In March 2025, the arrest of South Sudan’s First Vice President Riek Machar reignited fears of renewed civil war. Armed clashes broke out across Upper Nile and Jonglei, echoing the collapse of earlier peace agreements. For the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which helped broker the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the events were a critical test of its mediation legacy and a warning sign for the region’s fragile peace architecture.

IGAD’s mediation in South Sudan, culminating in the R-ARCSS was a milestone for regional peace efforts and arguably a win for African-led diplomacy. By drawing on its familiarity with the region and political pragmatism, IGAD spearheaded a process that helped halt one of the continent’s deadliest civil wars. But the renewed crisis underscores the limitations of that achievement, raising concerns about how Africa’s peace and security architecture can adapt to more complex and dynamic conflict environments.

IGAD’s past mediation strategies, especially from 2013 to 2018, continue to shape the current political landscape in South Sudan and offer lessons for how regional peace and security governance can evolve. These lessons are particularly important as South Sudan and other African countries face growing pressure to move beyond stabilization efforts and elite bargains to address deeper structural and societal challenges.

IGAD’s 2013–2018 Mediation: A Hybrid Approach to Peacemaking

Immediately after civil war erupted in South Sudan in December 2013, IGAD leveraged its proximity and political leverage to facilitate negotiations between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar. IGAD’s mediation was led by three mediators: Ethiopia’s Seyoum Mesfin, who chaired the process, alongside Kenya’s Lazaro Sumbeiywo and Sudan’s Mohammed Ahmed al-Dabi. In the short term, the mediation aimed for a ceasefire, which evolved into an elite power-sharing arrangement. This strategy was rooted in IGAD’s pragmatic, realist approach to peacemaking.

The result was the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), which collapsed a year later. Violence flared up in Juba, with the Equatoria region emerging as a new conflict epicenter. IGAD recalibrated and launched the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), leading to the R-ARCSS.

Under the HLRF, IGAD’s mediation broadened in scope. Although transitional justice was first introduced in the ARCSS, it gained greater prominence during the HLRF, as IGAD’s mediation expanded to encompass not only security sector reform and power redistribution but also a renewed focus on accountability and other forms of justice and reconciliation. This approach exemplified a form of situated multilateralism—a pragmatic regional diplomacy rooted in local knowledge rather than rigid institutional frameworks, reflecting a liberation-era logic that continues to shape political life across Africa. Instead of imposing external democratic models, IGAD mediators adopted a more adaptive and pragmatic model of peacemaking. IGAD sought to integrate familiar practices such as power-sharing (a political language well understood by leaders like Kiir and Machar) with sequenced transitional arrangements and transitional justice mechanisms aimed at public accountability and societal healing. The resulting hybrid peacemaking model, which merges African norms of subsidiarity and sovereignty with international peacebuilding frameworks, allowed IGAD to navigate local realities while addressing growing skepticism toward liberal peacemaking models.

IGAD’s mediation in South Sudan stands out as a credible example of African-led peacemaking, especially when compared to other regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). While ECOWAS and SADC have often been criticized for state-centric, hegemonic interventions driven by dominant member states such as Nigeria and South Africa, IGAD has adopted a more flexible, context-sensitive approach. This distinction is rooted in IGAD’s “vastly different” approach, which is more intergovernmental and less intrusive than that of ECOWAS. The legitimacy of IGAD’s mediation was also reinforced by formal endorsements from both the African Union Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council.

Yet IGAD’s mediation efforts faced several shortcomings. While IGAD aimed to incorporate civil society actors into the negotiation process, this inclusion was tokenistic. Critics argued that IGAD’s overreliance on elite bargains reinforced exclusion and created a peace agreement more concerned with balancing power than addressing root causes. To underscore its flaws, critics described the R-ARCSS as “peace on paper,” “payroll peace,” and “a shaky peace.”

IGAD also struggled with internal contradictions among its members. For example, Uganda’s military support for Kiir’s government led it to play a double game as both a peace broker and a weapons supplier. Sudan’s competing interests in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s political predicaments and shifts were injurious to IGAD’s credibility. While it operated under the AU’s principle of subsidiarity, IGAD lacked technical infrastructure or robust enforcement tools and heavily relied on donor funding.

Even as the foundation laid by the R-ARCSS cracks—with worsening political fragmentation and widespread violence—IGAD’s peacemaking model should not be rejected but reset or reimagined. That requires ascertaining why regional diplomacy has struggled to respond to the R-ARCSS’s faltering implementation.

Recent Developments: Fragmented Peacemaking and a Growing Humanitarian Crisis

By early 2024, delays in implementing key provisions of the R-ARCSS, such as unified security forces, transitional justice mechanisms, and constitutional reform, had given way to open frustration, political tension, and violence. In March 2025, tensions exploded with the controversial arrest of Riek Machar, leading the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–In Opposition (SPLM-IO) to declare the collapse of the R-ARCSS.

Fighting quickly reignited in parts of Upper Nile and Jonglei, sparking fears that the country could slip back into civil war. UN officials warned that the political unraveling had crossed red lines, urging IGAD and the AU to act swiftly. IGAD warned that “these developments seriously undermine the R-ARCSS and risk plunging the country back into violent conflict.”Part of the problem lies in the incomplete integration of armed groups. The R-ARCSS had envisioned a new unified army, drawn from both government and opposition forces. But by 2024, most cantonment sites remained under-resourced, with soldiers unpaid and ill-equipped. The Security Council noted that “many cantonment sites remain under‑resourced, and integration is stalling, increasing the risk of defections and undermining trust.” Many soldiers either deserted or remained loyal to factional commanders, undermining efforts to build a single national force. Meanwhile, implementation fatigue eroded trust among stakeholders—including signatories, civil society, and international partners—creating a dangerous security vacuum that exposed “the limits of short-term stabilization efforts” and elite-driven political bargains.

Against this backdrop, a new mediation initiative emerged. The Tumaini Peace Initiative, launched in Nairobi in mid-2024, was billed as a fresh start. By including more actors, such as the hold-out groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS, the Tumaini Initiative promised broader inclusion than previous IGAD-led mediation efforts. The government of Kenya sought to offer a neutral platform to reengage disillusioned actors. Initial rounds produced protocols on ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian access, and a revised transition timeline.

The initiative sought to engage hold-out groups, with notable figures, like Pagan Amum andPaul Malong, joining the talks. Others, such as Thomas Cirillo, leader of the militarily powerful National Salvation Army (NAS), abstained, severely limiting the Tumaini initiative’s reach. The inclusion of Stephen Buay and his South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A) added tactical weight to the talks given the militia’s control over parts of Unity state and ties to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Still, the military relevance of these groups is geographically limited, making the notion of ending armed conflict through the Tumaini process unrealistic.

For President Kiir, the Tumaini initiative was a way to bolster his international legitimacy ahead of the elections scheduled for late 2026. For figures like Amum and Malong, it represented both a political lifeline and a possible pathway back into Juba’s inner circle. At the regional level, the Tumaini initiative appeared to revive Kenya’s longstanding peacemaking role in South Sudan. This role was embodied by Sumbeiywo, who carried forward his role in the previous IGAD-led mediation effort by serving as chief mediator of the Tumaini initiative. The initiative also reignited competition for regional dominance between Kenya and Ethiopia, reflected in the visible tensions between Sumbeiywo and Ethiopia’s Mesfin during the earlier mediation efforts.

By early 2025, enthusiasm for the Tumaini initiative had waned. The main parties, including the SPLM-IO and some civil society coalitions, accused the framework of bypassing earlier agreements and sowing confusion. Some analysts expressed skepticism, arguing the initiative was unlikely to address the largely localized nature of current violence. Critics also viewed the Tumaini initiative as an unnecessary, parallel mediation track that could undermine the implementation of the R-ARCSS. The Tumaini initiative lacked both the legitimacy and the enforcement capacity needed to guarantee compliance. Ultimately, the initiative failed to deliver on its promises and now appears moribund. Whether it can be revived remains uncertain.

Despite the AU Peace and Security Council’s communiqué on June 12, 2025, urging more coordinated mediation efforts, regional leadership on South Sudan remains fragmented. Sudan is engulfed in its own crisis, while Ethiopia and Kenya are preoccupied with internal tensions. Meanwhile, IGAD’s Office of the Special Envoy for South Sudan is underfunded and largely sidelined, leaving the organization unable to deliver a coherent response to the renewed violence or to coordinate the overlapping peace initiatives. These include not only the AU-IGAD joint initiative but also unilateral state-led initiatives such as those led by Raila Odinga (Kenya) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda).

Meanwhile, the humanitarian consequences of South Sudan’s escalating violence have been devastating. An estimated 7.7 million face acute food insecurity, driven by conflict, displacement, and drought. Aid convoys have been attacked, clinics have shuttered, and famine warnings are mounting.

This moment starkly underscores the fragility of elite pacts and the limitations of short-term stabilization strategies. It reaffirms that durable peace cannot be achieved without inclusive governance, credible institutions, and enforcement mechanisms. Even the most ambitious agreements are likely to collapse under pressure if these foundational elements are absent.

Yet these challenges do not render IGAD or its peace efforts in South Sudan irrelevant. On the contrary, they highlight the critical importance of IGAD and other regional mechanisms, especially at a time when much of the international community, particularly Western powers, remains preoccupied with crises such as the war in Ukraine and the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, IGAD has been walking a fine line in South Sudan. Working alongside the AU, the Revitalized Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the UN, and other partners, IGAD has taken some recent steps to revive the peace process. These efforts include renewed engagement with South Sudanese actors and support for the R-ARCSS implementation process. IGAD’s has also played a quiet but key role in trying to steady the political and security landscape, including through the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), a team meant to track the ceasefire and military arrangements in real time. Hence, while IGAD is no longer in the spotlight, it is still relevant, carrying out the slow, hard task of watching, nudging, and holding the process together the best it can amid its own institutional challenges.

The urgent question is: What would it take to recalibrate IGAD’s peacemaking model to meet the demands of this new phase of regional and global volatility?

Recalibrating Regional Mediation for a New Era

The crisis of the R-ARCSS marks a turning point not only for South Sudan’s fragile transition but also for IGAD’s peacemaking role. If the initial mediation was a test of African-led diplomacy, the current moment is a test of institutional adaptability. IGAD must now decide whether to remain a reactive, crisis-driven actor or evolve into a credible architect of durable peace in a region under growing geopolitical and security strain.

At the heart of this shift lies the need for greater coherence. The Tumaini Peace Initiative, which ran in parallel to IGAD-AU and bilateral mediation efforts, created confusion among signatories to the R-ARCSS, negotiating parties, and mediators alike. To legitimize the process and avoid unnecessary competition among its members, IGAD should lead in coordinating these efforts through a joint roadmap. A unified structure for messaging, monitoring compliance, and sequencing the transition could help restore confidence among domestic actors and international partners.

But coherence alone is not enough. Peacemaking in South Sudan has marginalized the ordinary people who are the most affected by violence. Civil society actors possess not only moral legitimacy but also crucial knowledge of local conflict dynamics. Drawing on insights from relevant scholarship, a more sustainable model must move beyond consultation with these groups toward their meaningful participation in agenda-setting and decision-making.

Effective implementation and enforcement are equally urgent. Without clear repercussions for noncompliance, peace agreements risk becoming symbolic rather than operational, and spoilers continue to operate with impunity. IGAD, in coordination with the AU Peace and Security Council, should strengthen its rapid-response capabilities and establish a regional sanctions framework. Indeed, the council’s subcommittee on sanctions, which was established to address unconstitutional changes of government, has also been tasked with identifying external supporters of combatants in Sudan. While the subcommittee’s mandate doesn’t explicitly cover South Sudan, and it lacks sufficient political clout and funding to act effectively, it could be extended to monitor and hold accountable those fueling violent conflicts in the country.

IGAD’s mediation architecture remains underdeveloped, heavily dependent on external donors, and reliant on ad hoc expertise. IGAD must strengthen its mediation support unit, staff it with regional analysts, and equip it with real-time monitoring tools to enhance its capacity to anticipate crises and respond rapidly and effectively. IGAD should forge strong and enduring partnerships with African universities, think tanks, and conflict-resolution hubs to institutionalize its peacemaking knowledge base and reduce its external dependency.

IGAD’s future mediation strategy must be grounded in long-term conflict transformation, with a focus on addressing the structural drivers of violence. This includes building inclusive institutions, integrating ex-combatants, resolving land disputes, and confronting historical grievances. These deep-rooted challenges lie at the core of South Sudan’s recurring cycles of conflict and, if left unaddressed, will continue to undermine even the most carefully crafted peace agreements. A critical, yet often overlooked, factor is the persistent lack of justice and accountability, which fuels impunity and enables recurring violence. While the R-ARCSS outlines transitional justice mechanisms, including the establishment of a Hybrid Court for South Sudan under the leadership of the African Union, there has been little political will to advance this process, further eroding public trust and weakening the foundations of long-term peace.

Overall, IGAD’s past and present mediation role in South Sudan remains one of the most ambitious efforts in African regional diplomacy. But ambition must now give way to evolution. In a multipolar world where global attention is fleeting and multilateralism under pressure, Africa’s regional institutions may be required to do more. The principles of subsidiarity and solidarity that once inspired the African Union’s call for “African solutions to African problems” must now be matched by accountability, capability, and adaptive leadership. For IGAD, this is not just a moment of reckoning; it is a moment of opportunity. With the right reforms and repositioning, IGAD can move beyond crisis mediation and become a regional anchor for long-term peace.

Ibrahim Magara is a Peace-Rep Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Coventry University’s Centre for Peace and Security (CPS) and an Adjunct Lecturer at St. Paul’s University in Kenya.