Seventy years after developing countries banded together to form the Group of 77 (G77) during the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the group is still—and perhaps increasingly so—a formidable force at the United Nations. Yet the decision-making processes of the G77 remain enigmatic. The group has grown from 77 to 134 members, representing just over two-thirds of the entire UN membership, and it has become rather diverse, including both high- and low-income countries with few shared interests.

Can the G77 be the voice of a rising Global South? Answering this question may require understanding how the G77 works. Based on the interviews with UN delegates and independent experts, as well as the analysis of voting patterns and UN meeting records, our new study examines the G77’s internal decision-making processes and how these shape the group’s contributions to global dialogue or “effective multilateralism.” The report finds that the G77 struggles to carry out inclusive, consensus-based decision making as a way to balance its diversity with unity. It could benefit from strengthening its structures and processes to support it taking on a larger global governance role.

An Increase in Bravery in Confronting the Global North

In hindsight, the relatively amiable North-South relations of circa 2015, when the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was negotiated, seems like a golden past. The tone has changed, and trust appears to be at a low point. Recent G77 chairs have criticized the Global North and the current international system in a more assertive manner. Egypt accused major powers of holding a “monopoly,” and of “disregard” for Global South “peoples and communities.” Guinea criticized the Global North for maintaining a “system of exploitation.” Escalating its long-standing criticism, Cuba branded the current system as “unjust, irrational, and abusive” and as “replicating a pattern of modern colonialism.” Such strong and assertive language may not be broadly shared by the group, but it fits into the larger picture of increased tensions at the UN.

In our interviews, Global North delegates observed an increase in what they feel are confrontational and unproductive negotiation practices by G77 members. These include “blunt deletions” that reduce language in zero drafts of annual resolutions far below the previous year’s content, unrealistic maximalist demands, an unwillingness to listen to each other, and a readiness to vote on resolutions that had previously been adopted by consensus. If these are efforts to challenge red lines and renegotiate the power balance at the UN, then the G77 seems to be gaining ground.

An illustrative case is the 2023 General Assembly tax resolution, which mandates an intergovernmental committee to begin developing a binding international framework on tax cooperation. Global North states had for years tried to limit the UN’s role in tax matters, which they saw as the responsibility of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But Global South states—led by the African Group—pushed through the resolution using their numerical majority. Many states in the Global North perceived the passage of the resolution as a “loss of control.” They did not just lose the vote (125 in favor, 48 against) but also the discourse around it. When a G77 member rejects “narratives of local governance and corruption to explain the problems they faced” (Nigeria), this is a direct challenge to Global North countries’ ability to define the agenda at the UN and set the terms for how to solve global challenges.

The tax resolution is one example of how the G77 has defied predictions that it would fall apart because of increased internal diversity. Instead, it tends to maintain a high degree of unity when voting in the General Assembly. Over the last decade, on average, only 10% or so of the group has voted against the majority in any given year, with defections typically coming from small island states that are subject to various geopolitical pressures. Moreover, the group has retained its membership. Only five countries have left the G77 since the 1990s, one of which (Mexico) decided to rejoin the group in 2023.

Internal Processes Do Not Match External Strength

Groups like the G77 are not only vehicles to increase the collective power of individually weak states; they also serve a genuine multilateral function by aggregating interests in a way that can be conducive to striking deals with global counterparts. With 134 members, the G77 is bound to face challenges in aggregating such a wide array of interests. Doing so effectively requires meeting some basic criteria: the process should be inclusive, informed by competent input, and guided by the spirit of compromise for the common good. It’s also worth acknowledging that the interplay of two consensus-based systems—the G77 and the General Assembly—can lead to a number of difficulties and produce its own shortcomings.

In terms of inclusiveness, the G77 takes all decisions by consensus, which requires hearing and considering the positions of all members that wish to weigh in. However, consensus without institutional guardrails opens the door to unaccountable informal influences. The only rule applicable for G77 decision making seems to be that anyone who wants to participate must be in the room. There is no system of written inputs, and there are no protocols for meetings. In practice, only a core group of 10–30 states is said to be actively involved in the decision-making process.

Regarding competent input, the G77 struggles with that lack of “bandwidth” among its members. Capacity is a rare commodity for most G77 missions, which often have just a handful of diplomatic staff. This severely limits their ability to be physically present in coordination meetings, skewing the balance of influence in favor of the larger members. It also limits their ability to engage on substantial matters, compare proposed policies with their national interests, and assess risks and benefits accordingly.

Among the G77 members that are represented and have relatively robust capacity is a set of members often referred to as “radicals” due to their uncompromising opposition to the Global North. These members, which currently include Cuba and Pakistan, are not inclined toward compromise, which became evident more than once during negotiations of the Pact for the Future. Their outsize role in the G77 contrasts with their relatively small influence in the wider global governance arena. Among the BRICS, which are heavyweights in their respective regions, only China seems to play a role in the G77 that matches its level of global influence, having evolved from a silent observer to something of a “big brother” of the G77 over the last decade (Russia is not a G77 member).

Smaller countries acutely feel the influence of the “radicals” and China but still see value in being members of the G77 due to the practice of reciprocity. While some of their proposals may be “killed,” they still receive some support from fellow G77 members on others.

Effects on Global Dialogue

While there are many dynamics at play, we found that deficits in the G77’s internal aggregation of interests have knock-on effects on General Assembly negotiations. To start, insufficiently inclusive decision making may lead to fragile and erratic outcomes. In Rome, for example, the chair of the G77 presented the group’s official candidate from Venezuela for a position at a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) committee, only to see G77 members support a candidate from the Global North instead. The challenges of internal decision making also lead the G77 to take some rigid positions, with group negotiators not given any flexibility to compromise for the larger good. This perpetuates a status quo orientation, hindering progress even when it would benefit the group.

With difficulties in its internal processes and the strong influence of radical members, the G77 tends to fixate on what it wants the Global North to do (e.g., financial transfers) and not do (dictate how to govern internal affairs), rather than focusing in more constructive ways on solving common global problems. This is evident in the prioritization of contentious issues such as sanctions, Palestinian independence and statehood, and, as mentioned, North-South transfers of resources. At the same time, the G77 tends not to prioritize its positions that overlap with the interests of the Global North, for example on climate, gender, and biodiversity. In the G77’s South Summit outcome document from 2024, these positions rank at the bottom.

The G77 at times also undermines its legitimacy when it adopts positions that seem misaligned with the presumed interests of Global South “peoples and communities.” Some G77 members represent kleptocratic and authoritarian systems. When a country ranked as one of the most corrupt wants to shift the “narrative” away from corruption, as noted above, the discourse in the UN General Assembly becomes detached from issue, making it difficult to engage in constructive dialogue and fact-based problem solving.

The Global North Also Contributes to Confrontational Approaches

The Global North also contributes to growing confrontations in the General Assembly and engages in practices that impact effective multilateralism. The G77 may have the majority of votes, but it is still behind in global economic and political power. Global North countries have, for example, effectively marginalized UNCTAD, seen as the G77’s home in the UN. This marginalization can drive the G77 to resort to opposition, which may explain the G77’s lenience toward radical members who are willing “to give the Global North a beating,” as one of our sources put it.

Double standards within the Global North underline the role of power, rather than of rules in international relations, which also invites confrontational approaches. While Western countries scolded some countries in the Global South for not condemning the war against Ukraine, they have lost the moral high ground (if they ever had it) through their positioning on issues such as Palestine, the global response to the Covid pandemic, the severe impacts of climate change, and the lack of international tax cooperation. These are all issues that affect developing countries and remind them of their limited global role. If the Global North instead offered to engage the Global South in genuine dialogue on these issues—including by shifting some issues from the G20 or OECD back to the UN—it might invite more constructive responses from the G77.

In addition, the Global North is susceptible to some of the issues faced by the G77. For example, capacity issues are equally pertinent to European Union states, although these are mitigated by allowing the submission of written inputs. Global North states also sometimes delegate relatively young and inexperienced representatives to UN negotiations, who may lack influence to strike a deal and sell it to their missions and capitals. Finally, similar to “blunt deletions” by the G77, Global North states are occasionally known to propose language that is divisive for the G77 and, hence, will inevitably impede negotiations.

Reforms to Make the G77 Fit for Global Governance

Despite its deficits—and the criticism of the concept of the Global South itself—the G77 should not disband. In the context of an intensifying East-West conflict, an effective Global South platform may be necessary. Not all G77 members will have an interest in changes that introduce more structure and accountability. For a minority of influential members, particularly China, the group works quite well as it is. Nonetheless, for all the others, particularly the smaller members that stand to benefit from the UN’s egalitarian multilateral setup, reforms could enhance the voice of the Global South in the international system.

We suggest four areas for reform. First, the G77’s decision making should produce more balanced positions that reflect common Global South interests. The group could revive its 27-member subgroup to prepare positions for the plenary and establish a system for written inputs and full internal transparency. Second, the group could reduce its long list of positions and focus on annual strategic priorities on which it could concentrate its strategy and energy. This would also provide a framework for reviewing progress and drawing lessons.

Third, the G77 could benefit from expanding its engagement beyond the UN bubble. If the group aspires for real world change and not just diplomatic victories, then it could increase its global influence through more expertise and public discourse. Strengthening ties with civil society and think tanks, particularly from the Global South, would enhance its knowledge base and legitimacy simultaneously. Finally, the group, both collectively and as individual members, should invest in diplomatic capacity in line with its aspirations for global influence through the UN. Even modest increases in capacity could change the game, in particular for the smaller members of the G77.

Max-Otto Baumann is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Anna Novoselova is a researcher at IDOS.