The war in Sudan drew high-level attention during this year’s United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September, but these brief spotlights on the crisis have not changed its trajectory. Much of the country is still on the brink of famine, and more than 20,000 have been killed in the fighting. Over the past 17 months, Sudan has become one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history.

In this interview, Dallia Abdel Moniem, a Sudanese political analyst and commentator, describes the conditions civilians are facing in Sudan, including the rampant sexual violence committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). She also discusses the cost of inaction and the urgent need for greater support from the international community.

The interview was conducted by Bitania Tadesse, a policy specialist for Africa at the International Peace Institute. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

As leaders convened in New York for the Summit of the Future and the 79^th UN General Assembly, the violence in El Fasher escalated, endangering the lives of over a million people, including more than 500,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). If you had been here in New York, what key messages would you have delivered to the diplomatic community, specifically on the violence in El Fasher?

Civilians are the lowest priority to both sides, and civilian protection has not been on the agenda for anyone until recently. If El Fasher falls under the control of the RSF, then what happened in El Geneina will pale in comparison. The militia is hellbent on committing genocide, war crimes, and humanitarian violations on an unimaginable scale. We will never get the full picture of what they’ve done until much later. However, the pictures, reports, and fact-finding missions that are coming out show that the RSF is hellbent on wiping out communities and specific ethnic groups. More pressure needs to be applied to the backers of both the RSF and SAF to ensure that they can’t hold the civilians hostage.

There’s also no access to hospitals. I think the Zamzam refugee camp has only a single ambulance that was not destroyed by the RSF. El Fasher alone houses more than half a million IDPs, and aid is not coming through, even though the Adre border crossing has been an option now for a month or so. More than half of the Sudanese population is facing acute hunger.

Warring parties need to ensure safe passageway for aid convoys. Green zones should be discussed so that a plan can be formulated and implemented. But I am not sure who is willing to have this conversation, because that will require increased engagement and commitment from the international community. International organizations like to talk and release statements, but they rarely follow up. The UN has highlighted that $2.7 billion is required to fund the humanitarian response in Sudan, but only half of donations have been received.

“Everyone used to escape to Khartoum. Now, everyone is escaping from Khartoum.” This was your poignant description after the war broke out in April 2023. Seventeen months later, how would you describe the current situation in Khartoum and the implications of the city descending into violence?

I saw the news on September 26^th that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched attacks and made progress on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Khartoum. Even if Khartoum is to fall back into the control of the SAF, I think it will be a long time before it becomes habitable by us Sudanese. Khartoum was the hub of Sudan—not just because it was the capital, but also because it was a place where everyone could come and make a home.

Usually, wars happen on the periphery and then move into the capital. But in this case, it was the opposite. The war started in the capital and then spread to the rest of the country.

Do you foresee external actors showing support or any engagement that might change the dynamics in Khartoum?

It was good to see that the situation in Sudan took center stage at the UN General Assembly at a few key moments. President Biden mentioned Sudan in his opening speech, and there were many side meetings about the situation. This is good because the war in Sudan has long been ignored. Unfortunately, Sudanese actors have neither the will nor the desire to bring an end to this war. We have had to rely on external actors, whether the international community or regional states or bodies, and until recently, these efforts have been half-hearted.

At the same time, we’ve been down this road before where we get a lot of statements but little action. President Biden and United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Mohamed bin Zayed released a memorandum of understanding that referenced cooperation on bringing an end to the war in Sudan. I thought that was hilarious because the UAE is part of the war. If it were any other actor, the criticism would have been stronger. We’re now relying on individuals to raise the issue of the UAE’s involvement in Sudan.

The longer this war drags on regionally, the more negative impact it will have. It might become too late to do anything. We need to bring an end to this war, step up our efforts, and put in place substantive measures to address the humanitarian situation.

With reference to the recently released report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, one of the recommendations was to deploy an independent and impartial force with the mandate to protect civilians in Sudan. What is your view on this?

I’m not against it per se, but I wonder about the mechanics of such a mission in Sudan. If it goes through the Security Council, I could see two countries from the permanent five—Russia and China—voting against it. Until recently, even Russia was saying that the protection of civilians is an internal matter.

The only way to bypass this issue is to go through a regional body like the African Union (AU). The AU has an agreement with the UN where they can deploy independent forces for peacekeeping. But the AU does not have the political force to supersede the Sudanese army or Sovereign Council and impose troops to maintain peace or protect civilians. Thus, the only way to go about it is to get both sides to agree to safe zones that include hospitals, schools, and religious places where civilians can stay.

Do you think Sudanese communities would be open to the deployment of a peace operation based on previous experiences with UNAMID and UNITAMS?

Until UNAMID left Darfur, they were maintaining peace relatively well. We also have no other choice. If the deployment of a mission will guarantee the safety of the millions of Sudanese who are still inside Sudan, then we have to put aside our grievances and agree to it. The Sudanese resistance committees and emergency response rooms can only do so much because they are facing detainment, torture, and arrest. We need outside help that must come in a package that both the RSF and SAF would be okay with.

One of the recommendations we hear from various civil society organizations (CSOs) is that there needs to be a dedicated diplomatic track on the protection of civilians separate from the cease-fire talks. How can these diplomatic efforts be scaled up, and what challenges could we anticipate with having separate tracks?

It would be a good step to separate protection from the political track because it gives importance to the protection of civilians. A separate protection track may also work because it has nothing to do with politics; it is about helping the civilians in need. This worked in Geneva when the Sudanese authorities agreed to open the Adre crossing. Moreover, neither side wants to be perceived poorly. This could be used to the advantage of a specialized group tasked to work on establishing a protection track.

Protection for aid workers is critical. The local responders, don’t wear a vest with the UN colors or with the MSF logo—they also need protection. These people are doing a similar job to international humanitarian actors and they have better reach.

You mentioned that international agencies have better protection mechanisms than local responders. What are the protection needs of local responders, and how can they be better supported?

The local responders are the resistance committees who rose during the revolution and in the aftermath of the coup. Their main aim is to serve the community, whether through providing medical aid or guiding civilians out of Khartoum. One of the biggest problems they’re facing is lack of funding. Local responders get external funding, but the vast majority is from donations by the Sudanese diaspora, which is not enough.

Some international organizations have tried to provide support. The Norwegian Refugee Council has piloted a funding campaign that enables local responders to buy medicine, food, and other supplies. But these organizations have to go through the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) to get permits to carry out humanitarian work in the country. Additionally, many international organizations have bureaucratic protocols, like presenting receipts and invoices, that are not applicable to the current situation. We’re talking about people who have no running water or electricity and are barely surviving. Such organizations need to adapt and understand that this is a different situation.

Conflict-related sexual violence has been rampant in the ongoing conflict, as recognized by the fact-finding mission report. With the destruction of health facilities and services, how are women and girls getting the medical help and psychosocial support that they need?

There is nothing for them. The trauma that they’ve experienced makes it very difficult for them to even talk about it. There’s also a social stigma—we’re a conservative society, and the idea of rape is already taboo.

Further, the protocols that can help the victims through this trauma, like rape kits, morning-after pills, and hepatitis medication are unavailable. The warehouses where these resources were kept were looted by the RSF. There are volunteers who are trying to help, but they also need help because what they hear takes a toll on them, too.

We’re scratching the tip of the iceberg regarding how many cases of violations there really are. There have been many cases of men and boys also being subjected to rape and sexual violence at the hands of the RSF. This is more difficult to comprehend, because in a conservative society, it doesn’t even cross anyone’s mind that a man could have been raped by another man.

There is also an extra layer of complications because many women who are raped fall pregnant. Even though abortion due to rape is legal within Islamic law, there is no access to doctors or safe medical centers that can handle these procedures. These women are also confronted with health issues due to lack of food or medicine.

This issue is also underreported. We’ve been through this in Darfur in 2003, but it wasn’t properly dealt with even then. Now, it’s on a wider scale and no longer confined to one region in Sudan. Instances of sexual violence have been reported in essentially every area that the RSF has been present. The fallout of this will be much worse than anything else that has occurred during this war, and we will see it within a few years.

Rape has been used intentionally as a weapon by the RSF since the very beginning of the war. It is their way of exerting control and superiority. It is not a byproduct of the war—it is a product of their agenda and their methodology. This is entirely planned, and they have done this before in Darfur.

In a recent statement, the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide talked about the links between impunity from past violations and the continued vulnerability of civilians. How do you see this link between impunity and threats to civilians playing out in Sudan?

We’ve never had accountability in Sudan. If you look back at our history, we have never held anyone accountable for any of the atrocities that have occurred in my country. Due to this lack of accountability, we see these violations being repeated time and again in Sudan. For example, why were Omar al-Bashir and others not handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) right after the revolution? The ICC said that they would be tried, but we did not push for accountability. We can never move forward if we don’t have justice. My fear is that there will come a point in this war where both Hemedti and Burhan will be given immunity to ensure a cessation of the conflict. If this war ends, will there be a system in place where the perpetrators will be held accountable?

Many offices and mechanisms are in place both within the AU and UN, including special envoys on Sudan and envoys on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Do you have any messages for these specific actors?

They take their time, but time is not a luxury in Sudan. I understand there are many procedures, protocols, and bureaucratic impediments, but I’m hoping that after all the discussions at the UN General Assembly there will be a sense of urgency conveyed to these actors. There’s no sense of urgency, and that is worrying. More force needs to be applied to both sides and their backers. Every day there is a new crisis happening, which pushes Sudan further down the agenda. We are not a priority, but the fallout will be huge, impacting not just Sudan but the entire region.