A UN Peacekeeping Blacklist?

Following the latest in a series of sexual abuse allegations against members of the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH)–by UN police this time–the United Nations indicated this week that it may set up a sexual abuse blacklist of countries whose peacekeepers would be banned from UN missions. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping said that countries with a record of abuse “have to suffer the consequences,” and the record will be “taken into account for future peacekeeping missions if they don’t assume their responsibilities.”

While strong condemnation is to be expected from the local and international media, this is unusually tough talk from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which reports to member states through the UN Secretary-General but also relies on those same member states to find troops and police to sufficiently staff its peacekeeping missions.

Key Conclusions

In a way, a peacekeepers blacklist is not without precedent. There have been cases when the host government of a UN peace operation on its territory has successfully opposed the participation of certain contingents in that mission.

But blacklisting carries some risks. Blacklisting countries based on sexual abuse allegations puts the blame on entire contingents and countries, even though abuses are often due to the actions of a few bad soldiers or police, or just one unit. And it is clear that more attention is given to misconduct through sexual abuse than any other type of misconduct. A blacklist would also risk alienating countries that currently contribute to the UN or might consider doing so in the future.

If the UN’s zero-tolerance policy has achieved as much as it can, perhaps the answer isn’t more shame heaped on the countries, but more praise for countries that excel in their duties. Traditionally, “whitelists” (ones that recognize compliance with standards, rather than non-compliance) have been more effective in creating incentives and changing behavior than blacklists. If the UN, or even an outside research institution, had a mechanism for highlighting and therefore rewarding standout behavior by specific countries, it may influence the equation more than increased condemnation would.

Analysis

Despite the tough “zero tolerance” language used by the UN for years, and the implementation of some of the recommendations from the 2005 Zeid Report, the UN cannot seem to prevent sexual abuses committed by its peacekeepers, uniformed and civilian personnel, around the world. Although statistics on sexual abuse allegations are not made public by the UN, some accounts report that in 2011, MINUSTAH alone repatriated about twenty uniformed personnel and dismissed another five civilians (an earlier GO post discussed Uruguay’s problems this past Fall).

The UN can send home any personnel it deems to have disobeyed its policies on conduct and discipline, as well as bar them from ever serving again. In a few instances, it has even repatriated commanding officers or contingents (over 100 Sri Lankan peacekeepers were sent home from MINUSTAH at the end of 2007, following the result of an investigation on sexual abuse of minors). However, because members of military contingents are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective country, it is up to the member states to follow-up and prosecute the repatriated offender once they return home.

In a way, a peacekeepers blacklist is not without precedent. There have been cases when the government hosting a UN peace operation on its territory has successfully opposed the participation of certain contingents in that mission. This can be related to past records of abuse or other misconduct, or simply the perception that certain contingents would not be accepted by the local population, due to their country of origin, religion, etc. Allegations of misconduct involving peacekeeping personnel have been tracked since 2006, and in July 2008, the UN Department of Field Support launched a global database and tracking system (the Misconduct Tracking System), which remains confidential. Yet a blacklist has never been created by the UN itself.

While there may be some deterrent value in public shaming, it also carries some risks. First, a blacklist based on sexual abuse allegations puts the blame on entire contingents and countries, even though abuses are often due to the actions of a few bad soldiers or police, or just one unit. As regrettable as it is, there are bad apples in every military in the world. DPKO would need to investigate how a country trains and disciplines its soldiers and find the source of the problem if they want to distinguish a case of a few bad apples from an entire rotten tree.

It is also clear that a lot more attention is given to misconduct through sexual abuse than any other type of misconduct. This is generally what garners the most media attention, though it could be argued that other types of poor performance by individual contingents in peacekeeping cause even greater harm to the local population than a case of sexual abuse. Rarely is the spotlight put on soldiers or contingents that refuse orders during a crisis or are otherwise derelict in their duty to protect civilians within their mandate. Such negligence may go unnoticed by the outside world, but tends to do tremendous damage to the peacekeepers’ credibility in the eyes of the local population. Highlighting some abuses at the expense of others does little service to the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping.

Of course, a blacklist would also risk alienating countries that currently contribute to the UN or might consider doing so in the future. The demand for peacekeepers is still very high, with a deployment of nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel in UN missions at present. At the same time, the financial incentives for countries to provide peacekeepers to the UN have become less enticing. The possibility of being added to a sex abuse blacklist would almost certainly weigh on a country’s decision to participate in UN peacekeeping, and possibly make it harder for DPKO to generate sufficient forces to conduct important peacekeeping tasks.

If the UN’s zero tolerance policy has achieved as much as it can, perhaps the answer isn’t more shame heaped on the troop-contributing countries (TCCs), but more praise for countries that excel in their duties. Traditionally, “whitelists” (ones that recognize compliance with standards, rather than non-compliance) have been more effective in creating incentives and changing behavior than blacklists. If the UN, or even an outside research institution, had a mechanism for highlighting and therefore rewarding standout behavior by specific countries, it may influence the equation more than increased condemnation would.

At present, rankings of TCCs and police-contributing countries (PCCs) focus solely on how many troops and police they contribute, providing little incentive for countries to improve the quality of their contributions. What if TCCs were judged instead on their overall performance in relation to their mandate, as well as the other enabling capacities they bring to the table? Perhaps giving countries the appropriate acclaim and recognition according to their contribution to international peace and security would also be a motivating tool to improve the performance of UN peace operations.

Arthur Boutellis and Adam Smith are Research Fellows at the International Peace Institute.