Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic deterioration in the ability of the multilateral system to prevent conflict and build peace. This trend raises questions about the state of the United Nations (UN) peacebuilding architecture, which will undergo its fourth review this year. The review provides UN member states, UN entities, civil society, and other stakeholders with an opportunity to strengthen the UN’s peacebuilding institutions and enhance their capacity to build and sustain peace moving forward. While the UN peacebuilding architecture is not a panacea, it is uniquely placed to support member states in sharing their peace challenges and mobilizing intergovernmental support to address them.

Over the past two decades, the UN peacebuilding architecture—which comprises the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)—has evolved to undertake a range of activities aimed at building and sustaining peace. While building and sustaining peace is a UN-wide effort, the peacebuilding architecture is primarily responsible for working in partnership with national authorities, local peacebuilders, and other stakeholders to prevent the outbreak and recurrence of conflict and foster post-conflict recovery. To date, the PBC has engaged with 31 countries and regions, while the PBF has been used to fund projects in more than 60 countries.

What Does the Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) Entail?

Source: 2025 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

In an effort to assess and continuously improve the implementation of the UN’s peacebuilding and sustaining peace agenda, member states mandate that the peacebuilding architecture undergo a review every five years. The fourth review, mandated by General Assembly Resolution 75/201 and Security Council Resolution 2558, includes an informal phase, which took place in 2024, and a formal phase, which will take place in 2025. The information gathered during the informal phase culminates in a report issued by the secretary-general on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This report assesses the UN’s progress in the implementation of the peacebuilding and sustaining peace agenda and sets out recommendations for improving the peacebuilding architecture. It is expected that, before the end of the year, member states will deliberate on the report’s findings and adopt joint UN General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions likely reflecting some of the recommendations made in the secretary-general’s report.

Member states mandated that the 2025 PBAR be a “comprehensive review,” meaning that the scope of the review is broad and is expected to cover the entire spectrum of the peacebuilding architecture’s work. The 2020 review, which was also “comprehensive,” resulted in 792 recommendations and 261 sub-recommendations for member states to consider. Many of these recommendations have not yet been implemented because, in addition to political sensitivities, the process yields more recommendations than the UN can feasibly implement within five years. As a result, many of the recommendations produced in 2020 remain relevant and were reflected in the outcome documents produced at the end of the informal phase of this year’s PBAR.

Five Key Issues Likely to be Debated

While there are a range of topics and recommendations that member states can discuss, the following are the five key issues that will likely be debated.

1. Strengthening the PBC’s “bridging” and advisory roles

The Peacebuilding Commission was created by member states as an advisory body, mandated to play a “bridging role” among the principal organs and other entities of the UN on peacebuilding needs and priorities. As part of this mandate, the PBC can provide advice to the Security Council, at the Council’s request. The focus of the advice is typically on the peacebuilding needs and priorities in a given context and/or on a thematic area. Since 2020, the PBC has provided advice to the Council 62 times.^[1]

The extent to which this advice has shaped the Security Council’s decision-making to date is unclear, though there is a perception among member states that the advice provided by the PBC rarely introduces new insights for consideration. Member states have tried to address this issue by strengthening the relationship between the two bodies, including through the introduction of an informal coordinator between the PBC and the Council. They will likely consider additional options for improving communication and coordination between the Commission and the Council moving forward, including by improving the timing of both formal and informal meetings as well as formalizing and expanding the role of the informal coordinator. Member states may also consider looking further than the Security Council by strengthening the PBC’s bridging role with the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Human Rights Council.

2. Addressing the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus

In his 2022 report to the Security Council on transitions in UN peace operations, the secretary-general noted the need to better coordinate mission transitions with national peacebuilding strategies. There may be opportunities for the PBC to help sustain the political engagement of the international community during and after the transition or withdrawal of a UN peace operation. For example, the PBC could provide oral briefings to the Council during transitions and conduct country visits to consult with the host government and local civil society organizations on peacebuilding needs. The PBC is uniquely placed to support such transitions, as the voluntary nature of host governments’ engagement with the Commission signals their openness to discuss issues that other UN bodies may be less able to consider. Additionally, the PBC’s ability to provide a forum for convening allows it to enrich the transition conversation by presenting a range of diverse perspectives, including those of the host country’s national and local government representatives, as well as regional and civil society organizations.

The PBF could also continue to help bridge peacebuilding funding gaps that emerge during peacekeeping transitions. Peacebuilding Fund projects have been implemented in several contexts to support the transition phase of a peacekeeping mission, including in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Mali. These projects can help ensure a continued flow of funding for peacebuilding programming previously funded through the peacekeeping budget, smoothing out the transition of the financial and administrative burden to the host government or other relevant bodies in charge of post-mission peacebuilding tasks.

To that end, member states will likely discuss ways that the peacebuilding architecture can be further leveraged during mission transitions. This issue is also being considered as part of the review of UN peace operations which is already underway, as requested by member states in the 2024 Pact for the Future.

3. Discussing the role of the PBC in supporting national prevention strategies

The UN secretary-general referred to national prevention strategies in his policy brief, A New Agenda for Peace as a means of addressing violent conflict and strengthening national infrastructures of peace. In the Pact for the Future, member states committed to “strengthen and implement existing national prevention strategies and approaches to sustain peace, and consider developing them where they do not exist, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national priorities, to address the root causes of violence and armed conflict.”

Given this commitment, member states will debate what role the peacebuilding architecture can and should play in supporting the development and implementation of national prevention strategies. One idea that has emerged in multiple fora is for the PBC to act as a clearing house for member states to deposit their strategies. The PBSO could also help states develop their strategies by conducting field visits to share evidence-based good practices and provide technical support.

4. Responding to funding and financing challenges

Funding and financing for peacebuilding remain perennial challenges. The majority of the PBF’s funding comes from voluntary contributions provided by just a small number of countries. In 2023, more than 50% of the PBF’s funding came from just three donor countries. The noticeable drop in voluntary contributions over the last few years and the need for more stable funding led to the General Assembly’s 2023 decision to allocate an additional USD 50 million to the PBF through assessed contributions. However, this amount is unlikely to be sufficient to bridge the financing gap experienced by the PBF, particularly in light of member states’ heightened demand for PBF resources.

Addressing the funding issues of the peacebuilding architecture also involves exploring alternative sources of financing. Multiple recommendations emerged during the informal phase on ways the PBA could tackle these challenges, including strengthening links with international financial institutions and regional development banks. This could include, for example, inviting the institutions and banks to brief the PBC, including them in joint site visits, and enhancing desk-to-desk interactions with the PBSO, with a view to furthering their understanding of the PBA’s work and look for ways to innovatively address the PBA’s financing challenges. The PBAR is also happening in parallel with the upcoming Financing for Development Conference, which could provide an opportunity for member states to look more broadly at the funding and financing landscape for both peacebuilding and development.

5. Focusing on the role of the peacebuilding architecture on thematic issues

Member states might also utilize the PBAR to make recommendations on specific issues. For example, multiple written submissions have highlighted the need for further work on integrating the women, peace, and security agenda into peacebuilding. In addition, in its written submission, the Netherlands, which is the second largest donor to the PBF, emphasized the importance of including mental health and psychosocial support in the peacebuilding agenda. UNODA and UN Women also emphasized the need to better explore the role of digital technologies in facilitating peacebuilding, and improving the sustainability and inclusion aspects of peace efforts, particularly with regards to women and youth. Separately, during its annual session in December 2024, the PBC focused its thematic discussion on internally displaced people and refugees, with an emphasis on the interconnectivity of climate change and peace.

Member states may consider these thematic issues during the PBAR and seek opportunities to strengthen the UN’s work in these areas.

Conclusion

There is an increasing demand for the UN peacebuilding architecture’s capabilities and there are pertinent challenges that its institutions can help to address. However, since the PBAR resolutions will be adopted by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, there is a chance that proposed language aiming to strengthen the architecture on any of the above issues will not be included, and member states will opt for previously agreed language from past reviews. While the PBAR provides an important point for reflection, it is critical that member states, UN entities, civil society, and other stakeholders continue to seek opportunities for enhancing the peacebuilding architecture beyond the review, such as during the Financing for Development conference in July, the UN-CSOs dialogue, and the review of future peace operations, prompted by the Pact of the Future.

Lauren McGowan is a Policy Analyst at the International Peace Institute. Ilianna Kotini is an intern at the International Peace Institute.

^{[1] Final 2024 data is not yet available. Data for remaining years was obtained from the following reports: A/78/765/Corr.1-S/2024/153/Corr.1; A/77/720-S/2023/86; A/76/678–S/2022/89; A/75/747–S/2021/139.}