolidation of operational services, and the strengthened role of the resident coordinator as a single entry point signal a shift away from loosely coordinated, project-based delivery models toward more integrated, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing modalities.

But the context is difficult. The secretary-general’s second term concludes at the end of next year, and the incoming secretary-general will need to decide how to ensure continuity for any agreements made by member states while bringing in their own ideas and proposals.

Furthermore, the attacks on multilateralism and the assault on the SDGs by the current US administration and others are stifling genuine efforts to address global challenges such as climate change, that requires the biggest emitters to be on board. When the president of the United States claims that climate change is “the greatest con job”, it deals a major blow to the progress made and to prospects for future success. Also, tepid commitments in  nationally determined contributions (NDCs) , in particular China’s, further undermine global climate action. Despite the mounting climate crisis, the UN80 proposals are muted on climate action and environmental governance. This omission weakens the claim to holistic transformation.

Finance and Power Asymmetries: Beyond the gaps, the UN80 proposals have critical shortcomings. They do not address the core asymmetry in how development cooperation is financed and governed. Funding gaps remain unchallenged and, besides increasing “pooled funding”, no new funding compact is on the table. Aligning more closely with the Financing for Development agenda and key international financial institutions could open pathways for innovative financing and structural reforms.

Political Risks and Implementation Challenges: The reaction of member states is yet to be seen, but each proposal will be closely scrutinized. In past discussions on UNDS reform, there have been sharp differences of view—for example, on using multi-country offices to consolidate functions in specific locations, on the role of the resident coordinator and the resident coordinator’s office, and on the current funding arrangements. Program countries vary widely in how they benefit from the system, both in substance and presence on the ground. The UN80 development proposals are likely to encounter strong resistance and scrutiny, including over questions such as whether blanket staff cuts and reductions in field presence could disproportionately affect the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS), where the UN remains a crucial partner. Streamlining these functions for efficiency could also reduce the system’s capacity to respond flexibly in times of crises. Without genuine ownership by member states, the reforms risk generating backlash rather than consensus. Lastly, despite repeated calls for more tailored support to middle-income countries (MICs)—which are home to 75% of the world’s population and 62% of the world’s poor—there has been persistent resistance to creating a system-wide strategy designed to address the particular challenges they face. While the UN80 report invites further cross-pillar collaboration, it also does not fully address structural silos, and mechanisms to enforce integration remain weak. For double- or triple-hatted entities (with mandates in the development, human rights, or humanitarian fields), there is no clear accountability for joint mandates or cross-agency coherence. Analysts have described this as a “coherence paradox,” where the desire for unified purpose is undercut by governance fragmentation and weak mandate enforcement.

Continued Focus on Service Provision: From the perspective of many developing countries, the UN80 proposals fall short of reimagining the UNDS as a true structural enabler rather than a fragmented service provider. These countries have consistently called for an international environment that ensures equitable access to finance, technology, and fair trade. While the reforms may improve the system’s internal efficiency, they do little to shift decision-making power or financing authority toward program countries. The most entrenched structural constraints—unsustainable debt burdens, inequitable trade rules, restrictive intellectual property regimes, and gaps in global taxation—remain largely unaddressed, like. Yet these are precisely the areas where the UN has normative influence and convening legitimacy. By avoiding bolder reforms—such as governance modalities led by program countries, restructured funding mechanisms, or closer integration between operational work and global economic policymaking—the proposals miss the opportunity to position the UNDS as a genuine catalyst for transformation.

To make the system fit for purpose, reforms would need to focus on enabling countries to mobilize the means of implementation through technology partnerships, facilitation of climate finance, global norm-setting, and stronger alignment with the Financing for Development process. A future-oriented UNDS would help broker debt workouts, support transitions to low-carbon economies, promote equitable digital infrastructure, and build national capacities that reduce dependency over time. It would be funded through more predictable, pooled mechanisms under national leadership with strong UN oversight, with greater decision-making power resting with the program country. Rather than racing to secure short-term project funding, agencies would be rewarded for their contribution to long-term, country-defined outcomes.

Alternatively, the UNDS could embark on a bolder, more imaginative approach that embraces “constructive deconstruction”—a deliberate process of questioning outdated assumptions, dismantling institutional rigidities, and enabling the emergence of more fit-for-purpose models. The starting question would be: What would the UNDS look like if it were designed today? This would mean not just trimming bureaucracy but rethinking the fundamental role of the UNDS.

Such transformations will not be easy. They require confronting vested interests, challenging the status quo and donor dominance, addressing historical positions on all sides, and navigating interagency politics. But the alternative is more of the same: incremental efficiency gains in an overall inefficient and ineffective system that continues to lose relevance as a trusted partner.

Moving Beyond an Administrative Reshuffle

Dag Hammarskjöld once remarked that “the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.” In the development pillar, that mission remains true: countries have the primary responsibility for their own development, but the multilateral system must create a just and fair enabling environment to help them escape the traps of poverty, vulnerability, and structural exclusion.

The UN80 development proposals offer an opportunity to rethink and reinvent the UNDS in response to long-standing calls for coherence, efficiency, and modernization. Yet they risk becoming little more than an administrative reshuffle unless matched by deeper vision and political courage. As Simon Chesterman once asked, “Is the Secretary‑General more Secretary or more General?” When looking at the UNDS, can the current secretary-general—or the next—play the role of general: a thought leader, user of good offices, guiding voice of reason and morality, pushing forward the agreements needed for a more sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and robust system? Or will the secretary-general act as secretary: a neutral facilitator, recorder, and proposer, but staying out of the hard political battles?

There is also another dimension to consider. As Ian Johnstone has argued, the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions rest on their capacity to foster meaningful deliberation. Enduring reform must go beyond technocratic design and be shaped through inclusive dialogue. Deliberation builds understanding, trust, and ultimately ownership. It is through this process, not just its structure, that the UNDS can evolve into a support platform for country-led transformation and shared global purpose.

The challenge, then, is not just to reform the UNDS to make it leaner, but to make it more impactful and more deliberative. The opportunity is not just to improve efficiency but to renew the very purpose of the UNDS, keeping the UN relevant, responsive, and resilient for the next 80 years.