When deciding how to tackle a specific challenge, the UN has multiple policy options: an “agenda,” a “roadmap,” a “code of conduct,” or perhaps a “compact.” It is this last option that UN officials working on the UN80 initiative have proposed to address the current crisis facing the UN humanitarian system, prompted by unprecedented funding cuts earlier this year.

The UN secretary-general’s new report under Workstream 3 of the UN80 initiative—“Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver”—is dedicated to restructuring the organization in light of its worst-ever financial crisis. It proposes structural changes across all pillars of the UN’s work: peace and security, humanitarian, sustainable development, and human rights. Under the humanitarian pillar, the main proposal is a New Humanitarian Compact. The compact is described as a “six-step blueprint to deliver faster, leaner and more accountable support to people in crises; restore trust in multilateral action; and maximize impact from every dollar.”

These are fine words that no one would dispute. It is questionable, though, whether another compact is really what the humanitarian system—so stubbornly resistant to reform—needs right now. To most humanitarians working on the frontlines of crises, this kind of proposal will be meaningless. And to humanitarian policymakers, many of whom are involved in the broader Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)’s Humanitarian Reset launched by Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Tom Fletcher in March, the reaction will likely be, “Really, another compact?”

There are times when compacts have clearly been useful: the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants come to mind, as well as the original, nondenominated Global Compact on responsible business. The New Humanitarian Compact, however, seems more cosmetic than substantive, developed by those short on ideas for reforming the humanitarian system and, more importantly, unwilling to address the structural problems with how the UN delivers humanitarian aid.

Countless reviews have concluded that past humanitarian reform efforts have failed because they avoided meaningfully challenging the system’s architecture. If it follows the path laid out by the “Shifting Paradigms” report, UN80 is unlikely be any different.

No Humanitarian Mergers on the Cards

Under the development pillar, the “Shifting Paradigms” report proposes merging or closing several UN entities, including the merger of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNOPS, the merger of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women, and the sunsetting of UNAIDS. Within the peace and security pillar, further integration of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and Peace Operations (DPO) is planned, the remit of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) will be adjusted, and several UN peace operations will be reconfigured with the responsibilities of certain civilian components moving to UN agencies.

However, the humanitarian pillar stands out for the lack of any structural changes  whatsoever. There has been a long-standing debate about whether the UN’s agencies dealing with migration—the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—could become one. In an article I wrote in April outlining proposals for UN80, I made the case for joining the UN’s food agencies—the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)—on efficiency grounds. The memo with options for structural changes under UN80 that leaked in May hinted at such ideas and went even further by proposing the creation of a single humanitarian entity comprising all UN humanitarian agencies—a UN Humanitarian Operations Department.

These proposals have fallen by the wayside as they simply are not in the organizational self-interest of UN humanitarian agencies. The UN spends more on humanitarian assistance than any other pillar— 45% of its budget in 2023. Within the broader humanitarian system, the UN receives the lion’s share of funding. Between 2012 and 2021, 60% of humanitarian funding went to UN agencies, with 47% going to just three organizations—UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), and UNICEF.

Given their dominance and privileged access to donor government funding, the large UN humanitarian agencies operate as an oligarchy. Despite the massive funding cuts they have endured this year, it is still not in their interest to cede market share to other humanitarian actors, or to each other, through structural changes such as mergers.

This outcome stems from the flawed design of the UN80 process. To lead the reform process, the secretary-general established seven thematic clusters, including a humanitarian cluster led by the emergency relief coordinator, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM. These UN entities clearly feel they would have more to lose than to gain from any major restructuring.

It is therefore not surprising that the proposals emerging reveal a preference for maintaining the status quo. They focus on better coordinating supply chains and scaling up common services—issues that are much easier to agree on than mergers or other restructuring. For example, WFP and UNICEF plan to merge their procurement to prevent competing for goods and hiking prices. While these are welcome changes, the proposals could have gone much further with many already underway as part of the Humanitarian Reset. In short, the New Humanitarian Compact is a convenient smokescreen for avoiding more fundamental reform.

Limited Proposals for Breaking Down the Silos

Despite championing cross-pillar collaboration, the “Shifting Paradigms” report offers little in the way of ideas to link up the UN’s humanitarian work with other parts of the organization. There is a commitment to align humanitarian, development, and peace plans but not to make them fully integrated, which would make more sense given the multidimensional and interrelated nature of most crises today. UN80 should be an opportunity to advance the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, not retreat from it.

For example, the report could have proposed merging the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Development Coordination Office (DCO) to consolidate and streamline strategic support from headquarters to field-level UN humanitarian and development activities. It could also have proposed a joint task force to oversee the strengthening of the nexus in the eight countries that humanitarian actors have deprioritized due to funding cuts and are soon transitioning out of.

The report does propose improving collaboration on humanitarian diplomacy across the humanitarian, human rights, and peace and security pillars—something the IASC is already trying within the humanitarian pillar. Yet much like last year’s UN Agenda for Protection, which was intended to foster greater collective responsibility across the UN system for protecting civilians, the report proposes no structural changes.

“Shifting Paradigms” devotes minimal attention to the human rights pillar other than a proposed new Human Rights Group at the principals level. While this new coordination body is no doubt needed, a more radical approach would have been to do away with several of the special representatives and special advisers on different protection issues and integrate their responsibilities into the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). This would not only streamline the UN’s protection approach but also save money.

A Moment of Reckoning

The current discussions on UN reform come nearly a decade after the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), convened by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2016. The WHS generated a plethora of initiatives to reform the humanitarian system, including the Grand Bargain—a multi-stakeholder platform of donors, UN agencies, and NGOs dedicated to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. Earlier this year, the three ambassadors of the current iteration of the Grand Bargain commissioned Lydia Poole, Suleiman Abdullahi, and myself to write a think piece to provide strategic foresight on the humanitarian system. We concluded that most initiatives launched at the WHS have made only incremental progress, as they have focused on technical fixes for what are fundamentally structural problems. We argued that the humanitarian system has reached a moment of reckoning: if it fails to reform, it risks becoming irrelevant.

The UN-led humanitarian architecture is no longer fit for purpose and is increasingly being supplanted by a broader humanitarian ecosystem made up of diverse actors—particularly local organizations—that are forging their own path. In Mozambique, where I am based, national NGOs are establishing their own platform and demanding a greater leadership role in the humanitarian response. This is to be welcomed. We need a plurality of humanitarian actors where the UN remains important but not dominant.

The funding cuts this year have put into sharp focus reform proposals that have been on the table for years but that humanitarian leaders have failed to implement. There was early optimism that the Humanitarian Reset would finally deliver the necessary reforms. While Phase Two of the reset was  announced in June, the lack of consensus on the way ahead and the paucity of concrete decisions are breeding disillusionment. The outcome of the humanitarian cluster of UN80 is, regrettably, not a source of renewed hope.

It is now up to member states to react to the UN80 proposals when the secretary-general provides his next update in October. They should deliver a blunt message: the restructuring of the UN’s humanitarian pillar must go further and deeper. It should not just be about cost-cutting but rather about reimaging the UN humanitarian system to provide a vision of how it will meet future global challenges. The era of large-scale UN agencies delivering the bulk of humanitarian aid should be over. What is needed is a different kind of humanitarian response—one that is more people-centered, principled, locally led, results-oriented, and accountable. Only then will trust in the UN’s humanitarian work be rebuilt. UN80 is still an opportunity to make this happen, but it needs to change tack.

Damian Lilly is an independent consultant working on humanitarian, peace, and security issues.