After nearly a year and a half of civil war, millions of Sudanese civilians are facing starvation, displacement, and violence, including sexual violence. Considering the scale of the violence against civilians, a recent UN fact-finding mission called for an “independent and impartial force with a mandate to safeguard civilians be deployed without delay.” The UN secretary-general is expected to make recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan within the next month, as requested by the UN Security Council.

In this interview, Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, Executive Director of Fikra for Studies & Development, a Sudanese think tank, discusses the shortcomings in the international response to the situation in Sudan and options for the protection of civilians.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The level of suffering and atrocities being experienced by civilians in Sudan right now is staggering, but the protection of civilians has not been a major focus of the mediation efforts. What do you see as the shortcomings of the current mediation efforts when it comes to the protection of civilians?

I think the major shortcomings are related not only to the protection of civilians but also to the entire peace process in Sudan. This is because of the institutional impunity that is given to domestic and regional stakeholders such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for their breaches of international law, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1591, which banned the transfer of weapons to Darfur. Both of these actors have been allowing crimes against civilians to take place without any sort of political accountability.

Look at the recent US-mediated efforts in Switzerland that took place in the middle of August. The RSF delegation was discussing codes of conduct and protection of civilian and humanitarian commitments while in those same ten days their troops were killing more than 650 civilians in different areas in Sudan, bombarding three main hospitals, and bombarding Zamzam camp in North Darfur, which hosts more than 700,000 people, destroying medical and food aid in the main humanitarian warehouse near the camp. This did not trigger any reaction from the mediators. At the same time, the UAE has the guts to organize a World Food Security Summit while continuing to supply the RSF with weapons and logistical support.

While the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have their share of the blame, the flow of people fleeing from RSF-controlled areas to SAF-controlled areas should be indicative of who is committing most of the atrocities. The RSF has been documented several times, including by many international organizations, to be implementing a siege on the Sudanese people in areas like Gezira, Darfur, and Khartoum Bahri, where we see a death rate reaching up to 100 people per day because of starvation and disease.

I will give you another example from the beginning of the war. In May 2023, the US embassy received a confidential memo about sexual violence perpetrated by the RSF. In response, then-US Ambassador John Godfrey put out a tweet referring to the sexual violence committed by “armed actors.” It’s not warring factions committing these atrocities; it’s uniquely the RSF. Covering this up allows the RSF to continue committing more atrocities and putting civilians at more risk.

We have been talking about El Fasher since last May, and we are looking at a looming genocide. This is backed up by facts on the ground and the history and the attitude of the RSF when they controlled other areas. Still, we see Joe Biden receiving UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and talking about the joint mediation effort in Sudan. But talking about concern is not enough—Zayed needs to stop sending American weapons to the RSF. The most dangerous matter in all of this is the narrative that the RSF and its supporters are normal political actors and the institutional impunity that is given to them.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution in June asking the secretary-general to propose new measures for protecting civilians in Sudan. One of the suggestions that you and others have made is the establishment of green zones for protecting civilians in active fighting areas. What do you think those green zones could look like in practice?

The resolution was passed in June, so it has been three months of waiting for the secretary-general to conduct consultations with stakeholders to present options for protection of civilians after almost a year and a half of the war. It tells you about the lack of urgency within the international community about the situation in Sudan.

Green zones are currently the most feasible, practical option. The whole idea is if you can’t do it all, that’s not an excuse to do nothing. We need to start somewhere. If we cannot protect all civilians, let’s demarcate zones that can allow a sort of safe haven for some. These zones should be demarcated in a way that allows physical protection, eases the flow of humanitarian assistance, and offers some economic added value. For example, some areas in Gezira state might be able to resume agricultural activity if protected from RSF attacks and SAF bombardment.

These green zones should also include housing because there are almost 10.7 million Sudanese who are displaced from their homes, in addition to another 2.8 million outside Sudan. We should also consider the capacity of available infrastructure in the green zones for the provision of basic services, including communications. The lack of communications resulting from the blackout allows more violations to be committed as they are more difficult to report. Communications should be allowed to be maintained in the green zones.

For example, a green zone could be demarcated in El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state. El-Obeid has a relatively large airport that can receive big planes. A five-kilometer-diameter perimeter around this airport can include the city market, almost 100,000 houses and residential units accommodating up to 500,000 people, and access to the region and the rest of the country. However, these green zones need to be supported with an international civilian mission that should have a strong policing component to ensure law and order and support to social services.

What level of openness are you seeing right now from SAF or the RSF to the deployment of a civilian mission like this?

If the world shows it is serious about a civilian mission, then I think that SAF would welcome it. A mission would help them in their basic duty—the protection of civilians—as they seek to legitimize themselves. In the end, you cannot commission such a mission without consent from the de facto government. Discussions that ignore this reality are problematic because they make us lose focus on the objective.

I think the bigger problem is with the RSF. They are a fascist militia that will never commit to anything. They are recruiting, looting, killing, raping, and more. At the same time, a joint monitoring mechanism for the safety and protection of green zones would allow some major accountability to see whether the RSF is controlling its troops on the ground or not.

Could you talk about how a joint monitoring mechanism might work?

The joint monitoring mechanism is not a new idea. It has worked before in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur in 2004. The whole idea is that this joint monitoring mechanism can be supported from the sky by a satellite monitoring system and from the ground by a community-based early-warning system that can jointly report an attack against a green zone. The international civilian mission can then request the responsible party to withdraw their troops or, as a last resort, even commission a defensive military to push back on the attack. We can then scale up the monitoring mechanism toward a more comprehensive option. We need to leverage this approach, because I think a lot of UN Security Council members may have reservations about sending boots on the ground right now.

We also need to establish another joint monitoring mechanism between the Sudanese authorities and international human rights organizations to monitor, report, and verify human rights violations in government-controlled areas. This will allow the early and swift resolution of, or due process for, these violations.

You’ve said that we need to redefine protection. Can you explain what you mean by that?

We should talk beyond physical protection, because physical protection through military means will only add a third military actor to the equation. There would inevitably be a clash between these military forces, and there will be accusations of bias.

This is why it is important to have a mission that focuses on more than just the physical protection of civilians. A potential mission’s political objective needs to be defined as allowing civilians to lead somewhat normal lives in these green zones. It needs to keep in mind well-being, dignity, and social safety. Many classic peacekeeping missions have failed because they did not have this expanded definition of the protection of civilians. This modality needs to change, and we need to think creatively about the meaning of the responsibility to protect.

In the absence of international support, the Sudanese have been creating their own mechanisms for protection at the local level. What are some of the ways people are trying to protect themselves, and how can these existing local mechanisms be supported?

Many of the local initiatives, including emergency response rooms, communal kitchens, and initiatives by religious leaders, have been innovative in trying to cover the humanitarian needs of their communities. But they cannot continue doing it alone. They are doing this because no one else is doing it—bravely showing resilience and heroism and putting themselves at risk to serve their community.

Now the world needs to step forward and start helping them. The world has talked enough about the protection of civilians. The secretary-general has been doing consultations for the protection of civilians for the last three months. Those people have forgotten what their mandate is, and they are using the bravery of the local actors as a coverup for their failure to do their job.

We also cannot wait for a cease-fire to engage in the protection of civilians. A cease-fire is one means to achieve protection of civilians, but it’s not a required condition for it. You cannot ask the civilians to suffer while we are waiting for a cease-fire.

Is there anything else you want to add?

Dialogue on the protection of civilians is unfortunately usually made by international and regional actors. There is a need for Sudanese ownership. Sudanese stakeholders need to take the lead on these discussions to reflect the reality of what is realistic and doable on the ground. Allowing it only to be a foreign-driven discussion allows some actors to utilize it to serve their interests, which may not be in line with the Sudanese people’s interests.