Nearly eighteen months after the outbreak of fighting, the humanitarian situation in Sudan has become dire, with nearly 25 million people in need of assistance. While United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) efforts have focused primarily on attempts to achieve a ceasefire, calls to address the immediate security concerns of civilians are increasing.

In its first report on September 6, 2024, a UN independent fact-finding mission to Sudan cited grave human rights violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. In response, the report called for the immediate deployment of an independent and impartial force to protect civilians. Yet is the deployment of a peacekeeping presence to protect civilians in Sudan feasible or even advisable?

Targeted protection: green zones

It’s important to state that (almost) no one is suggesting the deployment of a full-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Rather, some—including the UN’s independent fact-finding mission—are calling for a more limited deployment of security forces to focus specifically on the protection of civilians.

For many years, the UN and AU had a hybrid peacekeeping presence in Darfur (UNAMID), which was followed by a UN-led political mission (UNITAMS). However, since the sudden exit of UNITAMS in February 2024, there is no longer any regional or international presence in Sudan responsible for the protection of civilians. While community-led efforts have been critical in facilitating self-protection, civilians continue to be targeted at an alarming rate, and additional resources are needed. Given this, and since efforts to achieve a ceasefire have so far been unsuccessful, there is an imperative to provide more robust, immediate protection assistance.

Providing widespread protection across Sudan is likely unfeasible given the size of the country and the intensity of the ongoing fighting. However, it may be possible to provide more targeted protection. This could include the creation of so-called “green zones” to protect areas where internally displaced people (IDPs) are sheltering and to facilitate humanitarian aid, which is critical given the heightened risk of famine. A mission could also monitor and report on rights violations and support local self-protection efforts.

Sudanese authorities were quick to reject the recommendations of the fact-finding mission, which also included an expansion of the current arms embargo and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) beyond Darfur to the rest of Sudan, as well as the establishment of a separate international judicial mechanism to work in complement to the ICC. However, a deadly shelling just two days later in a crowded market in Sudan, which killed at least 21 individuals and injured more than 70 others, reinforced the imperative of immediate action.

What stands in the way?

While the gravity of the situation in Sudan is clear, there are barriers to deploying a protection or broader peacekeeping mission.

First, it’s not clear who would lead the mission. Less than a year ago, the Sudanese authorities kicked out the UN-led political mission, citing the mission’s ineffectiveness in achieving its objectives, including support to the political process and the protection of civilians. Most stakeholders are pessimistic over the prospects of achieving the consent of the parties to deploy another UN-led mission, which is a precondition for a UN peace operation.

Some have questioned whether the consent of the Sudanese authorities is required, given their de facto status. However, the UN has learned difficult lessons from deployments where consent is lacking (including, recently, in Mali). Thus, the Council is unlikely to approve a mission that would be actively resisted by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and could lead to additional attacks on civilians and peacekeepers.

This puts the ball in the AU’s court. The AU is also actively involved in trying to support the political process. While it’s not clear that the SAF and RSF would consent to an AU-led presence,  the AU has historically held a higher level of political legitimacy among Sudanese authorities than the UN. This was the impetus for creating a hybrid (rather than UN-led) mission in Darfur and was exemplified again with the unceremonious termination of UNITAMS.

Thus, some have suggested that Sudan could be an appropriate test case for Security Council Resolution 2719. This resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the Council in December 2023, allows AU-led peace support operations to access UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. While the resolution is primarily understood as providing support for peace enforcement (as opposed to peacekeeping), some Council members are reportedly open to the prospect of using it to support other types of intervention in Sudan, including for protection.

However, even if the Security Council could come to an agreement to deploy a UN- or AU-led protection mission to Sudan—a tall order given current Council divisions—this raises a broader question about the viability of deploying a mission that lacks a political role.

The UN has been clear that peacekeeping is to be driven by the “primacy of politics.” This means that peacekeeping missions should be deployed to support an ongoing political process and that their work should be guided by a political strategy. Deploying a protection mission without a political mandate would be a clear deviation from this principle. Lessons from previous missions should also give pause to the idea of deploying a purely protection mission. In Chad, for example, a UN mission (MINURCAT) was deployed to protect civilians from violence spilling across the border from neighboring Sudan. Because MINURCAT did not have a political mandate, it lacked leverage with the Chadian authorities, undercutting its ability to fulfill its mandate, and it was eventually kicked out by the government.

What next?

The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council have both asked their respective secretariats to prepare recommendations on the protection of civilians in Sudan. However, policymakers find themselves in the tight position of needing to do something but having few good options. While there are no easy answers, the following are some points to bear in mind.

First, the UN and AU should consider options for deploying a physical protection force to Sudan. As noted above, this would probably be targeted to specific geographic areas to maintain safe areas for displaced people and protect routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, policymakers will have to carefully consider how to ensure any such presence remains connected with political efforts to ensure that they have the leverage needed to maintain access to and put pressure on the perpetrators.

Second, and relatedly, those involved in the political process need to integrate protection into their mediation efforts. The lead-up to negotiations can be a crucial time for mediators to focus on protection, as the warring parties may ratchet up violence to improve their bargaining positions. Mediators can also push to ensure that agreements include specific language on protection—including protection from sexual and gender-based violence—which can later be used to hold the parties accountable for their behavior.

Third, at the international level, member states must put diplomatic pressure not only on the SAF and RSF but also, importantly, on third-party states that are supporting the warring groups. In particular, the United Arab Emirates has been widely implicated in providing weapons to the RSF, though it denies these allegations. Other countries in the region and beyond also have a stake in the outcome of Sudan’s civil war given the amount of oil and other resources in the country. The amount of money tied up in the conflict is a major barrier to peace. However, unless external powers use their diplomatic pressure to stop efforts to arm both sides, it is unlikely to stop.

Finally, in the immediate term, greater assistance should be given to community-led efforts for self-protection. This includes support to end the communications blackout, which has severely impeded civilians’ abilities to protect themselves. Increasing cash transfers as part of humanitarian aid is also critical to help individuals buy food and other life-saving supplies.

To this end, all efforts should be made to integrate local perspectives into ongoing planning for protection. Some Sudanese stakeholders have critiqued the UN for not sufficiently consulting those who are currently on the ground in Sudan, and whose views may differ or present greater nuance than members of the Sudanese diaspora.^[1]  Thus, despite the difficulties of accessing some communities amid the ongoing fighting, the UN and AU must heed the imperative of gathering and centering the perspectives of those affected.

^{[1] As conveyed during an IPI closed-door session on August 13, 2024.}

Jenna Russo is Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.