When the Security Council adopted Resolution 2719 in December 2023, there were high expectations about its potential to further consolidate the partnership between the African Union (AU) and the UN. The resolution, which provides a framework for financing AU-led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis, reflects a mutual recognition that neither the AU nor the UN can achieve peace and security in isolation, highlighting the necessity of collective action. If applied effectively, it could present both institutions with opportunities to strengthen their roles in advancing peace and resolving conflicts at a time when they are struggling to do so.

Now, with looming budget cuts to UN peacekeeping and the Security Council’s lack of consensus on Resolution 2719’s initial application, questions persist about how the resolution will ultimately be utilized. Concerns have arisen particularly since the Security Council failed to reach consensus on utilizing 2719 to finance the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in May. While this does not necessarily invalidate the framework, it does require further reflection about how it will be applied in practice and the broader implications for the AU-UN partnership. Ultimately, for Resolution 2719 to succeed, it must be decoupled from its narrow association with peace enforcement and instead be leveraged across a broader spectrum of peacemaking approaches.

The Status of the Implementation of Resolution 2719

For over a year since the adoption of the resolution in December 2023, the AU and UN have been engaged in preparing the groundwork for its implementation, including through the establishment of joint task teams along with a joint roadmap to address operational readiness across four streams: planning, decision making, and reporting; mission support; financing and budgeting; and compliance and protection of civilians. The joint roadmap was signed by the UN secretary-general and AU Commission chairperson at the 8^th AU-UN annual conference.

At the same time, developments within the Security Council and changing dynamics on the ground have shifted discussions on the implementation of Resolution 2719. In the field, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was initially being considered as one of the potential test cases of the resolution, has laid bare the limitations of peace enforcement and the challenges peacekeeping forces face in the absence of a viable political process. Sudan, the other context that was considered by some Council members, would still require de-escalation to possibly deploy any mechanisms through 2719.

The case of Somalia received a significant push from the AU. In an effort to navigate some of the more contentious issues raised during negotiations of the resolution—particularly regarding burden sharing—the AU and the UN proposed a hybrid application of Resolution 2719 to support AUSSOM. This proposal, submitted to the Council in November 2024, recommends ongoing support to a reconfigured and rightsized UN Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS) and applying the 2719 financing framework to AUSSOM’s 75% budget to cover primarily troop reimbursements. However, this approach was met with resistance from the US, which has consistently opposed the application of Resolution 2719 in Somalia, emphasizing the need for other donors to contribute and expressing preference for the resolution to be applied in a new mission setting.

Changes in the three African members of the Security Council (A3) have also affected dynamics within the Council. The A3 that negotiated the resolution are no longer in the Council. After Ghana’s departure from the Council at the end of 2023, Mozambique kept the momentum by holding a dedicated discussion on the implementation of the resolution as the chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa and through its presidency in May 2024, which featured an open debate on the role of African states in addressing global security and development challenges that adopted a presidential statement, putting a spotlight on 2719.

Subsequent African presidencies in the Council, while profiling other continental priorities, did not focus on 2719. Instead, discussions on the resolution—given the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)—were  increasingly centered on its potential application in Somalia. Some members, however, cautioned against merging these two processes and advised that the financing of AUSSOM should be treated as a separate track from discussions on the operationalization of 2719.

Amid the significant financial challenges facing the UN, the reality is setting in that it will have to do less with less. This will undoubtedly influence how the organization engages with regional partners by limiting the availability of assessed contributions for AU-led missions under Resolution 2719. This situation may necessitate a reassessment of the resolution’s potential, both in the short and long term.

What (Non-)implementation of Resolution 2719 Means for the AU-UN Partnership

Resolution 2719 can be seen as one of several tools the AU and UN have at their disposal to collaborate on peace operations. Before its adoption, the two organizations already had a long-standing history of cooperation through different modalities. These included the re-hatting of African-led missions to UN peacekeeping operations; the deployment of a hybrid operation in Darfur; and the establishment in 2009 of UN support offices for AU missions in Somalia. Many of these involved the sort of robust, boots-on-the-ground force that may no longer be feasible in the current climate due to waning interest from host states and limited resources. This should not deter policymakers from exploring alternative, more flexible models of cooperation such as those outlined in the independent study on the “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.” Resolution 2719 offers a political framework to facilitate more systematic cooperation across different types of peace operations. It is not merely a financial or logistical instrument, but a strategic tool to foster political consensus and enable joint planning and decision-making processes.

Taking Resolution 2719 forward is a shared responsibility of both organizations. The UN and member states need to understand the AU’s note of caution that “it took a marathon” to reach Resolution 2719 and “we can no longer afford another marathon for its implementation.” For its part, the AU needs to engage in internal reflection to develop a clear strategy that maps security needs, identifies areas where further UN support is required, lays out its comparative advantages, and outlines various options that could benefit from the activation of Resolution 2719.

Not all conflicts and crises on the continent require the application of Resolution 2719. A well-defined strategy with clear considerations as to why certain cases would benefit from the resolution more than others would provide a strong basis for not only identifying a suitable case but also preventing Resolution 2719 from being entangled in geopolitical rivalry. The initial case for triggering the resolution may not be one of the contexts that have been widely speculated, such as Sudan, the DRC, or the Sahel. However, it would be difficult to make an informed determination about where to apply the resolution without a thorough assessment of needs.

Determining where to apply the resolution also requires consensus among the broader AU membership. Achieving consensus within the AU would facilitate smoother engagement with UN counterparts and help build a shared understanding of how the resolution would be applied before triggering the process. It would also help ensure that African countries are consistent in their messaging within the Council, regardless of the composition of the A3, and help to foster broader ownership of Resolution 2719 across the AU membership, both in Addis Ababa and in New York.

2719 as a Peacemaking Tool?

There is a growing recognition that both the UN and the AU need to rethink their approaches to peace operations. Increasingly, experts have raised concerns about the limitations of stabilization efforts carried out under the banner of UN peacekeeping. Similarly, the Council’s recent lack of consensus on applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM is viewed by close observers of the AU as an opportunity to reaffirm the centrality of political solutions in addressing complex crisis. Indeed, the growing insecurity by armed groups and the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism cannot be defeated by putting hard security front and center at the expense of broader strategies needed to address the drivers of such challenges.

While Resolution 2719 has been highly linked to peace enforcement missions, the resolution itself does not specifically limit support to such missions. While that is one option, its potential application to a broader range of missions should also be recognized. With peacekeeping increasingly characterized by fragmentation and ad hoc measures, the resolution serves as an opportunity for both the AU and the UN to engage more effectively, maintain a presence, and offer political solutions. Its successful application will depend on both organizations, along with their respective council members, aligning on a shared understanding of a conflict and agreeing on the most suitable response mechanisms.

The UN task force established to operationalize Resolution 2719 includes both the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, enabling the partnership to draw on cross-departmental expertise and providing entry points for engagement in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. This configuration of the teams allows the UN and AU to consider a range of options for deployments and models, depending on the unique needs of each crisis or conflict situation. While some of these models may be more cost-efficient, the rationale is not based on mere affordability; it is a strategic imperative. The complex and persistent crises unfolding across Africa and beyond call for robust political solutions that can forge and sustain lasting peace.

Building Momentum

The Council’s decision not to apply Resolution 2719 in Somalia will likely cause unease for the AU, which has been strongly advocating for UN support to the financing of AUSSOM. However, this is also a critical moment for the PSC and the A3 to strategize and mobilize support for the resolution, particularly ahead of key multilateral fora. Consultations on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September can help gauge the perspectives of various member states and partners, while the ninth AU-UN annual conference offers a timely platform to chart a strategic direction for the resolution. Additionally, the annual joint consultative meeting of the two councils presents a critical opportunity for the AU to engage directly with Security Council members.

Now, with the resolution passed and a structure for its implementation established, failing to build on the progress would be a significant missed opportunity for both organizations to reaffirm their leadership and effectiveness in conflict resolution. While differences of opinion regarding specific cases are to be expected, the complete abandonment of the resolution would establish a concerning precedent.

Bitania Tadesse is the policy specialist for Africa at the International Peace Institute.